Dial-In Testimony by Friedman, Richard D. & McCormack, Bridget
DIAL-IN TESTIMONY
RICHARD D. FRIEDMANt & BRIDGET MCCORMACKtt
For several hundred years, one of the great glories of the common
law system of criminal justice has been the requirement that prosecu-
tion witnesses give their testimony in the presence of the accused-
"face to face," in the time-honored phrase-under oath, subject to
cross-examination, and, unless unfeasible, in open court. In the
United States, this principle is enshrined in the Confrontation Clause
of the Sixth Amendment, which provides that "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted
with the witnesses against him."1 But now a new way is developing for
witnesses for the prosecution to testify: Call 911.
As we will show, it is now common practice for some prosecutors
to prove a crime by offering the recording of a 911 call-that is, a
telephone conversation between the alleged victim of the crime or
another witness to it and an agent of an emergency assistance service.
Similarly, prosecutors often offer evidence of statements made by the
caller to a police officer who responded to the call. In this Article, we
will describe and explain prosecutors' use and courts' tolerance of this
practice. We will then use this phenomenon to explore at a broader
level both what we believe are the defects in the Supreme Court's cur-
rent approach to the confrontation right, as exemplified most recently
2in its decision in Lilly v. Virginia, and the possibility of re-
conceptualizing the right in a way that would restore it to its proper
place.
Part I of this Article describes the developing practice by which
statements made in 911 calls or in follow-up conversations are often
admitted at trial to prove the truth of the caller's narration of a crime
allegedly committed against him or her. The statements are some-
times admitted for this purpose, we will show, even if the caller does
not testify at trial and the prosecution has failed to account for his or
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her absence-and even if the caller does testify but gives an account
fundamentally inconsistent with his or her earlier one.
Part II describes one source of the new practice. Changes in the
way that domestic violence is treated by the criminal justice system
make a serious official response to 911 calls highly likely. There is a
developing public awareness that calls to 911 reporting an alleged
crime are in effect reports to law enforcement authorities. Further-
more, prosecutors are more disposed than in earlier times to pursue
charges even without the cooperation of the alleged victim. This de-
velopment is in part attributable to increased judicial receptivity to the
victim's out-of-court statements, but it also enhances the evidentiary
value of those statements. Our discussion in Parts I and II will present
information from around the nation, and will also draw on the expe-
rience of one of us (McCormack) in domestic violence cases in
Washtenaw County, Michigan.
We will then turn to doctrine. Part III discusses the early history
of the confrontation right. It shows that the right emerges out of the
basic concept, central to the common law system among others, that
testimony must be given under prescribed conditions, among which
are that it must be under oath and in the presence of the accused.
What is now known as the excited utterance exception to the rule
against hearsay at first developed in adherence to this principle, but
then departed from it; that exception now provides the principal doc-
trinal basis for exempting from the rule against hearsay statements
made in 911 calls or to officers responding to those calls. Further-
more, under the current jurisprudence of the United States Supreme
Court, if a statement satisfies the hearsay rule, then the Confrontation
Clause is unlikely to create any obstacle to admission.
Part IV then discusses theoretical implications. We will argue that
the doctrine admitting these statements fails on its own terms, for
these statements are not particularly reliable. More basically, we will
argue that current confrontation doctrine, geared to improving the
reliability of evidence, is fundamentally misconceived and fails to re-
flect the basic values underlying the Confrontation Clause. We be-
lieve that a better source of guidance lies in Justice Breyer's concur-
ring opinion in Lilly-not surprising, perhaps, because that opinion
drew heavily on an amicus brief coauthored by the other one of us
(Friedman). The confrontation right, we will argue, should apply
only to a limited category of out-of-court statements, but as to those it
should be deemed categorical, not subject to balancing or ringed with
exceptions. We will examine three different categorical approaches.
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We conclude that the values and history underlying the Confrontation
Clause are best reflected by a theory that focuses on whether the out-
of-court statement, if admitted at trial, would amount to the func-
tional equivalent of testimony. This approach, unlike the others,
leads to the proper treatment of 911 calls.
I. THE PHENOMENON: THE DIAL-IN TRIAL
In this Part we will describe the phenomenon at the heart of this
Article, the developing practice in which statements made in 911 calls
or in follow-up conversations with police officers are often admitted at
trial to prove the truth of the caller's narration of a crime allegedly
committed against him or her. We will show that these statements are
sometimes admitted even if the caller does not testify at trial and the
prosecution has failed to account for his or her absence. Similarly,
they are sometimes admitted if the caller does testify but, even without
surprising the prosecution, gives an account fundamentally inconsis-
tent with his or her earlier one.
In 1995, the State of Ohio successfully prosecuted one Jerry Lee
for domestic violence! As noted by the trial court, "The only evidence
offered by the state at trial was a tape recording of the victim's tele-
phone call to 911 and the testimony of one of the two police officers
",4
responding to the scene. In the tape recording, the victim, Lee's
wife Kathy, says that her husband stabbed her door, hit her, and tried
to throw her out the door.' When police officers arrived at the scene,
two minutes after receiving a dispatch, the couple's eighteen-year-old
son told them, "I think my father is killing my mother., 6 Within five
more minutes, Kathy made additional statements to one of the offi-
cers, including one that Jerry had tried to stab her. The trial court
admitted all these statements, along with one of the officer's descrip-
tion of evidence he found at the scene-slits in the door and slashes
in the bedroom mattress-indicative of a physical struggle.8
Neither Kathy Lee nor the son testified, and the State made no at-
tempt to account for their absence. The court was not troubled by
3 State v. Lee, 657 N.E.2d 604 (Hamilton County, Ohio, Mun. Ct. 1995).
4 Id. at 607 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 607 n.2. Jerry Lee's angry voice is heard on the tape, saying that he no
longer had a knife but that he had had one. Id.
6 Id. at 607 n.3.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 607.
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this. "[P]roceed[ing] to trial without the presence of the alleged vic-
tim" in domestic violence cases was not only "[i]n keeping with the
new policy of the Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney" but consis-
tent with the practice "[i]n many jurisdictions across the country.'
The court pointed out that "[n] o rule of law requires that a battered
partner testify against a once loved one for the state to proceed on a
charge of domestic violence."'0
That is true, of course. The fact that the prosecution need not
present the victim's testimony is demonstrated most vividly by murder
cases, in which, by definition, the victim does not testify at trial." But
in a case like Lee, though the prosecution does not present the victim
as a live witness, it does present her allegations as to what occurred.
And the court found this approach perfectly acceptable. "Some-
times," the court said, "all that is necessary is the testimony of a re-
sponding officer and a transcript of the 911 tape." And in the
court's view, Jerry Lee's was such a case. The court had little difficulty
in determining that each of the offered statements fit within the hear-
say exception for excited utterances. Therefore, in light of recent Su-
preme Court doctrine (which we discuss in Part III), the defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to "be confronted with the witnesses against
him" did not pose a problem."l In effect, the police officer was the
complaining witness, and Lee's opportunity to cross-examine him sat-
isfied his confrontation right.14 And this was true without any need to
inquire into whether Kathy or her son were-unlike a murder vic-
tim-available to testify in court; availability, the court said, was "not
an issue.'
5
In short, the Lee court regarded this as "a textbook case of prose-
cuting the crime of domestic violence without the presence of the vic-
tim at trial.""' And the court surely was right in that respect. Jerry
Lee's case is not an anomaly, but rather representative of what has be-




12 Id. (footnotes omitted).
13 Id. at 608 n.5. In some states, however, the confrontation clause of the state
constitution might pose an obstacle to admission. Infra note 227.
14 657 N.E.2d at 608 n.5.
15 Id. at 608 n.8.
16 Id. at 607. There is, in fact, an Ohio "textbook" for prosecuting domestic vio-
lence cases without the complainant. RONALD B. ADRINE & ALEXANDRA M. RUDEN,
OHIO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAw (1999).
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prosecutors are proving their cases by using statements taken by 911
operators and police officers responding to crime scenes instead of
the witnesses themselves. There is no limit to the type of crime for
which prosecutors use such evidence-they have used it to prove cases
of arson, felon in possession of a firearm, and murder 7 -but they
have found it to be a particularly valuable tool in domestic violence
cases.
Prosecutors are proving cases in this way because it pays off.
Though some defendants tried on the basis of this type of evidence
have been acquitted,18 prosecutors have won many convictions, and
when those convictions have been appealed they have almost always
been upheld.'
In some cases, prosecutors use this type of evidence in addition to
the live testimony of the caller, essentially to bolster or corroborate
that testimony. More problematic, in some cases prosecutors use the
17 See, e.g., United States v.Joy, 192 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 1999) (felon in possession of
firearm); United States v. Bradley, 145 F.3d 889 (7th Cir. 1998) (felon in possession of
firearm and ammunition); State v. Kester, No. 0001017369, 2001 Del. Super. LEXIS
288 (Del. Super. Ct. July 31, 2001) (criminally negligent homicide); State v. Martin,
562 So. 2d 468 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (murder); Garrett v. State, No. 04-97-00411-CR,
1999 WL 542577 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999) (murder); State v. Ballos, 602 N.W.2d 117 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1999) (arson).
Prosecutors report roughly the same conviction rate in domestic violence cases
tried with the complainant as in those tried without her. Infra note 75. Some cases of
acquittals have been reported in the press. For example, Warren Moon, the Minnesota
Vikings quarterback, was accused of assaulting his wife in 1995. Bruce Nichols, Moon
Cleared of Assaulting Wife Last Year, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 23, 1996, at IA. The
State of Texas proceeded with his prosecution over his wife's objections and subpoe-
naed her to testify. Id. She exculpated her husband in her testimony, but the prosecu-
tion asked the jury to find him guilty based on the other evidence in the case, includ-
ing a 911 call placed by their son and Mrs. Moon's statements to the police who
responded to that call. Id. Moon was acquitted, id.; the prosecution may have had
more luck had it gone forward without Mrs. Moon's testimony.
19 Most domestic violence cases are tried as misdemeanor cases. Misdemeanor
convictions are rarely appealed, and when appealed rarely reported. But as summa-
rized below there are already a substantial number of reported cases in which prosecu-
tors have won convictions based on statements to 911 operators and responding offi-
cers.
20 See, e.g., State v. McLaughlin, 642 A.2d 173, 174-75 (Me. 1994) (upholding con-
viction based on testimony of complainant and responding officers); State v. McGuire,
No. C3-96-2310, 1997 Minn. App. LEXIS 896, at *2-3 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 1997)
(relying on testimony of the responding officer as well as testimony of the complain-
ant); State v. Hernandez, 987 P.2d 1156, 1158-59 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999) (upholding
conviction based on testimony of complainant and responding officers); People v.
Simpson, 656 N.Y.S.2d 765, 767-68 (App. Div. 1997) (affirming conviction based on
testimony of complainant and a 911 tape recording of complainant's statements); State
v. Issa, No. C-970270, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 686, at *8-10 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 27,
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evidence because, though the caller testifies at trial, she does so in a
way that is unhelpful to the prosecution. It "has become lamentably
common in cases of domestic violence" that the complainant's testi-
mony at trial is directly contrary to the statements she earlier made on
a 911 call and to a responding officer." In such cases prosecutors
have often been allowed to introduce those prior inconsistent state-
ments-even without the need to prove that the prosecutor was sur-
prised by the trial testimony-and have secured convictions.'2
1998) (holding admissible testimony of responding officers as well as a 911 tape).
21 Williams v. State, 714 So. 2d 462, 463 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
22 See Gutierrez v. Municipality of Anchorage, No. A-6947, 1999 Alas. App. LEXIS
35, at *4-9 (Alaska Ct. App. June 2, 1999) (permitting prosecutor, expecting complain-
ant to recant, to introduce a 911 tape of witness under the excited utterance excep-
tion); State v. Borrelli, 629 A.2d 1105, 1108-09 (Conn. 1993) (admitting complainant's
statements to police to impeach the witness who recanted her testimony, first at the
hearing on motion to dismiss and then at trial); Williams, 714 So. 2d at 463-66 (admit-
ting statements made by the complainant to responding officers as well as a tape re-
corded 911 call where the witness had changed her initial description of events to the
police); Impson v. State, 721 N.E.2d 1275, 1280-83 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that
the prosecutor's impeachment of the complainant with her past inconsistent state-
ments to the responding officers was admissible as an excited utterance); State v. John-
son, No. C9-99-446, 1999 Minn. App. LEXIS 1316, at *9-12 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 14,
1999) (allowing testimony of responding officer, under excited utterance doctrine,
where complainant changed her testimony at trial); State v. Sloat, No. 1999CA00057,
2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 387, at *7-8 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2000) (holding that a
prosecutor need not be surprised by his witness' own testimony to invoke the excited
utterance exception); State v. Smith, No. 98CA01003, 1998 Ohio. App. LEXIS 6454, at
*2-6 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 22, 1998) (permitting the testimony of the responding offi-
cer, under the excited utterance doctrine, where the complainant has recanted at least
part of her original account); State v. Mineo, No. 24993-6-II, 2001 Wash. App. LEXIS
59, at *7-15 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 2001) (deeming harmless the allowance of re-
sponding officers' testimony despite inconsistent testimony by the complainant at
trial); Jennifer Liebrum, Jury Convicts Husband of Assault: Wife Testifies That He Didn't
Hit Her, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 26, 1996, at A32 (reporting a case in which the prose-
cutor used complainant's statements to the responding police officer and the 911 tape
of her daughter calling to report the incident to gain a conviction even though the
witness testified that her husband did not hit her); Bill Miller, Officials Persist in Domestic
Violence Case; D.C. Officer Is Convicted Despite Victim's Recanting, WASH. POST, Apr. 11,
1996, at B1 (reporting a case in which complainant alleged in a 911 call that her fi-
anc6, a police officer, had beaten her, but recanted before trial and repeated recanta-
tion in testimony, yet prosecution used earlier statement to gain a conviction).
In one case tried for the defense by law students under Professor McCormack's
supervision, the complainant testified that she lied to the 911 operator, and to the po-
lice officers who responded to her call, to get her husband, the defendant, out of the
house. The complainant was an imperfect witness in more ways than this. She was fac-
ing her own domestic violence charges and admitted to having been very high when
she called 911. The jury convicted the defendant, though the court later set aside the
conviction and dismissed the complaint for unrelated reasons. Personal trial notes
from Case Nos. 99-0190 & 01-0445, 14B Dist. Ct., Washtenaw County, Mich. (Sept. 2000
& Dec. 3, 2001) (on file with authors).
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Increasingly, though, prosecutors are finding that there is no
need to put the 911 caller on the witness stand at all in order to use
her prior statements. In some cases, they have used the statements
because, for one reason or another, the 911 caller is unavailable to
testify at trial.
23
Most strikingly, prosecutors are now often using the prior state-
ments even though the caller may be available to testify at trial but
does not do so. In such cases, the courts tend not to ask the prosecu-
24
tors to account for the absence of the witness. Thus, the prosecutor
23 See People v. Hernandez, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 747, 749-52 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (us-
ing testimony of police officer where complainant was unavailable as a witness); Kwon
v. State, 517 S.E.2d 83, 84 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (introducing the testimony of the re-
sponding officers when complainant invoked spousal privilege to avoid testifying); Sor-
row v. State, 505 S.E.2d 842, 843 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (allowing introduction of the
complainant's hearsay statement even though she refused to testify); People v. Hen-
drickson, 586 N.W.2d 906, 910 (Mich. 1998) (allowing prosecution to rely on com-
plainant's 911 call and statement to police in order to prove its case even though com-
plainant recanted after the defendant was arrested and indicated that she would
invoke Fifth Amendment privilege); State v. Edwards, 31 S.W.3d 73, 76-77 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2000) (using a 911 tape to prove a case where complainant invokes her Fifth
amendment privilege); State v. Archuleta, 955 S.W.2d 12, 14 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (ob-
taining a conviction based on the testimony of the responding officer when the com-
plainant claimed that she could not remember anything about the night in question
other than the police officer showing up at her door); State v. Cornell, 717 N.E.2d 361,
366 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the trial court did not abuse discretion in ad-
mitting testimony of statements to police officers made by complainant who was un-
available at trial); State v. Krakue, 726 A.2d 458, 460 (R.I. 1999) (presenting testimony
of responding officer where complainant absented herself from the state); Tejeda v.
State, 905 S.W.2d 313, 315 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (circumventing spousal privilege by
introducing testimony of responding officer). In Cornell, the complainant was appar-
ently unavailable to testify because she would have asserted her Fifth Amendment
privilege against incrimination. 717 N.E.2d at 367-68. The State conceded "that its
case rested entirely upon the admissibility of [hearsay] testimony," id. at 365, specifi-
cally, her statements to the police officer who responded to the scene. Cornell's con-
viction was reversed, not because the court had erred in admitting the hearsay, but be-
cause it refused to permit Cornell to raise before the jury the complainant's previous
conviction for falsely reporting a crime to 911. Id. at 367-68.
24 See, e.g., Dawson v. Commonwealth, 867 S.W.2d 493, 494 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993)
(noting that complainant "declined to testify"); Commonwealth v. Brown, 705 N.E.2d
631, 633 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999) (holding admissible 911 calls by six neighbors); State v.
Harris, No. 5-99-14, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 4585, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 30, 1999)
(allowing officer's testimony regarding complainant's statements when her where-
abouts were unknown to the authorities at the time of trial). Many cases provide no
reason for the failure of the complainant to testify. Humphrey v. State, No. A 6543,
1999 WL 46541, at *1 (Alaska Ct. App. Feb. 3, 1999); Matthews v. State, No. CACR 98-
1232, 1999 WL 286626, at *4 (Ark. Ct. App. May 5, 1999); State v. O'Connor, No. Cl-
98-575, 1998 Minn. App. LEXIS 1268, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 24, 1998); State v.
Payne, No. 76539, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3274, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. July 20, 2000);
State v. Jorden, 730 N.E.2d 447, 451 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999); Salt Lake City v. Alires, 9
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is free to present the secondary evidence rather than the live testi-
mony of the caller-because the caller would be an unhelpful witness
or would be subjected to a difficult cross-examination, because she
finds it distasteful to testify, or for any other reason.
Although occasionally other doctrines come into play," the so-
called "excited utterance" or "spontaneous declaration" exception to
the hearsay rule provides the principal basis on which courts allow this
type of evidence to bypass the obstacles of the rule against hearsay and
the defendant's confrontation right. This exception is based on the
idea that if the declarant is speaking while still under the stress of ex-
P.3d 769, 772 (Utah Ct. App. 2000); State v. Butler, No. 17564-2111, 1999 Wash. App.
LEXIS 1536, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 1999); State v. Carter, No. 41682-1-I, 1999
Wash. App. LEXIS 799, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. May 3, 1999); State v. Sims, 890 P.2d 521,
522 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Harris, 531 S.E.2d 340, 343 (W. Va. 2000); State v.
Fields, No. 92-1464-CR, 1993 Wisc. App. LEXIS 472, at *1 (Wisc. Ct. App. Apr. 22,
1993); Oldman v. State, 998 P.2d 957, 960 (Wyo. 2000).
25 Sometimes, prosecutors invoke the hearsay exceptions for present sense impres-
sions or for statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment in addi-
tion to the excited utterance exception. See, e.g., People v. Hendrickson, 586 N.W.2d
906, 907 (Mich. 1998) (holding that the recording of the complainant's statement that
defendant had just beaten her is admissible under the present sense impression excep-
tion); Oldman, 998 P.2d at 959 (affirming the lower court's holding that the hearsay
statements of complainant, recounted by the emergency physician, were admissible
under both the excited utterance and medical diagnosis exceptions); Mary E. Asmus et
al., Prosecuting Domestic Abuse Cases in Duluth: Developing Effective Prosecution Strategies
from Understanding the Dynamics of Abusive Relationships, 15 HAMLINE L. REV. 115, 139
(1991) ("The present sense impression is an often overlooked rule of evidence provid-
ing a powerful tool for the prosecutor seeking to present evidence of domestic abuse
despite a victim's unwillingness to testify regarding that abuse.").
Where the declarant testifies in variance with her prior statements, the hearsay ex-
emption for prior inconsistent statements of a witness will not render the prior state-
ments admissible to prove the truth of the matter asserted in most American jurisdic-
tions. As established in FED. R. EVID. 801 (d)(1) (A), that exemption applies only if the
prior statement "was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hear-
ing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition." Statements made to 911 operators and
to responding police officers do not satisfy these requirements. Some jurisdictions,
though, do not insist on such restrictions on the admissibility of prior inconsistent
statements. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1235 (West 1995) ("Evidence of a statement
made by a witness is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement is in-
consistent with his testimony at the hearing and is offered in compliance with Section
770."); State v. Borrelli, 629 A.2d 1105, 1109-10 (Conn. 1993) (upholding the trial
court's admission of a prior inconsistent statement of complainant, reduced to writing
and signed by her, for the truth of the matter asserted).
In addition, Oregon recently established a hearsay exception created particularly
for victims of domestic violence. OR. REV. STAT. § 40.460(26) (1999). It allows a
statement made within twenty-four hours, so long as it is recorded or made to a police
officer or other designated officials or quasi-officials, and it has sufficient "indicia of
reliability," recantation not being sufficient in itself to lead to a conclusion of unreli-
ability. Id.
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citement caused by a startling event or condition, she presumably has
not had an opportunity to concoct a false account. Particularly, but
not exclusively, in the domestic violence context, courts look for tes-
timony that the declarant was "upset," "excited," and "crying," or• 26
sometimes "agitated" or "hysterical" before applying the exception.
Once the victim has been described in such terms, courts have been
willing to treat this exception rather generously.
Provided that the witness is still sufficiently "excited" when giving
her statement, courts are often willing to admit the statement despite
a considerable time lapse between the excitement-evoking event and
the statement.
27
Furthermore, if the witness is sufficiently upset (or excited or cry-
ing), the exception will usually apply even when her "statement" is a
series of responses to inquiries posed by a professional questioner-a
26 See, e.g., Matthews, 1999 WL 286626, at *1, 4 ("hysterical" and "excited"); Dawson,
867 S.W.2d at 494 ("upset"); State v. Barnies, 680 A.2d 449, 450 (Me. 1996) ("visibly
upset" and "crying"); O'Connor, 1998 Minn. App. LEXIS 1268, at *3 ("upset and cry-
ing"); State v. McGuire, No. C3-96-2310, 1997 Minn. App. LEXIS 896, at *8 (Minn. Ct.
App. Aug. 12, 1997) ("visibly upset and shaken"); Harris, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 4585,
at *9 ("very upset" and "crying"); Jorden, 730 N.E.2d at 450 ("distraught"); Smith, 1998
Ohio App. LEXIS 6454, at *1 ("crying" and "very upset"); Cornell, 717 N.E.2d at 364
("very upset" and "crying"); Krakue, 726 A.2d at 460 ("appeared upset" and "continued
to cry and shake"); Tejeda, 905 S.W.2d at 315 ("crying, screaming, shaking, and ap-
peared nervous"); Alires, 9 P.3d at 771 ("very upset, nervous, tearful, and shaky"). But
cf W. Valley City v. Hutto, 5 P.3d 1, 6-7 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) (stating that although
victim was "extremely upset," "very agitated," and "quite nervous" at time of interview,
prosecution did not overcome "presumption that the stress had subsided with her re-
location to a safe environment and the elapse of several hours").
27 See, e.g., Camp v. State, 991 S.W.2d 611, 613 (Ark. Ct. App. 1999) (affirming that
a three-hour lapse between the incident and the victim's statements does not render
them inadmissible); McGuire, 1997 Minn. App. LEXIS 896, at *8 ("Although over two
hours had lapsed between the time of the incident and the police report, the fact that
she was still visibly shaken supports the trial court's determination that her out-of-court
statement was admissible as an excited utterance."); State v. Zembower, No. 96-L-184,
1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 1274, at *13 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 27, 1998) (applying the ex-
cited utterance exception to statements made two hours after an assault); State v.
Daugherty, No. 97-CA-99, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 1345, at *4-7 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 16,
1998) (holding that statements made one and one-half hours after being seen by an
emergency squad can qualify as excited utterances). But cf, e.g., Commonwealth v.
DiMonte, 692 N.E.2d 45, 50-51 (Mass. 1998) (holding that the time lapse of nine to ten
hours was "at an outer limit" of qualifying as a spontaneous reaction and reversing trial
court's decision to allow the evidence in this instance because circumstances indicated
premeditation); State v. O'Neal, 721 N.E.2d 73, 84 (Ohio 2000) (holding that the trial
court's admission of statements made several hours after assault was harmless error);
Mineo, 2001 Wash. App. LEXIS 59, at *13-15 (holding that the trial court's admission
of statements was harmless error, to the extent they concern beatings two to six days
earlier, but proper to the extent they concerned beating earlier that day).
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setting that suggests some opportunity for reflection-rather than her
own spontaneous articulation. The typical 911 call consists largely of a
series of questions by the operator and answers by the declarant, and
most often the entire call is admitted.28
Finally, if the witness seems sufficiently traumatized by the event,
the court may be willing to admit a statement that admittedly includes
a self-interested lie-a factor that would seem to negate completely
29the lack of reflective capacity supposedly underlying the exception.
The phenomenon we have described represents a dramatic
change in the way criminal cases have traditionally been tried. Trying
a case without the live testimony of the victim or complainant is noth-
ing new; as we have acknowledged, that is how murder cases are nec-
essarily tried. Instead, what is novel is that prosecutors are trying cases
by relying on the out-of-court accusations of the complainant, some-
times in contravention of her live testimony and, most notably, often
without presenting her live testimony, even though she may be per-
fectly available to testify. What is more, prosecutors routinely do so,
and the courts are letting them do it.
Now we will explore reasons for this development. Part II dis-
cusses changes in the way domestic violence cases are treated. And
Part III discusses developments in the doctrines of hearsay and con-
frontation that have made courts more receptive to dial-in testimony.
II. THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Many of the cases that have used dial-in testimony-statements
made in 911 calls and to responding officers-have involved charges
28 Courts have held consistently that this question-and-answer format poses no
threat to a successful excited utterance foundation and have admitted testimony over
specific objections on this issue. See State v. Hernandez, 987 P.2d 1156, 1159 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1999) (affirming the trial court's finding that complainant's answers to police
questions fell within the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule); State v.
Wallace, 524 N.E.2d 466, 472 (Ohio 1988) (holding "that the admission of a declara-
tion as an excited utterance is not precluded by questioning").
In People v. Simpson, 656 N.Y.S.2d 765 (App. Div. 1997), the complainant called
911 to report a robbery and sexual assault. Id. at 766. At trial, she testified that she
lied to the 911 operator in reporting that the defendant had a gun, so that the police
would respond to her call quickly. Id. at 767. The 911 tape was nevertheless admitted
as an excited utterance, and the conviction was upheld over the dissent of two justices.
Id. at 765-66. We find application of the exception to this case rather remarkable. We
regard the admissibility of the tape as less troublesome than it otherwise would be be-
cause the complainant did testify, apparently in accordance with most of her assertions
on the tape, and the prosecutor did not rely on the tape to prove the assertion, regard-
ing the gun, that the complainant later repudiated.
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of domestic violence. This Part will demonstrate how changes in the
way that the criminal justice system handles domestic violence charges
have increased the incentives and opportunities for the use of such
statements. It will also show that such statements are usually testimo-
nial in nature, in that the caller knows she is not simply asking for
help but providing information for the use of the criminal justice sys-
tem.
Over the last decade, legislatures, courts, law enforcement
authorities, and the public have shown an increased awareness of the
extent and seriousness of domestic violence. Efforts to curb this terri-
ble problem have intensified at the national, state, and local levels. As
Section A of this Part discusses, these efforts have led the police to re-
spond far more actively to complaints of domestic violence. A com-
plaint of domestic violence made in a 911 call is now almost certain to
result in a police officer making a prompt investigative visit, and usu-
ally an arrest.30 Furthermore, prosecutors are now far more likely to
pursue the matter, even without the cooperation of the caller.
3' The
results are that a call to 911 is likely to lead to a criminal trial (absent a
guilty plea), and that at trial the prosecutor will seek to use the caller's
initial statements as evidence, often without the caller testifying in
court.3 Moreover, in part because of increased awareness of the na-
ture of domestic violence, courts have become more receptive to such
evidence.
In Section B, we focus on the caller. We argue that a caller to 911
knows that, directly or indirectly, he or she (for there are now many
male callers alongside the greater number of female callers) is provid-
ing information to the police that will almost certainly lead to a sig-
nificant official response, including the strong possibility of prosecu-
tion. The caller also probably knows that there is a good chance
statements he or she makes during the 911 call, or to the responding
officer, will be used in prosecution. The result is that 911 callers are
effectively allowed to testify without exposing themselves to the oath
or to cross-examination. Not surprisingly, some callers abuse the op-
portunity.
30 Infra text accompanying notes 81-86.
31 Infra text accompanying notes 35-51.
32 Infra text accompanying notes 63-75.
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A. Public and Official Responses
1. Increased Awareness and Effort
In recent years, the public, legislatures, law enforcement authori-
ties, and the courts have gained a greater awareness of the extent and
seriousness of domestic violence. While domestic violence once was
regarded as largely a private matter, that is no longer true.
Society has increasingly recognized that domestic violence is a
common, rather than an occasional, occurrence; that it often has dev-
astating and even fatal consequences; that recidivism among those
who commit domestic violence is very high; that even though acts of
domestic violence may appear to be of relatively slight significance
when taken in isolation, they often indicate a likelihood that the ag-
gressor will commit far worse acts in the future; and that for a variety
of reasons, a victim of domestic violence often will withdraw her accu-
sation and decline to testify against her victimizer or otherwise sup-
port prosecution, even though her initial accusation is true.
This increased awareness has triggered considerably greater inten-
sity in governmental efforts to curb and punish domestic violence.
For example, many states have increased the remedies for domestic
violence by expanding the availability and the scope of personal pro-
tection orders and expanding the penalties for abusers: They also
have intensified greatly their efforts in investigating and prosecuting
domestic violence. Even Congress has become involved, primarily by
34providing funds to assist efforts by state and local governments -
33 See, for example, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2950 (West 2000), the per-
sonal protection order (PPO) statute, which was amended for the first time since 1983
in 1994 and has been amended every year since then. Petitioners can, and regularly
do, receive PPOs ex parte. See § 600.2950(12) (stating the requirements for issuing an
ex parte PPO); E-mail from Anne N. Schroth, Clinical Assistant Professor, University of
Michigan Law School, to Bridget McCormack, Clinical Assistant Professor of Law, Uni-
versity of Michigan Law School (Jan. 28, 2002) (on file with authors) ("[M]ost PPOs
are granted on an ex parte basis."). In addition to prohibiting the restrained individ-
ual from entering the petitioner's home, place of employment, or place of education,
PPOs can order that the restrained individual refrain from carrying a gun.
§ 600.2950 (1)(e). A violation of a PPO can subject the restrained individual to charges
of criminal contempt, punishable by as many as ninety-three days in jail.
§ 600.2950(11) (a) (i).
34 The Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA) provided funding to states
to prosecute domestic violence aggressively. 42 U.S.C. § 10415 (1994). The Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, amended in 1998, provided addi-
tional funding for the training ofjudges in state and federal courts handling domestic
violence cases. 42 U.S.C. §§ 13991, 14001 (1994). The Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110
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which, as in the case of most crime, carry most of the burden.
2. Police Practices
In 1984, Tracey Thurman sued the city of Torrington, Connecti-
cut, for its egregious failure to take seriously her calls to authorities
complaining about domestic violence committed against her.
35 After a
jury awarded her $2.3 million, the State of Connecticut dramatically
strengthened its law enforcement response to domestic violence.
37 As
a general matter, a police officer may not arrest a person for a misde-
meanor without a warrant unless the offense is committed in the offi-
cer's presence." Connecticut made an exception to this rule for cases
Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 & 42 U.S.C.), which created
the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-619
(1994 & Supp. V 1999), establishes a general sixty-month cutoff for the receipt of
benefits, but it allows the state to exempt a family from this limitation for hardship or
"if the family includes an individual who has been battered or subjected to extreme
cruelty," up to a limit of twenty percent of the families receiving assistance from the
state under the program. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a) (7) (C) (Supp. V 1999). In addition, the
state has the option to certify that it has established and is enforcing standards to
screen and identify recipients with a history of domestic violence and to refer them to
counseling and supportive services. If it does so, it can waive various program re-
quirements (including the twenty percent limit stated above) in cases where the re-
quirements would make it more difficult for recipients to escape domestic violence or
would penalize unfairly individuals who have been victims of domestic violence or at
risk of future violence. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (7) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
35 Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984). In this
case, the Torrington police failed to do anything to assist Ms. Thurman, despite her
many pleas for help, and, in one instance, a police officer stood and watched as Char-
les Thurman kicked his wife in the head. Id. at 1524-26. For a detailed description of
this case, see EVE S. BUZAwA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE RESPONSE 102-03 (2d ed. 1996).
I% The parties later settled for $1.9 million. Amy Eppler, Note, Battered Women and
the Equal Protection Clause: Will the Constitution Help Them Mhen the Police Won't?, 95 YALE
L.J. 788, 795 n.31 (1986).
37 In addition to passing the first "must-arrest" statute, Connecticut mandated pre-
trial family violence counseling for people charged with violating the family violence
statute. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38c(g) (West Supp. 2001).
" Eg., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 764.15(l)(a) (West 2000) ("A peace officer,
without a warrant, may arrest a person in any of the following situations: ... [a] fel-
ony, misdemeanor, or ordinance violation is committed in the peace officer's pres-
ence."). In Commonwealth v. Howe, 540 N.E.2d 677 (Mass. 1989), the court said:
At common law, "[a] peace officer, in the absence of statute ... may arrest
without a warrant for a misdemeanor which (1) involves a breach of the
peace, (2) is committed in the presence or view of the officer ... and (3) is
still continuing at the time of the arrest or only interrupted, so that the of-
fence and the arrest form parts of one transaction."
Id. at 678 (alterations in original) (citation omitted).
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in which the police respond to a call concerning violence committed
between family members.39 Other municipalities and some states fol-
lowed.
Today every state except North Carolina permits warrantless ar-
rests in domestic violence cases. Twenty states provide discretionary
S 40
arrest authority to police, seven instruct police that an arrest is theprefered " 41
preferred action, and twenty-two states and the District of Columbia
require the police to make an arrest upon responding to a domestic
violence complaint if the officer has probable cause to believe that a
domestic assault has occurred.42 In states that do not require arrest by
39 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38b(a) (West Supp. 2001).
40 ALA. CODE § 15-10-3(a) (Supp. 2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1904(b)(1)
(2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-4-20(a) (1997); HAW. REV. STAT. § 709-906(2) (Supp.
2000); IDAHO CODE § 19-603(6) (Michie 1997); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/107-2
(West 1992); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.005(2) (Michie 1999); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM.
PROC. § 2-204 (2001); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.341(1) (West Supp. 2002); MO. ANN.
STAT. § 455.085.1 (West 1997); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29404.02(3) (1995); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 173-B:9(I) (a) (2001); id. § 594:10(a) (Supp. 2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-
1-7.A (Michie 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15a-401(b)(2) (a), (d) (1999); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 40.3.B (West Supp. 2002); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2711 (a) (West
Supp. 2001); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 14.03(a) (4) (Vernon Supp. 2002); VT. R.
CRIM. PROC. 3(a) (Supp. 2001); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-27-1001(b) (Michie 2001);
Wo. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-20-1 0 2(a), 35-21-107(b) (iv) (Michie 2001).
41 ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-81-113(b)(2) (Michie Supp. 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 741.29(4)(b) (West Supp. 2002); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 6(7) (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 764.15a (West 2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-
6-311(2) (b) (2001); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-10(1) (1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-
3-619(a) (1996).
42 ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.530(a) (Michie 2000); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3601 (B)
(West 2001); CAL. PENAL CODE § 836(c) (1) (West Supp. 2002); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 18-6-803.6(1) (West 2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38b(a) (West Supp. 2001);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1031 (a) (2001); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.12(3) (West 2000); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 22-2401(c)(2)(c) (2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2140(1)-(2) (West
1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 4012(6) (D) (West 1998); MiSS. CODE ANN. § 99-
3-7(3) (Supp. 2001); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 171.137(1) (Michie 2001); NJ. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:25-21(a) (West 1995); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.10(4) (McKinney Supp.
2001-2002); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.032(A) (1) (a) (Anderson 1999); OR. REV.
STAT. § 133.055(2) (a) (Supp. 1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-29-3(c) (1) (2000); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-25-70(B) (Law Co-op. 2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-3-2.1 (Michie 1998);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-2.2(2)(a) (1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-81.3(B) (Michie
2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.31.100(2) (West Supp. 2002); WiS. STAT. ANN.
§ 968.075(2) (a) (West 1998). Missouri requires arrest after the second complaint
within twelve hours, if the officer finds probable cause to believe the same person has
again committed a violation. MO. ANN. STAT. § 455.085(1) (West Supp. 2002).
Many states adopted mandatory arrest statutes because of the concern that police
were not appropriately using discretionary authority. See Developments in the Law-Legal
Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1498, 1537-38 (1993) ("By reducing po-
lice discretion, mandatory arrest schemes ensure that officers will not trivialize domes-
tic violence or make decisions about arrest on a discriminatory or otherwise illegiti-
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law, municipal ordinances or police department policies often fill the
gap, mandating in prescribed circumstances that the responding offi-
cer make an arrest.43 Although there are criticisms of the mandatory
arrest system," the trend toward this method of dealing with domestic
violence has not slowed.45
Most pro-arrest statutes require or encourage the police to arrest
the "primary aggressor" in a domestic dispute. 46 "Primary aggressor" is
generally defined as the most significant, rather than the first, aggres-
sor.4 ' Aggressive arrest policies in domestic violence cases have re-
suited in a dramatic increase in arrests of both of men and women,48
with local increases running as high as 431% over a decade in one
large California county.49 This increase is not a response to increased
mate basis.").
43 See, e.g., CITYOFANN ARBOR CODE § 9:68 ("A Police Officer shall arrest a person
when the Officer has reasonable cause to believe that person has, within the previous
24 hours, assaulted a spouse, former spouse or other person residing or having resided
in the same household .... ).
44 See Linda G. Mills, Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the Violence of State Inter-
vention, 113 HARV. L. REV. 550, 557-70 (1999) (arguing that mandatory state interven-
tions leave battered women less safe from violence by robbing them of the opportunity
to emotionally persevere and giving rise to increased violence against some women,
especially African-American women); Donna M. Welch, Mandatory Arrest of Domestic
Abusers: Panacea or Perpetuation of the Problem of Abuse?, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 1133 (1994)
(analyzing research on the efficacy of mandatory arrest laws in reducing recidivism and
finding that they have little deterrent value and, for some segments of the population,
lead to increased violence).
45 See generally Mills, supra note 44, at 558-60 (explaining the reasons behind the
popularity of mandatory arrest policies).
46 For examples of "primary aggressor" statutes, see CAL. PENAL CODE § 836 (West
Supp. 2002); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.29(4)(b) (West Supp. 2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 776.22 (West 2000); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §140.10(4)(c) (McKinney Supp.
2001-2002).
47 ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.530(b) (Michie 2000); MO. ANN. STAT. § 455.085(3)
(West Supp. 2002); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.10(4)(c) (McKinney Supp. 2001-
2002).
48 See David Doege, Slowing Cycle of Domestic Violence; Courts, Prosecutors Try New Ways
to Aid Abusers, Victims, MILWAUKEEJ. SENTINEL, May 7, 2001, at Al (reporting a ninety-
one percent increase in arrests immediately following the passage of a mandatory ar-
rest law in 1989); John Johnson, A New Side to Domestic Violence, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 27,
1996, at Al (citing the fact that "[l]ast year in Los Angeles, a record 14.3% of domestic
abuse arrests were of women, more than double the rate five years earlier"); Kerry
McCray, Raised Efforts Lower Domestic Abuse, MODESTO BEE (Cal.), May 21, 2000, at BI
(reporting a 137% increase in domestic violence arrests from 1988 to 1998 in one Cali-
fornia county); Susan Spencer-Wendel, Domestic Violence Efforts Doubled, PALM BEACH
POST, Oct. 3, 2000, at lB (reporting a consistent increase in domestic violence arrests
and predicting a fifteen-percent annual increase based on prior increases).
49 Jack Leonard, Domestic Abuse Arrests in 0. C. Skyrocket in Last Decade, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 5, 1999, at B5.
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incidence of domestic violence; on the contrary, according to the De-
partment ofJustice the actual incidence of non-lethal intimate partner
violence against women decreased between 1993 and 1998, and the
level of such violence against men has remained stable. 50 While the
increase in arrests of men was what was expected and intended by ad-
vocates-for there is general agreement that most domestic violence is
committed by men against their female partners-increased arrests of
women were not expected. 5
Because arrest followed by short-term incarceration has been
found to be the most effective deterrent against subsequent domestic
violence, 5 pro-arrest policies are sometimes accompanied (as the
mayor of Miami recently learned)" by laws effectively requiring over-
night lock-up of the suspected offender.
54
Police practices have changed in other ways as well. Many juris-
dictions require police to advise the complainant about the services
available to her,' and officers often do this even absent legal compul-
sion.
Furthermore, many states have required increased record keeping
50 Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Intimate Partner Violence, at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/ipv.htm (last modified May 17, 2000).
See Carey Goldberg, Spouse Abuse Crackdown, Surprisingly, Nets Many Women, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 23, 1999, at A16 ("[I]n some places, one-quarter or more of arrests for
domestic assault are not of men but of women.");Johnson, supra note 49 (chronicling
the increase of domestic assault arrests). There is no accepted explanation for this in-
crease. Some argue that women are finally being held accountable for their own vio-
lence. Others argue that police are misinterpreting "primary aggressor" to mean the
person who strikes first instead of the person who strikes hardest. Andrea D. Lyon, Be
Careful What You Wish For: An Examination of Arrest and Prosecution Patterns of Domestic
Violence Cases in Two Cities in Michigan, 5 MICH.J. GENDER & LAw 253 (1999). Still oth-
ers feel that there may be police backlash over the domestic violence movement.
Goldberg, supra.
52 Developments, supra note 42, at 1536 (citing Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A.
Berk, The Specific Deterrent Effects of Arrest for Domestic Assault, 49 AM. Soc. REV. 261, 270
(1984)).
53 Mayor's Case Handled Correctly: Domestic Violence a Serious Crime, S. FLA. SUN-
SENTINEL, Feb. 10, 2001, at 18A.
54 See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 780.582(a) (West 1998) (providing that a suspect
shall be held until he can be brought before a magistrate, or for twenty hours if no
magistrate is available); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-10(3) (1997) (providing that de-
fendants charged with domestic violence are not to be released on personal recogni-
zance or bond until they have been brought before a magistrate); NoVi, MICH., CODE
OF ORDINANCES § 22-50(c) (prohibiting interim bond when a suspect is charged with
domestic violence unless he or she has been held for twenty hours).
.55 Eg., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.29(1) (West 2002); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN.
§ 764.15c(1); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 40.2 (West 1991).
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in domestic violence cases. Such requirements tend to give the offi-
cer greater incentive to make an arrest; given that police officers are
required to complete a detailed report on whether they make an ar-
rest or not, they are less likely to leave the scene without arresting
someone. 7 Increased record-keeping requirements also can be an
evidence-gathering tool. Police are required to take a statement from
the complainant, and they are taught that these statements may be
used to prove the case, especially if the officer can lay the foundation
for the excited utterance exception.5 s Thus, since 1993, Florida
prosecutors have been training police officers to prepare a case so
that, if necessary, it can be tried without the victim's testimony.
59 Du-
luth, Minnesota, has made the police reporting task easier by creating
a form that "provides a list of emotional states that officers can check
off to describe the victim's demeanor at the time the statements were
made," including "crying," "hysterical," and "sobbing."
60 Given such
preparation, police officers have begun to see it as their role to supply
evidence in "victimless""' prosecutions.62
r, Most states require police to complete domestic violence incident reports when
they respond to a domestic violence complaint, whether or not an arrest is made. The
Michigan reporting statute requires the police to include the names of the persons in-
volved, contact information for those people, whether there is a restraining order in
effect, the name of the person who called law enforcement, names and contact infor-
mation of other witnesses, the relationship between the parties, a narrative of the inci-
dent, details of the assault, a description of injuries and property damage, and a de-
scription of previous domestic violence between the parties. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 764.15c(2). This report must be retained by the law enforcement agency and a copy
sent to the prosecutor within forty-eight hours. § 764.15c(3). For other states' re-
quirements for peace officers investigating reports of domestic violence, see FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 741.29(2) (West 2002); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.032(D) (Anderson 1999);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-2141 (West 1999).
57 See Developments, supra note 42, at 1553 ("By requiring a report even if no arrest
is made, reporting statutes encourage the officer to consider carefully whether he
should take the batterer into custody." (citations omitted)).
58 Asmus et al., supra note 25, at 152; see Angela Corsilles, Note, No-Drop Policies in
the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases: Guarantee to Action or Dangerous Solution , 63
FORDHAM L. REV. 853, 862 n.65 (1994) (referencing the Domestic Violence Prosecu-
tion Plan of the City Attorney's Office for Duluth, Minnesota, which provides for coor-
dination "with Duluth police to develop methods for gathering and preserving evi-
dence such as statements of victims and perpetrators at or near the time of the
incident").
59 Alison Frankel, Domestic Disaster, Am. LAW.,June 1996, at 54, 63.
W0 Kristin Littel et al., Assessing Justice System Response to Violence Against Women: A
Tool for Law Enforcement, Prosecution and the Courts to Use in Developing Effective Responses
(Feb. 1998), available at http://www.vaw.umn.edu/Promise/pplaw.htm.
';] Domestic violence, of course, is not a victimless crime. The term "victimless
prosecution" has sometimes been used in this context to refer to a prosecution in
which the victim does not testify. See, e.g., Cory Adams, Deterring Domestic Violence: Pros-
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3. Prosecution Practices
Prosecutors have responded to their increased domestic violence
caseload with aggressive new tactics for getting convictions. Special
prosecution units to handle domestic violence cases, some supported
by federal grant money, are now common."
One aggressive prosecution strategy now supported by federal
grant money is a "mandatory prosecution" or "no drop" policy.4
These policies vary from place to place, sometimes encompassing a
strict refusal to plea bargain in any domestic violence case.6 At their
heart, though, is a determination that the prosecutor will pursue the
case even over the complainant's objections. A prosecutor might
adopt such a policy for a variety of reasons-in part because of recog-
pects for Heightened Success in the "Victimless" Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases, 11 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 51, 51-52 (2000) ("[O] rdinarily the prosecution of crime fea-
tures victims, accusers, or witnesses who are willing to testify. City and district attorneys
will pursue a domestic violence case when these elements are lacking, but in order to
engage in these 'victimless prosecutions' they require exceptional police work."); Peter
Dworkin, Confronting Your Abuser in Oregon: A New Domestic Violence Hearsay Exception, 37
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 299, 299 (2001) (finding that the "rising number of 'victimless'
prosecutions" illustrates that "[t]he successful prosecution of domestic assault has in-
creasingly become a priority in many jurisdictions across the country"); David M. Ger-
sten, Evidentiary Trends in Domestic Violence, FLA. B.J.,July-Aug. 1998, at 65 ("[T]he vast
majority of victims refuse to cooperate... often result[ing] in the problem of a 'vic-
timless prosecution."'); Audrey Rogers, Prosecutorial Use of Expert Testimony in Domestic
Violence Cases: From Recantation to Refusal to Testify, 8 COLUM. J. GENDER & LAw 67, 71
(1998) ("[P]rosecutors ... should view expert testimony as an integral component of a
victimless prosecution.").
62 Frankel, supra note 59, at 65.
63 Washtenaw County, for example, received a grant of approximately $10 million
over five years under VAWA and the National Institute of Justice to prosecute domestic
violence cases and to collect data about those cases. Interview with Blaine Longsworth,
Chief Prosecutor, Domestic Violence Unit, in Washtenaw County, Mich. (Feb. 14,
2001). This money is funding a special domestic violence prosecution unit with its
own attorneys, investigators, "pre-trial services" officers and police and probation offi-
cers. Id.; Minutes of Domestic Violence Grant Informational Meeting, Washtenaw
County, Mich., at 2 (Dec. 10, 1999) (on file with authors).
64 VAWA grants are intended to promote aggressive prosecution policies including
a "no-drop" prosecution policy. See 42 U.S.C. § 10415(b) (3) (A)-(B) (1994) (listing the
characteristics necessary for consideration for Model State Leadership grants for do-
mestic violence intervention); see also, e.g., People v. Hendrickson, 586 N.W.2d 906, 907
(Mich. 1998) (referring to a Michigan County's "no drop" policy).
65 In Washtenaw County, the Prosecutor, Brian Mackie, has a policy of making no
plea offer in any domestic violence case. This policy includes never authorizing a "de-
ferred sentence" to a defendant who would be eligible for one. A deferred sentence
permits a defendant who pleads guilty and successfully complies with the terms of his
sentence to have his record expunged at the end of his sentence. Martha Churchill,
Prosecutor in Grips of Ultra-Feminists, DETROIT NEWS, Dec. 10, 1999, at A13.
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nition that domestic violence is a matter of public, not merely private
significance; because of a paternalistic realization that the complain-
ant may face greater danger than she realizes from recurrent violence;
or because of a practical judgment that, if the victim of a domestic vio-
lence crime lacks any control over the case, there will be one less fac-
tor that might lead to violence by the abuser, and the victim will be
safer.6 The policies are highly controversial, both because they may
deprive the complainant of choice in a matter that could fundamen-
tally affect her and because their effectiveness is in doubt.""
We take no position here on the merits of this debate. But clearly
one of the consequences of such policies is that prosecutors must
sometimes proceed even though the complainant is recalcitrant. In
some cases, she does not want to testify at all. Occasionally, prosecu-
tors have used legal sanctions to compel a reluctant complainant to
testify. Thus, in one well-known case in 1983, an Anchorage, Alaska,
woman named Maudie Wall filed an abuse complaint against her hus-
band but later changed her mind about testifying. 9 To compel her
testimony, she was arrested and held in jail overnight.70
Sometimes when the reluctant complainant does testify, she does
66 See Casey G. Gwinn & Anne O'Dell, Stopping the Violence: The Role of the Police Of-
ficer and the Prosecutor, 20 W. ST. U. L. REV. 297, 310 (1993) (finding that "abusers
would become more violent and aggressive toward the victim when they learned that
she controlled the outcome of the criminal prosecution").
67 Some argue that mandatory prosecution is a creative and effective solution to
the problems associated with domestic violence prosecution. Cheryl Hanna, No Right
to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 1849 (1996); Donna Wills, Domestic Violence: The Case for Aggressive Prosecution, 7
UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 173 (1997). But that view is not unanimously held among advo-
cates. See Mills, supra note 44, at 589-96 (arguing that mandatory arrest and prosecu-
tion polices abuse women in ways that parallel the abuse they receive from their bat-
terers-by reinforcing batterer judgements of them and by silencing them further by
limiting their options-and suggesting that mandatory policies reflect patriarchal in-
fluence); Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Feminist Responses to Violent
Injustice, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 967, 977 (1998) ("[N]o-drop policies deprive or con-
strict the victim's choices and refuse deference to her own assessment ... "); Christine
O'Connor, Note, Domestic Violence No-Contact Orders and the Autonomy Rights of Victims, 40
B.C. L. REV. 937, 961-62 (1999) (critiquing mandatory policies for silencing victims).
68 For a summary of the research conducted so far about the effects of mandatory
prosecution strategies on reducing domestic violence, see Robert C. Davis et al., The
Deterrent Effect of Prosecuting Domestic Violence Misdemeanors, 44 CRIME & DELINQ. 434, 441
(1998). Mixed support exists for the view that mandatory prosecution strategies re-
duce domestic violence. Mills, supra note 44, at 561 n.51.
69 Hanna, supra note 67, at 1866.
70 Id. In Duluth, complaining witnesses were forced to testify against their will as
early as 1991. See Asmus et al., supra note 25, at 135-36 (discussing the use of subpoe-
nas in domestic abuse protection).
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so inconsistently with the statements she made in her 911 call or to
the responding officer. In response, the prosecutor may offer those
statements into evidence, asking the fact-finder to credit those state-
ments over the complainant's in-court testimony.7'
Often, however, prosecutors do not bother with an unwilling or
recanting complainant. Rather, they simply go forward without her,
72
and instead of her live testimony, submit as evidence of the incident
the statements carefully taken from her by the 911 operator and the
police.73 In some cases, the prosecutor's decision to pursue a "victim-
less" prosecution is based on a well-founded belief that the defen-
dant's misconduct has inhibited the complainant from testifying.74
But often the prosecutor evidently concludes that it is easier to go
forward with unsworn, untested statements provided on the 911 tapes
than to expose a witness to the risks of testifying at trial.75
71 Supra note 22 and accompanying text.
72 As of 1995, thirty to forty percent of jurisdictions were proceeding in domestic
violence cases without complainants. Mark Hansen, New Strategy in Battering Cases, 81
A.B.A. J. 14, 14 (1995). In some jurisdictions, San Diego among them, prosecutors
were doing so in a majority of their cases. Id.; supra notes 23-24 and accompanying
text. In Washtenaw County, approximately half of the domestic violence cases are
prosecuted without the complaining witness. Interview with Blaine Longsworth, supra
note 63.
73 The San Diego Police Department's Domestic Violence Manual instructs offi-
cers that "[s]ince victims are often uncooperative, everything possible is done to de-
velop a solid case that does not depend on participation by the victim." CITY OF SAN
DIEGO POLICE DEPARTMENT, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE POLICING IN SAN DIEGO, available at
http://www.bsz-bw.de/depot/media/5600000/5736000/5736112/dvmanual.html
(last visited Mar. 19, 2002). The Duluth prosecution plan in domestic violence cases
directs the city attorney's office to work with the police to gather statements from vic-
tims and other witnesses. Corsilles, supra note 58, at 862 n.65. This is also true in
Washtenaw County, where police and prosecutors (and judges) are trained about vic-
timless prosecution by local advocates. Meeting notes from Domestic Violence Judicial
Oversight Grant Project Team, Washtenaw County, Mich., at 2 (Dec. 17, 1999) (on file
with authors).
74 In such a case, the accused should often be held to have forfeited his confronta-
tion right and hearsay objection. See infra Part IV (arguing that accused should be
deemed to have forfeited objection to admissibility of prior statement based on his in-
ability to cross-examine declarant if his misconduct prevented declarant from testifying
at trial). There is, however, a suspicion that any recanting witness is doing so because
she is afraid of the defendant. The rush to that conclusion, absent any showing of its
applicability in a particular case, is unjustified and sits uneasily, at best, alongside the
defendant's right to be presumed innocent.
75 In San Diego, "[t]he . . . track record for winning domestic assault cases has
been so good, prosecutors now prefer that the victim not testify." Jane Armstrong et
al., Hitting Back in San Diego, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 16, 1996, at Cl; see also Gwinn &
O'Dell, supra note 66, at 304 (indicating that San Diego was already prosecuting sixty
percent of its cases without the in-court testimony of the victims and nevertheless had
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4. Judicial Endorsement
Of course, prosecutors cannot introduce prior statements made
by complainants unless the courts let them do so, but in recent years
the courts have been very accommodating. We will discuss later the
doctrinal rubric under which they have done so. For now, we only
note that their receptivity to the evidence fits in well with the changed
environment of domestic violence cases.
Judges, like other participants in the criminal justice system, have
76
gained a deeper understanding of domestic violence in recent years.
Judges are often trained about domestic violence issues and expected
an eighty-eight percent conviction rate). Prosecutors in Duluth, Minnesota, were re-
porting an eighty-seven percent conviction rate as of 1994. See Sandra G. Boodman,
What Can Be Done? The Formidable Task of Treating Batterers, WASH. POST, June 28, 1994,
at Z11 -Z12. And prosecutors in Washington, D.C., report the same conviction rate for
cases tried with complainants as for those tried without them. Deborah Epstein, Effec-
tive Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and the
Court System," 11 YALEJ. L. & FEMINISM 3, 18 (1999).
Consider as illustrations two domestic violence cases tried by Ypsilanti Township in
Washtenaw County on February 7, 2000. In the first, the defendant was charged with
domestic violence and his wife was allegedly the victim. Just before giving his opening
statement, the prosecutor called out the name of the defendant's wife to see if she had
shown up. She was there, but maintained that her husband had not assaulted her.
The prosecutor decided not to call her to the stand. Instead, he played a 911 tape on
which a woman identifying herself as the defendant's mother-who also did not testify
at trial-claimed that the defendant assaulted his wife. Next the prosecutor called the
sheriff who arrested the defendant. He testified that when he arrived at the scene, he
interviewed the defendant's mother, who said that she lied to 911 to get the police to
come get her son. The defendant was angry and yelling, but he did not strike his wife,
the mother told the sheriff. The sheriff next spoke to the defendant's wife, who con-
firmed that her husband had not hit her. Based on that evidence, the prosecutor
asked the court to find the defendant guilty of domestic violence. The court acquitted
the defendant. Personal trial notes from Case No. 99-1053, 14B Dist. Ct., Washtenaw
County, Mich. (Feb. 7, 2000) (on file with authors).
In the second case, tried for the defense by law students under Professor McCor-
mack's supervision, the 102-pound defendant allegedly hit her 250-pound husband.
Although the complainant was in court ready to testify, the prosecutor preferred to go
forward without calling him to the stand and instead to play the tape of his call to 911.
In that call, the complainant claimed that his wife was going crazy and that he had
"bruises all over [his] ass." The prosecutor also presented the arresting officer, who
testified that the complainant told him that the defendant had hit him in the face. As
a result of defense counsel's successful confrontation argument, the prosecutor was
forced to call the complainant to the stand. The complainant admitted that he called
911 and lied to "mess with" his wife. The court acquitted the defendant. Personal trial
notes from Case No. 99-0906, 14B Dist. Ct., Washtenaw County, Mich. (Feb. 7, 2000)
(on file with authors).
76 Palm Beach County, Florida, State Attorney Barry Krischer credited the O.J.
Simpson case with the change in judicial consciousness. Frankel, supra note 59, at 63-
64.
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to be current on domestic violence trends.7 At the same time, the in-
creased public consciousness about domestic violence has put judges
under considerable pressure: If a judge shows leniency to the wrong
domestic violence defendant, it can be career ending.78 Courts are in-
creasingly receptive to expert testimony explaining victim absence or
recantations in domestic violence prosecutions.70 It is not surprising
that some judges openly advocate greater receptivity to complainants'
80hearsay statements to ease the way for "victimless" prosecution.
77 In many states judges have taken an active role in grant-planning teams and
other efforts to reform domestic violence prosecutions. See Gersten, supra note 61 (of-
fering a judge's account of the growing use of hearsay exceptions in proving domestic
violence cases where the victim is unwilling to cooperate); Cindy S. Lederman &
Neena M. Malik, Family Violence: A Report on the State of the Research, FLA. BJ., Dec. 1999,
at 58 (arguing that judges should keep current on family violence research to inform
decision making in domestic violence cases). Judge Lederman was one of the archi-
tects of Florida's domestic violence courts. In Washtenaw County, all of the judges
who preside over criminal cases are involved in the community response domestic vio-
lence grant team, which meets regularly to oversee the projects the grant money funds.
In addition, judges attend training sessions sponsored annually by domestic violence
advocates. As one Washtenaw County judge, John Collins, said at a recent meeting
about the domestic violence grant, "We are told, and we believe, that every time a de-
fendant gets arrested for domestic violence it is, on average, the seventh time he has
assaulted her. As judges, we don't have the luxury of thinking about the six times that
came before." Personal notes from Domestic Violence Grant Training/Planning
Meeting, Washtenaw County, Mich. (Feb. 8, 2000) (on file with authors).78
Judge Lorin Duckman, who sat in New York City Criminal Court, became a tar-
get of public outcry when a criminal defendant, whom he had released on bail after
allegedly assaulting his girlfriend, killed her. Mayor Rudolph Giuliani and Governor
George Pataki called for his removal, and Pataki filed a complaint with the Commis-
sion on Judicial Conduct. John Sullivan, Report Says Judge in Domestic-Violence Cases
Abused Power, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1997, at BI. Similarly, Maryland Governor Parris N.
Glendening and some state legislators urged the state Commission on Judicial Disabili-
ties to "take appropriate action" against Baltimore CountyJudge ThomasJ. Bollinger,
Sr., after he agreed to erase the conviction of a man who had beaten his wife. David
Montgomery, Judge Erases Conviction, Draws Outcry; Man's Record Cleared of Domestic Vio-
lence, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 1997, at Cl.
79 See Adam Nossiter, When Battered Women Recant: New Witness for the Prosecution,
N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1996, § 4, at 4 (highlighting New York courts' willingness to allow
"experts on battered women to contradict a reluctant witness"); Rogers, supra note 61,
at 69 (1998) ("Between 1991 and 1997 ... appellate courts in at least thirteen more
jurisdictions ruled on the admissibility of expert testimony to explain a battering vic-
tim's puzzling behavior at or before trial. All of those jurisdictions, except Ohio, ap-
proved of prosecutorial use of expert testimony.").
80 See Renee Esfandiary & Krista Newkirk, Interview with the Honorable John E. Klock of
the Alexandria Circuit Court Defending Mandatory Arrest, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L.
241, 241 (1997) (explaining why Judge Klock supports Virginia's "victimless" prosecu-
tion policy); Gersten, supra note 61, at 65-66 (outlining recent state courts' endorse-
ment of the use of hearsay exceptions in proving domestic violence cases where the
victim is unwilling to cooperate). Michigan's Domestic Violence Benchbook directs judges
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B. The Participants'Awareness
Increased law-enforcement responses to domestic violence have
been accompanied by greater awareness on the part of those who are
involved in the violence-whether as victim or as perpetrator-about
those responses and about domestic violence itself. Part of that
to consider all of the evidentiary possibilities in "victimless" prosecutions, because
"some criminal trials on charges involving allegations of domestic violence may be
similar to murder trials in that the victim will not appear as a witness." See MARY M.
LoviK, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE BENCHBOOK 5-1 to 5-21 (1998) (comprising part of a sec-
tion entitled Evidentiary Issues Where the Complaining Witness Cannot Participate Effectively
at Trial).
For a rather extreme example of judicial receptivity to a complainant's hearsay
statement, see State v. O'Connor, No. C1-98-575, 1998 Minn. App. LEXIS 1268, at *2-5
(Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 24, 1998). The complainant did not appear at trial, and the
prosecutor attempted to introduce her statements through the responding police offi-
cer by claiming they constituted a business record, id. at *2-3, and thus fell within an
exception to the rule against hearsay, MINN. R. EVID. 803(6). Defense counsel ob-
jected, and the court suggested that the prosecutor try the excited utterance excep-
tion. 1998 Minn. App. LEXIS 1268, at *2-3. When the prosecutor hesitated because
the statement had been taken "some time later after the incident took place," the
court responded that what was important was whether the victim was "upset and cry-
ing." Id. at *3. The prosecutor still hesitated, telling the court that the statement was
taken "about some 20 minutes later." Id. Perhaps frustrated by the lack of prosecuto-
rial assistance, the court then took over the examination of the officer and led him
through the excited utterance foundation:
THE COURT: Did the person say anything as to how she got injured when
she was upset and crying when you saw her?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: What did she say?
THE WITNESS: She said she was assaulted by her husband.
THE COURT: She was upset and crying at that time?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, Your Honor, that is not in the report.
THE COURT: Well, that is not-you can cross examine on that, but tell me-
you have testified that when you were at the scene she was upset and crying,
her left eye was puffy to the temple area?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: Did you talk to her then?
THE WITNESS: I talked to her shortly before I took the statement.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Then, your honor-
THE COURT: Well, when she was upset and crying, at that point did she say
something to you?
THE WITNESS: Yes, she said she was hit by her husband.
THE COURT: Describe her demeanor at the time she said that?
THE WITNESS: She was upset and crying.
Id. at *3-5. The appellate court held that the trial court "exceeded its prerogative to
interrogate witnesses by suggesting an exception to the hearsay rule that the prosecu-
tor had not only failed to consider but also deemed inapplicable," but it upheld
O'Connor's conviction on the ground that the error was harmless. Id. at *7-8.
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awareness, we believe, is an understanding that statements made in
911 calls or in follow-up interviews are likely to lead to arrest and
prosecution and to be used against the alleged abuser at trial.
Domestic violence cases are grist for the daily mill of the popular
media. Local media give close attention to local cases 8 and dramati-
zations of cases, real or fictional, are presented on national television• 82
and in the movies. The O.J. Simpson criminal case, probably the
most observed trial of the twentieth century, focused public attention
for an extended period on domestic violence and responses to it. Mil-
lions of Americans heard a tape recording of a 911 call by Nicole
Brown Simpson being introduced into evidence against Mr. Simpson.
Recognizing that domestic violence is terribly underreported,
governments and social service agencies have made concerted efforts
to foster awareness of the problem and of the responses to it. Indeed,
President Clinton issued a proclamation in October 1996 designating
83that month as National Domestic Violence Awareness Month. Fre-
quent advertisements in a wide variety of media remind us that do-
mestic violence is a crime and encourage victims to report it. 84 In the
stalls of a women's room at a movie house in Ann Arbor, Michigan,
for example, one finds posters, pamphlets, and small cards announc-
ing the different phone lines, including 911, that victims of domestic
violence can call to get a response. This information is repeated on
81 The San Diego domestic violence prosecution and police units "launched an
on-going campaign to work with the media to change the way every one in San Diego
thinks about domestic violence cases" to accompany changes in police and prosecution
strategy. Gwinn & O'Dell, supra note 66, at 303-04. A search conducted on NewsLi-
brary <www.newslibrary.com> revealed that in 1999 the Boston Globe ran at least 269 ar-
ticles containing the term "domestic violence." A similar search of the Detroit Free
Press database <www.freep.com/newslibrary> showed that during the same year the
Detroit Free Press ran at least eighty-three articles containing the term "domestic vio-
lence." These searches, of course, do not include articles that covered incidents of ac-
tual or alleged domestic violence but did not use the term "domestic violence."
82 See, e.g., SLEEPING WITH THE ENEMY (Twentieth Century Fox 1991) (relaying the
story of a woman who fakes her own death in an attempt to escape her abusive hus-
band); THE BURNING BED (NBC television broadcast, Oct. 8, 1984) (telling the tale,
based on a true story, of a woman who, after years of abuse, douses her husband in
gasoline and sets him on fire while he sleeps).
83 Proclamation No. 6927, 61 Fed. Reg. 52,677 (Oct. 3, 1996).
84 The national "There's No Excuse for Domestic Violence" public education
campaign, launched in 1994, and run by the Family Violence Prevention Fund, won
nearly $100 million in media support in its first five years. The campaign's public serv-
ice announcements aired on all the major networks and print versions ran in many ma-
jor newspapers and other outlets. Family Violence Prevention Fund, Public Education
Program Overview, at http://endabuse.org/programs/publiceducation (last visited
Mar. 19, 2002).
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the big screen before the show starts, between movie trivia and ads for
local businesses. 5 The same messages are presented on the sides of
local buses and on posters in all courthouses and county buildings, as
well as in some commercial and other buildings.
Because the principal aim of these efforts is to encourage victims
of domestic violence to report it, one of their major themes is that re-
porting will not be futile. Victims are reminded that their complaints
will be taken seriously and that protective and punitive action to assist
them will follow issuance of the complaint. Thus, five pages of a pam-
phlet distributed statewide by the Michigan Women's Commission de-
scribe the dangers and risks of domestic violence and the responses
the law can and will make when it occurs. Victims of domestic vio-
lence are encouraged to call the police because the police can help in
a number of ways-including using the report they are required to
complete to prove the case in court.
s6
Mandatory law enforcement strategies-mandatory arrest and
lock-up laws and "no drop" prosecution policies-also are a significant
part of the picture; these policies also have received wide, and favor-
able, media exposure.87 If these strategies are to have their intended
deterrent effect, law enforcement officials need to make sure that
both potential victims and potential abusers 
know about them.
8
85 These observations were made at the Quality 16 Theater, Jackson Road, Ann
Arbor, and the State Theater, State Street, Ann Arbor.
86 AIMEE ARGEL, MICHIGAN WOMEN'S COMMISSION, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: WHAT
SOME WOMEN LIVE WITH IS A CRIME 14 (n.d.) (on file with authors).
87 Churchill, supra note 65.
The "There's No Excuse" campaign directed public service announcements
(PSAs) at victims, assailants, and friends and neighbors of both. One aimed
at friends of abusers depicts a woman whose face has been beaten, and
then in large print the legend proclaims, "IT'S HARD TO CONFRONT A
FRIEND WHO ABUSES HIS WIFE. BUT NOT NEARLY AS HARD AS
BEING HIS WIFE." Family Violence Prevention Fund, Men's Invervention, at
http://endabuse.org/programs/publiceducaton/images/ads/n-l1 504-c'jpg. Under-
neath, the text of the advertisement reads:
So you know your friend is an abuser. Do you ignore it or bring it up? Ignor-
ing it is easy. Bringing it up is awkward. You could lose a friend. But maybe
bringing it up is the only way to really be a friend. Telling him you know, tell-
ing him it's wrong, telling him it's a punishable crime, could be doing him a
big favor. Maybe he needs someone to talk to. Maybe he needs someone to
say, "No, it's not OK." But more important than his feelings, his wife's
well-being, her very life may be in your hands. We can give you some informa-
tion that may help. Call us at 1-800-END ABUSE.
Id. To view other PSAs used in the campaign, see Family Violence
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There has been a substantial increase in calls to 911 reporting domes-
tic violence since mandatory law enforcement strategies took hold
across the country."" People know now that if they call 911 and report
domestic violence there will probably be an arrest and prosecution.
Indeed, "under mandatory arrest laws, a battered woman's call to the
police is tantamount to a request for arrest.
''
190
This awareness is reinforced by the fact that many of those who
are involved in incidents of domestic violence have been involved be-
fore,91 and even if they have not it is likely that they know someone
who has been.92 Whether their prior experience was as suspect or as
complainant, potential callers are not naive about the system. They
are almost sure to know that when a police officer responds to a do-
mestic violence complaint the officer will likely feel compelled to
leave the scene with someone in custody.
Furthermore, "repeat players" are likely to understand another
phenomenon: The person first to call and complain is most likely to
89 See Marion Wanless, Note, Mandatory Arrest: A Step Toward Eradicating Domestic
Violence, But Is It Enough?, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 533, 550 (citing New Jersey, Iowa, and
Wisconsin as examples of states witnessing an increase in reports of domestic violence
in response to their mandatory arrest policies). There is evidence, however, that not
every segment of the population avails itself of the service equally. In one New York
study, African-American participants expressed the view that reporting batterers to the
police was a breach of loyalty. INSTITUTE ON VIOLENCE, INC., VIOLENCE IN THE LIVES
OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN WOMEN: A Focus GROUP STUDY 18-19 (Beth E. Ritchie ed.,
1996). Mistrust of 911 services by African Americans has been reflected in popular cul-
ture. See PUBLIC ENEMY, 911 Is ajoke, on FEAR OF A BLACK PLANET (CBS Records 1990)
("Now I dialed 911 a long time ago/Don't you see how late they're reactin'/They only
come and they come when they wanna."). Studies finding that mandatory arrest poli-
cies lead to greater violence against African-American women, see supra note 44 (citing
such analyses by Linda G. Mills and Donna M. Welch), may suggest that the mistrust is
well-founded.
90 Developments, supra note 42, at 1538.
91 Approximately one in five victims of domestic abuse report three or more simi-
lar assaults within that six-month period. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T
OFJUSTICE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: VIOLENCE BETWEEN INTIMATES 2 (1994). Recidivism
rates are high regardless of police practices. SeeJ. David Hirschel & Ira W. Hutchison,
Realities & Implications of the Charlotte Spousal Abuse Experiment, in DO ARRESTS AND
RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 54, 73 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1996)
(showing that differing police strategies for coping with domestic violence calls pro-
duced similar results in recidivism rates).
92 Though domestic violence occurs frequently in all aspects of the population, it
is particularly common in certain subpopulations. See JAMES PTACEK, BATTERED
WOMEN IN THE COURTROOM: THE POWER OFJUDICIAL RESPONSES 23-26 (1999) (dis-
cussing the correlation between poverty and violence); Donna Coker, ShiftingPowerfor
Battered Women: Law, Material Resources, and Poor Women of Color, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1009, 1036-37 (2000) (discussing studies that have shown overrepresentation of domes-
tic violence to be correlated with race and socio-economic status).
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get to stay home, while the other person is the one charged and taken
in custody. We know of no formal research establishing this proposi-
tion, but it has held true in every case handled by Professor McCor-
mack and other lawyers who have shared their experiences with us. It
also helps explain a phenomenon noted above, that increasing num-
bers of women have been arrested for domestic violence." To some
extent, this phenomenon probably reflects the underlying reality that
men are sometimes the victims of domestic violence and, until re-
cently, had failed to report it. But we believe that, to a greater extent,
it reflects merely a race to the phone by abusers who have been
through the system and who know that they will be in a much better
position if they are the first to call;
94 batterers, skilled at controlling
their victims, 95 are also likely to manipulate the law enforcement and
evidence gathering system to which 911 is the threshold.
The behavioral patterns suggested by our incentive analysis of 911
have played out, at least anecdotally. In more than one case handled
by Professor McCormack's office, the complainant reported having
won a race to dial 911 and being the first to report the incident that
led to the defendant's arrest. In one case,
96 the fight for the phone
became the primary issue. Having been through the mandatory
prosecution system already, as a defendant, the husband understood
the problems he would face if his wife was the first to report their
physical altercation. As she reached for the phone, he ripped it out of
the wall. Once he had successfully insulated himself from her allega-
tions, he went outside with his cell phone and placed his own call to
911, claiming that she had assaulted him.
97 As he expected, his allega-
93 Supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
Q4 Even OJ. Simpson may have learned the advantage of getting to the phone first.
On one occasion, Simpson placed a call to 911, alerting the operator that he was con-
cerned about his girlfriend's safety. Sue Anne Pressley, OJ Simpson, from One Hot Spot
to Another; He's Traded Calif. for Fla., but Can't Dodge Scandal, WASH. POST, Aug. 31, 2000,
at C1. Several months later, an employee of a hotel in which the couple was a guest,
concerned by a loud altercation, called 911. Id. The police report of the incident
listed Simpson as the victim. Id.
95 See generally DONALD G. DUTTON & SUSAN K. GOLANT, THE BATFERER: A
PSYCHOLOGICAL PROFILE 29-33 (1995) (discussing how some batterers abuse their vic-
tims emotionally by dominating and isolating them); NEIL S. JACOBSON & JOHN M.
GOTIMAN, WHEN MEN BATrER WOMEN: NEW INSIGHTS INTO ENDING ABUSIVE
RELATIONSHIPS 76-79 (1998) (discussing how batterers use mind control to manipulate
their victims); PTACEK, supra note 92, at 74-91 (discussing the tactics of men who batter
and finding that batterers use violence to control their victims).
96 Personal case notes from Case No. 00-0000225, 14A-1 Dist. Ct., Washtenaw
County, Mich. (Aug. 14, 2000) (on file with authors).
97 According to his neighbor, after calling 911 from his cell phone he laughed and
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tion was treated seriously; his wife was charged with assault, though
the prosecutor eventually dismissed the charges.9
In another series of local cases, 99 a divorced couple had four do-
mestic violence charges between them; each party had been charged
twice. Each time one was arrested, there was a claim that there had
been a race to the phone with competing allegations. And each time,
the prosecutor used the winner's phone call to secure yet another
conviction.0 0 There was a running threat between the parties to call
and falsely report more domestic violence.
Similar cases have arisen in California. Some men have injured
themselves superficially and then called the police and had their part-
ners arrested. One Sacramento man scratched a scab on his ear to
make it bleed, and then called the police and had his wife arrested. 1
A Los Angeles man born with a pronounced bump on his head had
his wife arrested three times before the police realized that he was
manipulating the mandatory system to his advantage.]°
These attempts at manipulation do not always succeed to the
point of securing a trial and conviction of the other person. 13 We do
said, "Got you now, bitch." Id.
98 The prosecutor did so after learning how manipulative the "victim" was. He
had two convictions for child abuse and a history of abusing and controlling his wife
and ex-wife. But the prosecutor could have proved the case against the wife with his
911 call and follow-up statements to the police, and the jury might never have known
any of his history. Id.
99 Personal trial notes from Case Nos. 99-0190 & 01-0445, 14B Dist. Ct., Washtenaw
County, Mich. (Sept. 2000 & Dec. 3, 2001) (on file with authors).
100 Id.
101 Johnson, supra note 49. Another Northern California man hit himself in the
head with a brick and then reported to police that his wife assaulted him. As neigh-
bors saw the police arresting the wife, they spoke up and the additional facts came out.
Id. A California administrator of counseling groups for male batterers reports that
some abusers freely admit using the system to get revenge. Id.
102 Id. Similar incidents have occurred in Washtenaw County, Michigan. Accord-
ing to Blaine Longsworth, chief prosecutor of the Domestic Violence Unit, "[u]sually it
is a person who has been through the system previously and understands the decision-
making process that the police utilize. These folks realize that if they can show the
cops a visible injury, they can tell the police the victim attacked first." Interview with
Blaine Longsworth, supra note 63.
103 Sometimes, police and prosecutors get to the bottom of a false report to 911 or
police before a complaint is brought. See Keller v. State, 431 S.E.2d 411, 411-12 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1993) (describing how the police quickly assessed that the defendant had
falsely reported that the man with whom she lived had robbed her home); Chris Tisch,
Man Arrested in Phony Complaint, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 29, 2000, at 3 (telling the
story of a man who, in an effort to remove his girlfriend's seventy-two-year-old mother
from his home, called 911 and reported that she had attacked him with a steak knife).
In yet another case handled by law students supervised by Professor McCormack, the
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not contend that most 911 callers manipulate the system; on the con-
trary, we believe that most do not. Rather, our principal point is that
most 911 callers know what they are doing. They know that by making
the call they are practically ensuring that the other person will be ar-
rested, and that a criminal prosecution will probably follow. We also
believe that in most cases they understand that the prosecutor may at-
tempt to use the statements they make to the 911 operator or to the
police officer who follows up on the call. In short, these 911 callers
realize they are creating evidence for the prosecution as they call.1"
Even if such knowledge is not as widespread as we believe it is, it
will be soon, assuming present trends continue. As more courts admit
statements made by 911 callers, the message illustrated by the Simp-
son case will become only more deeply ingrained in the consciousness
of the public, and especially of those who are involved in domestic vio-
lence: If you call 911, your statements will make their way to court-
whether you do or not.
C. Summary
We are eager to avoid misunderstanding. Domestic violence, as
we have said, is a blight on society, and we applaud the increased ef-
wife was the first to dial 911, but the husband grabbed the phone and replaced the re-
ceiver before she could make her report. The 911 operator called back a moment
later, and the husband answered the phone and reported that his wife had scratched
and kicked him. When the responding officer arrived, the "victim" told the same story
he had told 911, and the officer-who had been called out to this family's home on
more than one prior occasion-arrested the wife. Personal case notes from Case No.
00-10138, 14A-1 Dist. Ct., Washtenaw County, Mich. (May 16, 2001) (on file with
authors). But when interviewed by the student attorney representing his wife, the hus-
band admitted that he had been drunk, had pushed his wife into a wall, and had
grabbed the phone when she tried to make a 911 report. Id. Only then did the prose-
cutor, who had been prepared to try the wife without the husband's live testimony, ar-
range for the wife to take a police-administered lie detector test. She passed it, and the
prosecutor dismissed the charge against her. Id.
104 The same problem can occur with reports directly to police. In another case
handled by law students supervised by Professor McCormack, the complainant, after
an argument with his girlfriend in his truck, instead of going to a phone to call 911,
drove directly to the police station and reported that his girlfriend had scratched him,
punched him and threatened him with a screwdriver. Personal case notes from Case
No. 00-2366, 15th Dist. Ct., Washtenaw County, Mich. (Dec. 31, 2000) (on file with
authors). The prosecutor issued a complaint based on his allegation, without ever in-
terviewing the girlfriend. Id. Had an officer done so, he or she would have seen the
extensive bruising the girlfriend suffered as a result of the "argument." Id. She had no
prior experience with the criminal justice system up to that moment and was afraid to
report her boyfriend's escalating abuse. Id. He, on the other hand, had a great deal of
experience with the system, id., which may explain why he reported her first.
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forts to combat it, and to encourage victims to report it. We take no
position on the complex question of the merits of mandatory law en-
forcement strategies. Our basic point is simply this: The web of de-
velopments that we have discussed-increased public concern and po-
litical attention to the problem, aggressive strategies by police and
prosecutors, a receptive attitude by courts, and understanding by par-
ticipants-means that statements made in calls to 911 or in follow-up
interviews with police are likely to result in arrest and prosecution.
Additionally, those conversations are likely to be deemed admissible at
trial, and many callers are aware of this. So long as courts remain re-
ceptive to this evidence, callers effectively will be able to dial in their
testimony, without having to appear at trial, take an oath, or subject
themselves to cross-examination.
III. THE DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORK
In this Part, we discuss the development and status of the doc-
trinal framework in which courts consider the admissibility of state-
ments made in 911 calls and follow-up conversations. Though doc-
trinal analysis cannot provide complete answers, we believe it can shed
significant light on two questions: Why have courts traditionally not
been receptive to prosecutors' use of these statements? And why have
courts recently changed their attitudes toward such use?
Section A of this Part shows that the confrontation right devel-
oped before and apart from the rule against hearsay. The confronta-
tion right, like the oath,'0 5 is one of the fundamental conditions gov-
erning the giving of testimony. If a person is going to testify against
an accused, she should offer the testimony under oath, in the pres-
ence of the accused and subject to cross-examination.
In Section B, we turn to hearsay law, with a focus on the "sponta-
neous exclamation" or "excited utterance" exception, which princi-
pally underlies the admission of statements made in 911 calls and fol-
low-up conversations. We will show that this exception emerged out
of the traditional res gestae doctrine, which originally was sensitive to
the testimonial nature of narrative statements describing an event that
predictably would lead to litigation. Thus, nineteenth-century courts
resisted the admission of statements that were narrative in nature or
that had been made after the close of the events they described.
American courts eventually abandoned these restraints under the in-
105 See generally Helen Silving, The Oath: I, 68 YALE L.J. 1329 (1959) (providing an
account of the evolution of the judicial oath in different legal systems).
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fluence of John Henry Wigmore in the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury and of the Federal Rules of Evidence in the second half. The ex-
ception is now well established; no longer can it be characterized as a
limitation on the definition of hearsay, applicable only to statements
offered for what might be considered a nonhearsay purpose. Nor is it
confined to genuinely spontaneous exclamations, made without any
opportunity for reflection. Instead, it has been stretched to reach
many statements that, while purportedly made while the declarant was
still affected by a stressful event, were made with ample opportunity
for reflection and with the anticipation that the statement would be
used in investigating or prosecuting crime. Furthermore, while the
issue may have been in doubt before, a pronouncement by Wigmore,
and its adoption by the Federal Rules, established for most American
courts that the exception is applicable even if the declarant is available
to be a witness.
Even if hearsay law does not prevent the admission of a statement,
the Confrontation Clause might. The Supreme Court, however, has
never articulated well the bounds of the confrontation right, and Sec-
tion C of this Part shows that, over the last two decades, the Court has
tended to merge the confrontation right and hearsay law. As a result,
if a statement fits within the hearsay exception for excited utterances,
the Confrontation Clause will not, under current law, pose an obstacle
to its admission.
As a result of these developments, what is now referred to as the
"excited utterance" exception has been used to allow prosecutorial
use of statements that are testimonial in nature, but were not made
under the conditions required for testimony-and current Confronta-
tion Clause jurisprudence offers no resistance to the practice.
A. Historical Development of the Confrontation Right'
0 6
Most adjudicative systems rely on the testimony of witnesses for
fact-finding, rather than on irrational methods like the ordeal or trial
106 This Section draws on a portion of the amicus brief submitted by the American
Civil Liberties Union in Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999). Professor Friedman and
Professor Margaret Berger were the principal authors of the brief. See Brief of Amici
Curiae American Civil Liberties Union et al., Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999) (No.
98-5881) (articulating the belief that the Confrontation Clause has too often been
treated as little more than a constitutional analog of the hearsay rules, thus undere-
valuating its significance in the constitutional scheme), available at LEXIS 1998 U.S.
Briefs 5881, at *1.
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by battle.0 7 If a system is to rely on testimony, then it must determine
the conditions under which acceptable testimony can be given. Since
ancient times, most western systems have required that testimony be
given under oath, or some similar affirmation. 18 The oath not only
provides solemnity and a reminder of the witness's obligation to tell
the truth, but it assures that if the witness testifies falsely she exposes
herself to considerable risk. In older days, many witnesses believed
that if they swore falsely they risked eternal damnation. While few
witnesses have that fear today, false testimony still exposes them to
prosecution for perjury or cognate crimes.
Another fundamental condition for testimony is that it be given in
front of the adverse party. The right of an accused to confront the
witnesses against him has received its fullest development within the
Anglo-American tradition, but it has also been a critical feature of
other judicial systems. The ancient Hebrews required accusing wit-
nesses to give their testimony in front of the accused,' 9 as did the Ro-
mans. The Book of Acts quotes the Roman Governor Festus as saying:
"It is not the manner of the Romans to deliver any man up to die be-
fore the accused has met his accusers face to face, and has been given
a chance to defend himself against the charges." l0
When medieval Continental systems began to rely on the testi-
mony of witnesses, they allowed the parties to examine the witnesses,
107 For an explanation of the ordeal, see J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO
ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 5 (3d ed. 1990):
Ordeals involved an appeal to God to reveal the truth in human disputes ....
In [ordeal by fire], a piece of iron was put into a fire and then in the party's
hand; the hand was bound, and inspected a few days later; if the burn had fes-
tered, God was taken to have decided against the party. The ordeal of cold
water required the party to be trussed and lowered into a pond; if he sank, the
water was deemed to have 'received him' with God's blessing, and so he was
quickly fished out.
For an explanation of trial by battle, see THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 105 (1929), explaining that in criminal cases battle "lay
when a private person brought a criminal charge against another. It was deadly; if the
defeated defendant was not already slain in the battle he was immediately hanged on
the gallows which stood ready."
08 See Silving, supra note 105, at 1329-30 (discussing the historical evolution of the
judicial oath in various legal systems and showing that it has remained an atavistic sur-
vival of an ancient ritual).
1o. Deuteronomy 19:15-18.
11 Acts 25:16, quoted in Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1015-16 (1988) and Greene v.
McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 n.25 (1959) (using slightly different language). The NEW
ENGLISH BIBLE 246 (2d ed. 1970) translates the key passage as "before he is confronted
with his accusers."
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but on written questions."' These systems took the testimony behind
closed doors, for fear that witnesses would be coached or intimidated.
By contrast, the open and confrontational way in which testimony was
taken-an "altercation" between accuser and accused, in a celebrated
sixteenth-century description by Sir Thomas Smith' 
2-was the most
critical characteristic of the common law trial. Beginning in the fif-
teenth century, and continuing for centuries afterwards, numerous
English judges and commentators praised the open and confronta-
tional nature of the English trial in contrast to its Continental coun-
terpart.13 For example, Sir Matthew Hale lauded the "open Course of
Evidence to the Jury in the Presence of the Judges, Jury, Parties and
Council" in English criminal procedure." 4 Among other advantages,
this procedure allowed "Opportunity for all Persons concern'd" to
question the witness and "Opportunity of confronting the adverse
Witnesses." 115 In a passage closely following Hale, Blackstone articu-
lated many of the same advantages, including "the confronting of ad-
verse witnesses" of "the English[] way of giving testimony, ore tenus.""
6
I R.C. Van Caenegem, History of European Civil Procedure, in 16 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW § 2-58, at 77 (Mauro Cappelletti ed., 1973) (dis-
cussing how witnesses' statements were "taken privately by the judge and his clerk,
though sometimes interrogatours might be handed in with statements of the points on
which the procator wished the witness to be examined").
112 THOMAS SMITH, DE REPUBLICA ANGLORUM 114 (Mary Dewar ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1982) (1583) (describing a typical criminal trial).
"13 Around 1470, even before the roles of witnesses and juries were clearly distin-
guished, Sir John Fortescue praised the openness of the English system in contrast to
that of the civil law. JOHN FORTESCUE, ON THE LAWS AND GOVERNANCE OF ENGLAND
38-40 (Shelley Lockwood ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997) (c. 1471).
114 MATrHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 163 (Charles
M. Gray ed., Univ. of Chi. Press 1971) (1713).
11 Id. at 164.
1 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *373-74. Ore tenus means "by word of
mouth" or "orally." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1126 (7th ed. 1999). Hale and Black-
stone spoke of "confronting" one witness against another. Similarly, in 1730, Sollom
Emlyn emphasized the "Excellency" of English criminal procedure in his monumental
collection of state trials: "In other Countries, the Witnesses are examin'd in private,
and in the Prisoner's Absence; with us, they are produced face to face, and deliver
their Evidence in open Court, the Prisoner himself being present, and at liberty to
cross-examine them... ." A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE-TRIALS, AND
PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH-TREASON, AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS, at iii-iv
(Sollom Emlyn ed., London, T. Wright 1776). Additionally, Lord Chief Justice Po-
pham, arguing for the superiority of English over Scots law, contended that "the Tes-
timonies, being viva voce before the Judges in open face of the world.., was much to
be preferred [over] written depositions by private examiners or Commissioners." Le
Case del Union, del Realm, D'Escose, ove Angleterre, 72 Eng. Rep. 908, 913 (KB.
1604).
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Thus, by 1696, in the celebrated case of Rex v. Paine,'7 it was clearly
established that, even if a witness had died, his statement made to a
justice of the peace could not be admitted against a misdemeanor de-
fendant because the defendant was not present when the examination
was taken and so "could not cross-examine" the deponent. n8
To be sure, the norm of confrontation was not always respected. 19
Thus, a set of courts in England, including the equity courts, followed
the Continental system rather than the common law, relying largely
on testimony taken out of court and out of the presence of the par-
ties."o These courts appeared to be arms of an unlimited royal power,
and so many of them-notably the Court of Star Chamber-did not
survive the political and social upheavals of the seventeenth century.12 1
17 87 Eng. Rep. 584, 90 Eng. Rep. 527, 90 Eng. Rep. 1062, 91 Eng. Rep. 246, 91
Eng. Rep. 1387 (K.B. 1696).
118 90 Eng. Rep. at 1062; see also 91 Eng. Rep. at 1387 ("An information taken be-
fore a justice cannot be read in evidence after the death of the party who gave it on a
prosecution for a misdemeanor.").
119 For example, Paine itself distinguished felony cases. Since the mid-sixteenth
century, justices of the peace had been required by statute to examine felony witnesses,
and these examinations were admissible at trial, even though the witness had not been
cross-examined, if the witness was then unavailable and the examination was taken un-
der oath. JOHN H. LANGBEIN, PROSECUTING CRIME IN THE RENAISSANCE 27-29 (1974).
This anomalously lenient treatment-which was probably one of the abuses at which
the Confrontation Clause was aimed-was controversial by the early seventeenth cen-
tury. See The King v. Westbeer, 168 Eng. Rep. 108, 109 (K.B. 1739) (overruling, after
much argument, objection to admissibility of deposition taken pursuant to statute and
without cross-examination of witness who had since died, but ruling that deposition
would not be taken as conclusive "unless it were strongly corroborated by other testi-
mony"). It was eliminated by statute in the nineteenth century. Sir John Jervis' Act,
1848, 11 & 12 Vict., c. 42, § 17 (Eng.) (allowing use of deposition of unavailable witness
at trial for any indictable offense if the deposition was taken under certain conditions,
including oath, the presence of the accused, and the opportunity of the accused to
question the witness).
120 See, e.g., WILLIAM HUDSON, A TREATISE ON THE COURT OF STAR-CHAMBER
(1621) ("Parties and witnesses may not hear the several examinations of every wit-
ness."), reprinted in COLLECTANEAJURIDICA 204 (Francis Hargrave ed., Fred B. Roth-
man & Co. 1980). The equity courts did, however, carefully preserve the ability of the
parties to examine adverse witnesses, albeit on written questions. Cf Rushworth v.
Countess de Pembroke & Currier, 145 Eng. Rep. 553 (Ex. D. 1668) (recognizing the
right of parties to examine adverse witnesses by means of depositions or interrogato-
ries, but denying such right to a non-party to the suit at hand). For this reason, the law
courts were willing to accept depositions as a substitute for trial testimony when the
witness was unavailable to testify at trial and the party against whom the deposition was
offered, or a privy, had the opportunity to examine the witness at the deposition. See,
e.g., Howard v. Tremain, 87 Eng. Rep. 314, 89 Eng. Rep. 641, 90 Eng. Rep. 757, 91 Eng.
Rep. 243 (K.B. 1692-1693) (deciding that depositions taken de bene esse are good evi-
dence at law, where the witness dies before defendant's answer).
1 THE STUART CONSTITUTION 104-06 (J.P. Kenyon ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2d
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And sometimes in the common law courts, especially in politically
charged cases, the Crown, eager to use the criminal law as a means of
controlling its adversaries, used testimony taken out of the presence of
the accused. Thus, it is in the treason cases of Tudor and Stuart Eng-
land that one finds the battle for the confrontation right most clearly
fought.
As early as 1521, treason defendants, often using the term "face to
face," demanded that witnesses be brought before them.
2 2 Sometimes
these demands were heeded,12 and sometimes they were not, but what
is most notable is that they found recurrent support in acts of Parlia-
ment, which repeatedly required that accusing witnesses be brought
"face to face" with the defendant. By the middle of the seventeenth
century, the battle was won, and courts routinely required that treason
witnesses testify before the accused and be subjected to questioning by
him.
25
Well into that century, prosecutorial authorities often tried to use
ed. 1986).
122 E.g., Duke of Somerset's Trial, Y.B. 5 Edw. 6 (1551), in 1 HOWELL'S STATE
TRIALS 515, 520 (1811); Seymour's Case, Y.B. 2 Edw. 6 (1549), in I HOWELL'S STATE
TRIALS 483, 492 (1811).
13 According to EDWARD HALL, THE UNION OF THE TWO NOBLE AND ILLUSTRE
FAMELIES OF LANCASTRE & YORKE (1548), reprinted as HALL'S CHRONICLE 623 (AMS
Press Inc. 1965) (1809), the witnesses against the Duke of Buckingham in 1521 were
produced at his request. Hall's account of Buckingham's trial appears to be the ulti-
mate source for the one offered by Shakespeare. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING HENRY
THE EIGHTH act 2, sc. 1.
John Spelman, a justice of the King's Bench, was careful to note in his report of a
1531 treason trial that the accuser confronted the defendant "face to face." R. v. Rice
AP Griffith, Lloyd, & Hughes (1531), reprinted in 93 THE PUBLICATIONS OF THE SELDEN
SOCIETY 47 (J.H. Baker ed., 1977).
124 For acts that used the "face to face" formulation, see An Act for Punishment of
Diverse Kinds of Treasons, 1552, 5 & 6 Edw. 6, c. 11, § 9 (Eng.); 1 & 2 Phil. & M., c. 10,
§ 11 (1554) (Eng.), which required witnesses to be "brought forth in person" before
the accused; 1 Eliz., c. 1, § 21 (1558) (Eng.); 1 Eliz., c. 5, § 10 (1558) (Eng.); 13 Eliz., c.
1, § 9 (1571) (Eng.); and 13 Car. 2, c. 1, § 5 (1661) (Eng.).
15 For example, in the celebrated trial of John Lilburne in 1649, there was no
doubt that the witnesses would testify live in front of Lilburne: "[H]ear what the wit-
nesses say first," said the presiding judge in postponing one of Lilburne's arguments.
Lilburne's Case (1649), in 4 HOWELL'S STATE TRIALS 1270, 1329. When the witnesses
did testify, Lilburne was allowed to pose questions to them through the court. Id., in 4
HOWELL'S STATE TRIALS at 1333-35, 1340. In John Mordant's Case, just nine years later,
there does not seem to have been any doubt that the accused could question the wit-
nesses directly, which he did. Mordant's Case (1658), in 5 HOWELL'S STATE TRIALS
907, 919-21. Indeed, at one point the presiding judge solicitously inquired whether
Mordant wished to ask a witness any questions, id., in 5 HOWELL'S STATE TRIALS at 922,
a practice that soon became routine, see, e.g., Colledge's Case (1681) (allowing the
prisoner to question the witness), in 8 HOWELL'S STATE TRIALS 549, 599, 603, 606.
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confessions made by alleged accomplices of the accused even if the
confessions were not made according to the usual norms of testimony
(under oath and before the accused). The case of Sir Walter Raleigh
is the most notorious, but far from the only one. In these cases, the
theory for admissibility of the confession was that self-accusation was
"as strong as if upon oath." 26 But the judges soon realized the iniquity
of allowing an exception to the usual norms of testimony simply be-, 127
cause the accomplice accused himself as well as another. In 1662,
the judges of the King's Bench ruled unanimously and definitively in
Tong's Case that, though a pretrial confession was "evidence against
the party himself who made the confession" and, if adequately proved,
could indeed support conviction of that person without witnesses to
the treason itself, the confession "cannot be made use of as evidence
against any others whom on his examination he confessed to be in the
treason."2 8 Thus, the judges stated in clear terms a fundamental prin-
ciple '2 that, as we shall see, the Supreme Court's modem Confronta-
tion Clause jurisprudence has occluded to a substantial degree.
The confrontation right naturally found its way to America.1
30
Thus, a Massachusetts statute of 1647 provided that "in all capital
cases all witnesses shall be present wheresoever they dwell." 31 But the
126 Earl of Somerset's Case (1616) (Coke, C.J.), in 2 HOWELL'S STATE TRIALs 966,
986. The theory was remarkably similar to the one adopted by the Virginia Supreme
Court in Lilly v. Commonwealth, 499 S.E.2d 522, 533-34 (Va. 1998), rev'd sub nom. Lilly v.
Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999).
In 1631, the judges concluded that, at the trial of a peer before the House of
Lords, "[c]ertain Examinations [clearly confessions from the context] having been
taken by the lords without an oath ... could not be used until they were repeated
upon oath." Lord Audley's Case (1631), in 3 HOWELL'S STATE TRIALS 401, 402.
128 Case of Thomas Tong, 84 Eng. Rep. 1061, 1062 (KB. 1662); see also Lilly v. Vir-
ginia, 527 U.S. 116, 141 (1999) (Breyer,J., concurring) (citing Tong's Casefor the prin-
ciple that an "out-of-court confession may be used against the confessor, but not
against his co-conspirators").
129 For important early endorsements of this principle, see GEOFFREY GILBERT,
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 99 (Garland Publ'g 1979) (1754). See also 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS,
A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 429 (Arno Press 1972) (1726). Gilbert's trea-
tise, published posthumously, was apparently written before 1710. Michael Macnair,
SirJeffrey Gilbert and His Treatises, 15J. LEG. HIST. 252, 266-67 n.107 (1994).
This importation was no doubt aided, especially toward the end of the seven-
teenth century, by the arrival of a substantial number of lawyers who "had received
their training at the Inns of Court in London and brought with them, applied, and en-
forced the procedural modifications enacted in England after the Revolution of 1688."
FRANCIS H. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 20 (1951); see also BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 30-31 (1967) (discussing the influence of England's legal
commentators on colonial American political thought).
131 THE BOOK OF THE GENERAL LAWES AND LIBERTYES CONCERNING THE
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Americans did not simply draw on English law. American criminal
procedure developed in a distinctive way. The right to counsel in fel-
ony trials developed far more quickly in America than in England,
and with it rose an adversarial spirit that made the opportunity for
confrontation of adverse witnesses especially crucial.
132 In addition,
the right became especially relevant to American concerns when in
the 1760s Parliament began to regulate the colonists through inquisi-
torial means like the Stamp Act, which provided for the examination
of witnesses upon interrogatories. 1
3 In the Revolutionary period, the
right to confrontation was frequently expressed, especially in the early
state constitutions. Some used the time-honored "face to face"
phrase; others, following Hale and Blackstone, adopted language
strikingly similar to that later used in the Sixth Amendment's Con-
frontation Clause. 135 It is clear that the Framers were aware not only of
the American history of the confrontation right, but also of the abuses
in the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century treason trials and of the de-
INHABITANTS OF THE MASSACHUSETs 54 (Thomas G. Barnes ed., 1975) (1648) (empha-
sis omitted). The same statute provided that in other cases the testimony of a witness
may be taken by a magistrate or a commissioner, but that if the witness lived within ten
miles of the court and was not disabled, this pretrial statement "shall not be received,
or made use of in the Court, except the witness be also present to be farther examined
about it." Id. (emphasis omitted).
132 See Randolph N. Jonakait, The Origins of the Confrontation Clause: An Alternative
History, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 77, 112-16 (1995) (arguing that before the Sixth Amendment,
several states adopted confrontation rights, as well as other procedural protections, as
a result of the adversarial nature of American trials).
133 See generally Murl A. Larkin, The Right of Confrontation: What Next?, 1 TEX. TECH.
L. REV. 67, 71-72 (1969) (citing the Stamp Act and other acts of Parliament as reasons
for the push for a confrontation right in America).
134 E.g., MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. XII, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR
LIBERTIES: DOCUMENTARY ORIGINS OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION AND BILL OF RIGHTS 376 (Richard L. Perry ed., 1952) [hereinafter
SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES] (outlining the right of the accused "to meet the witnesses
against him face to face"); N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. 1, art. XV, reprinted in SOURCES OF
OUR LIBERTIES, supra, at 384 (same).
15 See, e.g., MD. CONST. of 1776, § XIX, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, su-
pra note 134, at 348 (providing that "in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a
right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him"); N.C. CONST. of 1776, § VII,
reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 134, at 355 ("[E]very man has a
right... to confront the accusers and witnesses with other testimony."); PA. CONST. of
1776, § IX, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 134, at 330 ("[A] man
hath a fight.., to be confronted with the witnesses."); VA. CONST. of 1776, § 8, re-
printed in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 134, at 312 ("[A] man hath a fight•...
to be confronted with the accusers and witnesses."); VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. 1, § 10,
reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 134, at 366 ("[A] man hath a
right... to be confronted with the witnesses.").
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fendants' demands for meeting their accusers "face to face. 136
Note that in this account of the background of the Confrontation
Clause, we have not mentioned reliability. To be sure, one of the ad-
vantages perceived by those who lauded the common law system of
open confrontation of witnesses was its contribution to truth-
determination. 37 But neither in the statutes, caselaw, nor commen-
tary was there a suggestion that, if the courts determined that a par-
ticular item or type of testimony was reliable, then the accused lost his
right of confrontation. On the contrary, the confrontation principle
was a categorical rule, a basic matter of the procedures by which tes-
timony was taken.
Similarly, the law against hearsay has not played a role in this ac-
count. Hearsay doctrine, like evidentiary law more generally, was
not well developed even at the time the clause was adopted, much less
during the previous centuries."3 The tendency to meld the confronta-
136 The Framers had access to the reports of the state treason trials first published
in 1719, Symposium, Historical Development of the American Lawyer's Library, 61 LAW LIBR.
J. 440, 444 (1968). They also had access to standard treatises, such as Gilbert's and
Hale's, which relied heavily on the state trials, and they read and revered Blackstone.
See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 102 (2d. ed. 1985) (discuss-
ing colonial legal literature).
137 Hale, for example, argued that cross-examination "beats and boults out the
Truth much better" than privately taken examinations with "limited ... Interrogatories
in Writing." HALE, supra note 114, at 164. Similarly, Blackstone contended, "[t]his
open examination of witnesses viva voce, in the presence of all mankind, is much more
conducive to the clearing up of truth, than the private and secret examination taken
down in writing," in the manner of the civil law. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *373.
138 As late as 1794, "Edmund Burke remarked in the House of Commons that the
rules of 'the law of evidence ... [were] very general, very abstract, and comprised in so
small a compass that a parrot he had known might get them by rote in one half hour,
and repeat them in five minutes."' John H. Langbein, Historical Foundations of the Law
of Evidence: A View from the Ryder Sources, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1188 (1996) (quoting
12 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 165 n.3 (1938)); see also, e.g.,
Stephan Landsman, The Rise of the Contentious Spirit: Adversary Procedure in Eighteenth
Century England, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 497, 498 n.4 (1990) (paraphrasing Burke to the
same effect). Burke was overstating the point, of course; there was an identifiable law
of evidence well before this time. But, at least until relatively late in the eighteenth
century, much of the law of evidence was a matter of general principles and did not
result in the exclusion of evidence with the degree of consistency now associated with
it. Richard D. Friedman, Anchors and Flotsam: Is Evidence Law "Adift", 107 YALE LJ.
1921,1944 n.113 (1998).
139 See T.P. Gallanis, The Rise of Modern Evidence Law, 84 IOWA L. REV. 499, 531
(1999) (claiming that the rule against hearsay "was applied inconsistently, if at all, in
the middle of the eighteenth century but.., this approach had changed measurably
by the early 1820s"); id. at 533 ("If the treatises are to be believed, the rule against
hearsay began to mature into its modern form during the late eighteenth century.");
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tion right and hearsay, as we shall show, is a latter-day development.
As this historical account and the language of the Confrontation
Clause indicate, the clause was not an attempt to constitutionalize the
nascent law of hearsay. 14 Rather, it plainly expressed the basic proce-
dural principle that if a person acts as a witness against an accused,
the accused must have an opportunity to confront that person. Con-
frontation, like the oath, is one of the fundamental conditions under
which testimony must be 
given. 14 1
B. Development of the Modern "Excited Utterance" Exception
The confrontation principle discussed above, though powerful, is
relatively narrow: It does not apply to all out-of-court statements, but
only to those that constitute the giving of testimony. Beginning late in
the seventeenth century, however, courts and scholars-nonlegal as
well as legal-manifested significant concern over the epistemological
difficulty created generally whenever one person reports what another
has said.1 42 In the terminology of that day, as in today's lay under-
standing, this is the problem of hearsay.
In the early eighteenth century, the principle that "a mere Hear-
id. at 536 (stating that "[u]ntil the 1780s, the courts rarely discussed the hearsay rule,"
and "hearsay controversies in criminal cases were almost non-existent before then," but
there was a burst of activity in that decade). See generally Stephan Landsman, From
Gilbert to Bentham: The Reconceptualization of Evidence Theory, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1149,
1151 (1990) (tracing the expanding influence of the adversary idea through works of
famous evidence theorists); John H. Langbein, The Criminal TDial Before the Lawyers, 45
U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 300-02 (1978) (illustrating the lack of clarity regarding the hearsay
rule in early trials).
140 Indeed, Justice Story faulted the drafters of the Sixth Amendment for failing to
incorporate the law of evidence into the Sixth Amendment even while showing "undue
solicitude" for procedural protections. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 662 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1833).
141 Interestingly, until near the end of the eighteenth century, lack of the oath ap-
pears to have been a greater concern with respect to out-of-court statements than was
absence of the opportunity to cross-examine. Gallanis, supra note 139, at 533.
142 In both the terminology of the day and today's lay understanding of the term,
the problem of hearsay occurs whenever one person reports what another person said.
See Friedman, supra note 138, at 1944-45 (discussing the "preference for firsthand ob-
servation" in the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries). For example, in a
nonlegal, religious publication written around 1670, Sir Matthew Hale argued:
"[T]hat which is reported by many Eye-witnesses hath greater motives of credibility
than that which is reported by few; ... and finally, that which is reported by credible
persons of their own view, than that which they receive by hear-say from those that re-
port upon their own view." MATTHEw HALE, THE PRIMITIVE ORIGINATION OF
MANKIND, CONSIDERED AND EXAMINED AccORDING TO THE LIGHT OF NATURE 129
(1677).
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say is no Evidence " 143 was commonplace, but this rule-which was un-
derstood to refer only to the oral statements that the witness "heard
another say"144-was not carefully worked out or consistently applied
through the exclusion of evidence. By the end of the century, how-
ever, an exclusionary rule had gelled. Soon it gained all the breadth
and even more of the modem rule,145 which defines hearsay as an out-
of-court statement offered to prove the truth of a matter asserted in
143 GILBERT, supra note 129, at 107.
144 See id. ("The Attestation of the Witness must be to what he knows, and not to
that only which he hath heard, for a mere Hearsay is no Evidence .. "); 2 HAWKINS,
supra note 129, ch. 46, § 14, at 431 ("It seems agreed, That what a Stranger has been
heard to say is in Strictness no Manner of Evidence either for or against a Prisoner, not
only because it is not upon Oath, but also because the other Side hath no Opportunity
of a cross Examination .... ); WILLIAM NELSON, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 278 (2d ed.
1735) ("A Witness shall not give Evidence of what he has heard another say."); see also
id. at 277 ("Hearsay, or a Report of what another Man said, is no Evidence against a
Prisoner.").
145 In the early years of the nineteenth century, the category of hearsay expanded
to cover writings. In his discussion of hearsay, Thomas Peake contended that certain
written memoranda made in the ordinary course of business are admissible as "not
within the exception as to hearsay evidence." THOMAS PEAKE, A COMPENDIUM OF THE
LAw OF EVIDENCE 10 (1801). Peake was using the word "exception" in the same sense
that we would today use the term "objection." The statement, therefore, is that these
memoranda are not excluded by the hearsay rule; apparently implicit in this argument
is the inchoate idea that other writings would be. In 1815 S.M. Phillipps made the
principle clear: The exclusionary rule "is applicable to statements in writing, no less
than to words spoken," with the only difference being that there is greater facility of
proof in the case of written statements. 1 S.M. PHILLIPPS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE 173 (1st Am. ed. 1816). (The first London edition of Phillipps' influential
treatise was published in 1814 but is not readily available today. Gallanis, supra note
139, at 532 n.247.) Phillipps' analysis did not gain instant universality. The seventh
edition of Francis Buller's treatise, in a passage not present in earlier editions, follows
Peake's treatment virtually to the point of plagiarism. FRANCIS BULLER, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW RELATIVE TO TRIALS AT NISI PRIUS 294b n.d (Richard
Whalley Bridgman ed., 7th ed. 1817). Jeremy Bentham treats written evidence as dis-
tinct from hearsay but claims that the same rules apply to both. 3 JEREMY BENTHAM,
RATIONALE OFJUDICIAL EVIDENCE 447-48 (1827).
Soon, the hearsay rule also expanded to include the long-established rules govern-
ing when depositions of a witness, see supra note 120 (summarizing seventeenth-century
cases on the admissibility of written depositions), taken under oath before trial, could
be introduced in lieu of trial testimony. See PHILLIPPS, supra, at 177-78 (discussing the
celebrated Berkeley Peerage Case, 11 Eng. Rep. 333 (H.L. 1858-61)).
In 1838, the famous case of Wright v. Tatham, 47 Rev. Rep. 136 (H.L. 1838), ex-
tended the reach of the rule against hearsay to conduct that apparently reflected an
actor's belief in a proposition and was offered to prove the truth of that proposition,
even though the actor did not assert the proposition. This conception goes beyond
the modern American definition of hearsay, which is limited to conduct that is in-
tended as an assertion of the proposition that the conduct is offered to prove.
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the statement, 146 and renders the statement presumptively inadmissi-
ble for that purpose.141
The scope of the hearsay rule, therefore, extended beyond out-of-
court statements that might be considered testimonial. However, such
statements lay at the core of the rule, and the rule was supported on
the basis that it preserved the conditions that should govern the giving
of testimony. Thus, S.M. Phillipps, in one of the most important evi-
dence treatises of the nineteenth century, explained that "the reason
of the rule is, because evidence ought to be given under the sanction
of an oath, and that the person, who is to be affected by the evidence,
may have an opportunity of interrogating 
the witness.",
48
Because the rule had become so broad, it could no longer be ap-
plied without qualification or exception. Indeed, even before 1800,
several recognizable hearsay exceptions had developed to a consider-
able extent. 4 But these exceptions were, at least for the most part,
consistent with the principle that testimonial statements should be
given under oath and in the presence of the adverse party. With re-
spect to most of the exceptions, this consistency was attributable to the
fact that the exceptions principally concerned statements made ante
litem, before the dispute giving rise to the litigation.
5 ° Drawing on re-
cent cases, Phillipps distinguished between "'the natural effusions of a
party, who must know the truth, and who speaks upon an occasion,
146 FED. R. EVID. 801 (c).
147 FED. R. EVID. 802.
148 PHILLIPPS, supra note 145, at 173.
149 According to T.P. Gallanis:
[T]he treatises indicate that most of the modern exceptions to the rule
against hearsay were in place by the end of the eighteenth century, even if
their contours in particular cases required clarification. These exceptions
were: legitimacy, family relationships, pedigree, prescription, custom, general
reputation, prior consistent and inconsistent statements, and dying declara-
tions.
Gallanis, supra note 139, at 533 (footnotes omitted). Gallanis' list might be extended
to include former testimony and personal admissions.
150 This is true of the first six exceptions listed by Gallanis-statements concerning
legitimacy, family relationships, pedigree, prescription, custom, and general reputa-
tion. Id. With respect to prior consistent or inconsistent statements of a witness (to
the extent that these were actually admitted), at least the witness had to testify under
ordinary conditions at trial. We believe that the dying declaration exception was at
base a groping effort toward recognition of the doctrine under which a defendant may
forfeit her confrontation right if her misconduct causes the unavailability of the wit-
ness. With respect to former testimony, the conditions of oath and adverse examina-
tion were sedulously protected. Supra note 120. With respect to personal admissions,
the idea of confrontation does not apply, and there is little if any need for oath be-
cause the statement is offered against the person who made it.
2002]
1212 UNIVERSITYOFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 150:1171
when his mind stands in an even position, without any temptation to
exceed or fall short of the truth,""-' and statements made "for the ex-• )152
press purpose of being given in evidence.
Shortly after 1800, commentators began articulating the doctrine
to which some attached the label "res gesta" or "res gestae"153-liter-
ally, "things done.' 54 In its origin, this principle was not clearly an ex-
ception to the rule against hearsay. Rather, it was an expression of a
basic limitation on the scope of the exclusionary rule. Thus, Sir Wil-
liam Evans explained the concept, though without using the term:
What is called hearsay, may be properly divided under two principal
heads: 1st, Those in which it is a mere narrative of an event: 2d, Those
in which it is the actual occurrence of a fact, which fact may be materially
connected with the general conclusion intended to be drawn upon the
subject of the enquiry.... [T]he distinction between the cases, in which
the immediate action of speech furnishes a material indication with re-
spect to the object of inquiry, and those in which it is a mere act of nar-
ration, will in most cases furnish the proper principle for ascertaining
whether the evidence of its occurrence is or is not properly admissible.'55
Though Phillipps said that hearsay "is often admitted in evidence, as
part of the res gesta,' 6 he explained the res gesta concept in terms that
clearly distinguish it from hearsay under the modem definition. Ac-
cording to Phillipps, the meaning of res gesta
seems to be, that where it is necessary, in the course of a cause, to in-
quire into the nature of a particular act, and the intention of the person
who did the act, proof of what the person said at the time of doing it is
admissible evidence, for the purpose of showing its true character.
The same point was made about a decade later in another important
treatise, written by Thomas Starkie, who explained res gestae this way:
If the declaration or entry has no tendency to illustrate the question, ex-
cept as a mere abstract statement, detached from any particular fact in
151 PHILLIPPS, supra note 145, at 175 (quoting Lord Chancellor Eldon in Whitlocke
v. Baker, 13 Ves.Jr. 510, 514 (1807)).
152 Id. (citing Lord Chancellor Thurlow in the Berkeley Peerage Case, 11 Eng. Rep.
333 (H.L. 1858-1861)).
153 Gallanis, supra note 139, at 533.
154 See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 116, at 1310 (defining res gestae as
"[t]he events at issue, or other events contemporaneous with them").
155 William David Evans, Appendix to 2 ROBERT JOSEPH POTHIER, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS, OR CONTRACTS 284 (William David Evans ed. & trans.,
1806).
156 PHILLIPS, supra note 145, at 201.
157 Id. at 201-02.
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dispute, and depending for its effect entirely on the credit of the person
who makes it, it is not admissible in evidence; but if, on the contrary, any
importance can be attached to it as a circumstance which is part of the
transaction itself, and deriving a degree of credit from its connection
with the circumstances, independently of any credit to be attached to the
speaker or writer, then the declaration or entry is admissible in evi-
dence.
1 58
The basic idea of res gestae, then, was that if an utterance was part
of the event at issue rather than a report about it, it should not be ex-
cluded under the hearsay rule. Thus, courts sometimes stated the test
for admissibility in terms that today sound almost amusingly meta-
physical: "Were the facts talking through the party or was the party
talking about the facts?"'5 When the courts in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries spoke in operational terms, however, they
were often very restrictive, in accordance with the principles set out by
the early commentators.
First, courts were rigorous in limiting the principle to statements
that were made while the events at issue were occurring, or immedi-
ately thereafter. Some cases purported to preclude admissibility if the
event was already closed. For example, in the well-known-and much
criticized-case of Regna v. Bedingfield,16 0 the victim, whose throat had
been cut by the defendant no more than a minute or two earlier, ex-
claimed, "See what Harry has done!"'' and died ten minutes later.
62
The court ruled the statement inadmissible.
163 "Anything ... uttered
by the deceased at the time the act was being done would be admissi-
158 1 THOMAS STARKIE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, AND
DIGEST OF PROOFS, IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS, at pt. I, § 28, at 47 (1st Am.
ed. 1826).
159 Upton v. Commonwealth, 2 S.E.2d 337, 339 (Va. 1939) (citation omitted).
Also, see City of Wynnewood v. Cox, which stated:
"Res gestae," as said by Mr. Wharton, in his work on Criminal Evidence (section
262), "are events speaking for themselves, through the instinctive words and
acts of participants, not the words and acts of participants when narrating the
events. What is done or said by participants, under the immediate spur of a
transaction, becomes thus part of the transaction, because it is then the trans-
action that speaks."
122 P. 528, 533 (Okla. 1912) (citation omitted).
160 14 Cox Crim. Cas. 341 (Crown Ct. 1879).
161 Id. at 345 n.6; see alsoJames B. Thayer, Bedingfield's Case: Declarations as a Part of
the Res Gesta, 14 AM. L. REV. 817, 826 (1880) (rendering the statement as "See what
Bedingfield has done to me").
162 The court ruled that the statement was not admissible as a dying declaration
because there was no evidence that the victim knew she was dying. 14 Cox Crim. Cas.
at 343-44.
163 Id. at 342.
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ble," ruled Lord ChiefJustice Cockburn. 64 Thus, if the utterance was,
"Don't, Harry!" it would not have been excluded as hearsay. 6 5 "But
here it was something stated by her after it was all over, whatever it
was, and after the act was completed."' 66 Other courts, even though
not quite so restrictive, usually confined admissibility to those cases in
which the statement was made a very brief time after the events being
described. Courts and commentators described the requirement in
various ways. Many spoke of a requirement of contemporaneity. 6' A
typical expression of the rule was that the statement must be "in a
general sense, contemporaneous with the main occurrence; although,
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 342-43; see also Elder v. Arkansas, 65 S.W. 938, 939 (Ark. 1901) ("[M]ere
narrations of a past event, or the declarations of a witness concerning [the] event, giv-
ing his relations to it and his knowledge or opinion of it, made after the event is com-
plete, and having no immediate connection with it, are not admissible as evidence to
prove such event."); Chicago W. Div. Ry. Co. v. Becker, 21 N.E. 524, 525 (I1. 1889)
(declaring that "according to all the authorities" a statement is inadmissible if "it is...
merely a history or a part of a history of a completed past affair"); Waldele v. N.Y. Cent.
& Hudson River R.R. Co., 95 N.Y. 274, 278 (1884) (rejecting evidence of statements as
"giving an account of a transaction not partly past, but wholly past and completed").
Also, in Williams v. Southern Pacific Co., the court stated:
Expressions of persons who are actors, made during the occurrence, may
generally, but not always, be proved. If spontaneous and caused by the event,
they may nearly always be shown. But if afterwards, no matter how shortly af-
terwards, there is an attempt to explain what has happened, or to account for
it, or to defend one's self, or the like, it is incompetent and inadmissible as res
gestae.
65 P. 1100, 1102 (Cal. 1901). Compare this to People v. Del Vermo, in which the court
declared:
Strictly speaking, the spontaneous declaration [admitted in another case, and
made twenty seconds after the injury] did not really form part of the res ges-
tae, as being itself a verbal act contemporaneous with the principal occur-
rence; for the exclamation was uttered after the act of stabbing had been
wholly completed and after the assailant had fled, although it is true that the
time which had elapsed was very short.
85 N.E. 690, 695 (N.Y. 1908).
167 This was the position ofJames Bradley Thayer:
There can seldom be a perfect coincidence of time, but the ... rule calls for a
declaration which is made either while the matter in question is actually going
on, or immediately before or after it.... [T]he nearness in time should be
such that the declaration may in a fair sense be said to be a part of the res gesta,
i.e. a part of the transaction of which it purports to give an account.
James B. Thayer, Bedingfield's Case-Declarations as a Part of the Res Gestae, 15 AM. L. REV.
71, 84 (1881); see also id. at 86 ("[1]t is the closeness of the declaration to the fact in
point of time, coupled with its own import, that gives it its legally recognized quality as
proof."). The Thayer view, emphasizing contemporaneity and not stress, eventually
was reflected in the hearsay exception for statements of present sense impressions, now
expressed in FED. R. EVID. 803(1). Infra note 193.
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in case of a sudden accident or attack, the declaration would not be
inadmissible merely because the blow or collision immediately pre-
ceded it.".. In another formulation, the statement had to be "an in-
tegral part of the transaction, occurring dum fervet opus" 169 -" [w] hile
the work glows," or "in the heat of action."170 Whatever the time ele-
ment, courts insisted that the rule applied only if the statement "bears
no evidence of reflection or deliberation." 7'
Second, the courts frequently said that the statement must not be
,,172
a narrative of a past occurrence. Such narrations, they pointed
168 Heckle v. S. Pac. Co., 56 P. 56, 57 (Cal. 1899); see also, e.g., Becker, 21 N.E. at 525
(excluding statements made by decedent after a forty-foot walk from the place of in-
jury on the grounds that "[t]he declarations were not a part of the res gestae'; "[t]hey
were not made at the time of the accident"; and "[t]hey were not concurrent with the
injury, nor uttered contemporaneously with it, so as to be regarded as a part of the
principal transaction," but rather "[t]hey were made after the injury was received");
Commonwealth v. Hackett, 84 Mass. 136, 139 (1861) (holding that a statement by the
victim twenty seconds after a fatal stabbing could be admitted, as "an exclamation or
statement, contemporaneous with the main transaction, forming a natural and mate-
rial part of it"); Mo., Okla. & Gulf Ry. Co. v. Adams, 153 P. 200, 202 (Okla. 1915)
("[T]he statement must be substantially contemporaneous with the transaction, made
on the spur of the moment, and induced by the happening of the events concerning
which the statement is made .... ).
169 Kenney v. State, 79 S.W. 817, 819 (Tex. Ct. App. 1903).
170 BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 501 (6th ed. 1990). The operating principle appears
to have been that the question begged by one Latin phrase could be begged again by
another. This, of course, is essentially the same principle applied by many tourists: If
the locals don't understand you, talk louder.
171 Wash.-Va. Ry. Co. v. Deahl, 100 S.E. 840, 842 (Va. 1919). In perhaps the first
case to articulate a rationale for admissibility of spontaneous utterances, the court "al-
lowed, that what the [alleged victim of an assault and battery] said immediate[ly] upon
the hurt received, and before that she had time to devise or contrive any thing for her
own advantage, might be given in evidence." Thompson v. Trevanion, 90 Eng. Rep.
179,179 (K-B. 1693).
172 Upton v. Commonwealth, 2 S.E.2d 337, 339 (Va. 1934) ("As stated in Corpus
Juris, the true test is this: ... Was the statement made dum fervet opus or was it a nar-
rative of a past occurrence?"); see also, e.g., Largin v. State, 104 So. 556, 558 (Ala. Ct.
App. 1925) (noting that statements must have been "instinctive from the occurrences
to which they relate rather than the retrospective narration of a past fact"); Williams v.
S. Pac. Co., 65 P. 1100, 1102 (Cal. 1901) ("A narrative, even if given during the occur-
rence, is inadmissible."); Heckle, 56 P. at 57 ("[1]f it be a mere narrative of past events,
it then is clearly within the category of inadmissible hearsay, and must, beyond doubt,
be excluded."); Becker, 21 N.E. at 525 (holding inadmissible declarations that "were
made after the injury was received, and were merely narrative of what had taken
place"); Waldele v. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co., 95 N.Y. 274, 278 (1884) (re-
jecting evidence of statements deemed to be "purely narrative"); Prickett v. Sulzberger
& Sons Co., 157 P. 356, 360 (Okla. 1916) ("'[Res gestae statements] exhibit the mind's
impression of immediate events, and are not narrative of past happenings ... ". ' (quot-
ingJOHNJAY MCKELVEY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 198a (Ist ed. 1897)));
Adams, 153 P. at 202 (asserting that "the rule is universal that, to be admissible as part
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out, depended for their probative value "upon the accuracy and reli-
ability" of the out-of-court declarant, as well as on the veracity of the
witness who reported the statement in court. Thus, there was no way
that "the truth of the declarations could be tested" by "cross examina-
tion of the witness testifying, or by the examination of other wit-
nesses."' 73 On the other hand, if the statements were deemed to be
"so nearly contemporaneous with [the occurrence] as to characterize
it, or throw any light upon it' 174 then they would be considered part of
the res gestae, or in one formulation "a verbal act, illustrating, ex-
plaining, or interpreting other parts of the transaction of which it is
itself a part," as opposed to "merely a history or a part of a history of a
completed past affair."
75
As might be expected, the application of these standards was
problematic, not merely because they called for judgments of degree
but because they drew evanescent or even incoherent distinctions.
76
We suspect that, though the courts generally spoke in terms of the ac-
curacy of the statements, another consideration tended to motivate
them. The more time had passed between the event and the state-
ment, and the more the statement was a narrative of past occurrences,
the more likely the statement was made with the anticipation that
making it would provide information to be used later in adjudication.
Put another way, the more the statements looked like a reflective nar-
ration of past events, the more they resembled testimony, though not
given under the usual conditions prescribed for testimony. As one
leading case posed the problem:
[Statements not tnder oath] are frequently made under such circum-
stances as entitle them to very great, and frequently to implicit confi-
dence; and yet they do not answer the requirements of the law-that a
party prosecuted shall be confronted with the witnesses, shall have an
opportunity of cross-examination, and that the evidence against him
shall be given under the test and sanction of a solemn oath. Declara-
of the res gestae" the utterance must not be "a narrative or statement of what has oc-
curred"); City of Wynnewood v. Cox, 122 P. 538, 533 (Okla. 1912) ("'Res gestae,'...
,are events speaking for themselves, through the instinctive words and acts of partici-
pants, not the words and acts of participants when narrating the events."' (citation
omitted)).
173 Waldele, 95 N.Y. at 278.
174 Id.
175 Becker, 21 N.E. at 525.
176 As discussed previously, such distinctions include those between parts of an un-
completed transaction on the one hand and a completed transaction and a separate
statement about it on the other, or between narrative about an event and a statement
explaining the event.
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tions which are received as part of the res gesta are to some extent a de-
parture from or an exception to the general rule; and when they are so
far separated from the act which they are alleged to characterize that
they are not part of that act or interwoven into it by the surrounding cir-
cumstances so as to receive credit from it and from the surrounding cir-
cumstances, they are no better than any other unsworn statements made
under any other circumstances. They then depend entirely upon the
credit of the person making them and of the persons who testify to
them, and hence are of no more value as evidence in a legal proceeding
than the unsworn declarations of a person under any other circum-
177
stances.
By the time Wigmore published the first edition of his treatise in
1904, courts were beginning to display a more receptive attitude to-
ward spontaneous exclamations. Wigmore greatly fostered the devel-
opment. Some spontaneous statements, he pointed out, were admis-
sible notwithstanding the hearsay rule because they were not offered
for a hearsay purpose. But others were hearsay and were nevertheless
admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule that he contended
had been discernible in the cases for a generation.
17 8
Wigmore not only acknowledged but embraced the narrative na-
ture of such statements: "Such statements are genuine instances of
using a hearsay assertion testimonially; i.e. we believe that Doe shot
the pistol, or that the bell was rung, because the declarant so asserts,-
which is essentially the feature of all human testimony."'79 Wigmore
put less emphasis on timing than did many of the cases, and more on
external shock. The exception, he said, was
based on the experience that, under certain external circumstances of
physical shock, a stress of nervous excitement may be produced which
stills the reflective faculties and removes their control, so that the utter-
ance which then occurs is a spontaneous and sincere response to the ac-
tual sensations and perceptions already produced by the external shock.
Since this utterance is made under the immediate and uncontrolled
177 Waldele, 95 N.Y. at 287.
178 See 3JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS
AT COMMON LAW §§ 1745, 1746 (1904) (explaining that the courts consistently admit a
class of statements to which the hearsay rule applies, creating a distinct exception to
the rule).
179 Id. § 1746. In his digest of Dismukes v. State, 3 So. 671 (Ala. 1887), Wigmore
quoted the court's assertion that the statement in question "'being uttered so near the
scene of the transaction, and being apparently spontaneous in its nature.... was free
from all suspicion of device, premeditation, or afterthought,"' 3 WIGMORE, supra note
178, § 1747 case notes (quoting Dismukes, 3 So. at 673), but he excised the court's con-
clusion that the statement "cannot be regarded in any respect as merely narrative of a
past transaction," Dismukes, 3 So. at 673.
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domination of the senses, and during the brief period when considera-
tions of self-interest could not have been brought fully to bear by rea-
soned reflection, the utterance may be taken as particularly trustworthy
(or, at least, as lacking the usual grounds of untrustworthiness), and thus
as expressing the real tenor of the speaker's belief as to the facts just ob-
served by him ... .'80
This supposed psychological phenomenon-though unsupported
by any scientific finding-struck Wigmore as so powerful that it satis-
fied the two basic criteria he set out for an exception to the hearsay
rule: trustworthiness and necessity. Because the declaration was likely
to be "the unreflecting and sincere expression of [the declarant's] ac-
tual impressions and belief," it had sufficient trustworthiness to "ex-
empt[] it from the ordinary test of cross-examination on the stand.".'
Also "[t]he extrajudicial assertion being better than is likely to be ob-
tained from the same person upon the stand, a necessity or expedi-
ency arises for resorting to it.'
' 2
Wigmore acknowledged that this last point was "rarely noted" by
courts, a phenomenon he believed "may be ascribed to the influence
of the Verbal Act doctrine," which "usually obviated argument" as to
whether the proponent had to show "a specific necessity" for resorting
to the statement.113 In other words, when a court admits a spontane-
ous statement for a nonhearsay purpose-as part of the events being
proved rather than as a report of those events-the hearsay rule does
not apply and it generally does not weigh against admissibility that the
declarant could be, but has not been, made a witness in court. Glibly,
Wigmore simply extended the principle to the hearsay exception that
he discerned. With essentially no support in the caselaw, especially in
the context of prosecution evidence, 184 he pronounced "a proposition
never disputed"-that "the death, absence, or other unavailability of the
180 3 WIGMORE, supra note 178, § 1747.
181 Id. § 1749.
182 Id. § 1748.
183 Id.
184 He cited two criminal cases discussing the asserted superiority of the spontane-
ous statement. Id. § 1748 n.I. In one, the declarant was dead, a result of the murder
being tried. See State v. Wagner, 61 Me. 178, 194-95 (1873) ("The outcries of a person
deceased during the perpetration of the assault which results in death .... are compe-
tent evidence upon the trial of a party charged with the murder of such person .... ).
Thus, the forfeiture principle, discussed infra note 285 and accompanying text, may
have justified admission of the statement even without relying on the exception. In
the other case, the declarant was a witness, and the accused did not object to admission
of the prior statement. Jordan v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. (1 Gratt.) 943, 944-45 (1874).
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declarant need never be shown under this Exception." 
8 5
To Wigmore, the key to the exception was that "[t]here must be
some shock, startling enough to produce [the] nervous excitement and
render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecting."
8 6 Though in his
view there was "no definite and fixed limit of time" to the exception,
"[t]he utterance must have been before there has been time to contrive and
misrepresent, i.e. while the nervous excitement may be supposed still to
dominate and the reflective powers to be yet in abeyance.".. Further,
the statement had to "relate to the circumstances of the occurrence preceding
it"-a requirement that Wigmore had some difficulty justifying but
that he thought provided some extra assurance of trustworthiness and
necessity.""'
Wigmore's analysis was dubious in several respects. Later com-
mentators have challenged his supposition that a statement made
while the declarant's reflective faculties are dominated by a stress-
inducing event is more likely to be accurate than the run-of-the-mill
narrative statement.189 The premise that the reflective powers are "in
abeyance" for more than an instant is questionable. In many situa-
tions, the ability to recognize one's self-interest and articulate a state-
ment that supports it does not take much time at all. Further, what-
ever its impact on the sincerity of the declarant, extreme stress is likely
to distort her perception, memory, and communicative ability.'
90
Moreover, Wigmore's cavalier treatment of the unavailability ques-
tion is also subject to question. Even if he were right that an out-of-
court statement made under stress is "better than is likely to be ob-
tained from the same person upon the stand,"'
9' it does not follow that
the statement should be admissible without a showing that the declar-
ant is unavailable to be a witness. Presumably, better evidence than
the statement alone is the statement taken together with the declarant's
185 3 WIGMORE, supra note 178, § 1748.
186 Id. § 1750(a).
187 Id. § 1750(b).
188 Id. § 1750(c).
189 Many of the criticisms are ably summarized in Aviva Orenstein, "MY GOD!": A
Feminist Critique of the Excited Utterance Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 85 CAL. L. REV. 159,
178-82 (1997). One of the classical critical commentaries is Robert M. Hutchins &
Donald Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 432
(1928).
190 Cf State v. Harris, No. 5-99-14, 1999 WL 797159, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 30,
1999) (reporting a police officer's testimony that a declarant "'was so incoherent be-
cause she was so agitated[,] crying, upset, yelling, that I couldn't, I really couldn't get a
lot of information out of her"').
191 3 WIGMORE, supra note 178, § 1748.
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testimony, given under oath and cross-examination-which Wigmore
himself famously characterized as "beyond any doubt the greatest le-
gal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth. 192 The threat of
exclusion of the evidence if the declarant is available but not pro-
duced is a means of ensuring that the proponent will in fact produce
the declarant. Arguably, therefore, the hearsay exception should not
apply if the declarant is available but not produced by the proponent.
Nevertheless, Wigmore's analysis had a large influence on Ameri-
can courts and on other commentators in the twentieth century.1 93
According to the notable evidence scholar Edmund Morgan,
but few cases prior to 1880 gave weight directly to the element of spon-
taneity, and fewer still to the fact that spontaneity was insured by the
startling nature of the event.... [I]t is only since the publication of
Dean Wigmore's work that this exception to the hearsay rule has gained
wide recognition.
194
Although the exception was "by no means universally accepted,"
195
many American courts followed the framework set out by Wigmore
and exempted from the hearsay rule those statements made a short
time after, under the influence of, and relating to, a stressful event.
Following Wigmore's suggestion, they sometimes admitted such
statements even without inquiring whether the declarant was available• •196
to testify at trial. Over time, the courts applied the exception even
192 2 WIGMORE, supra note 178, § 1367.
193 See, e.g., People v. Poland, 174 N.E.2d 804, 807 (Ill. 1961) (citing Wigmore to
explain the "spontaneous declarations" exception to the hearsay rule); Zechariah
Chafee, Jr., The Progress of the Law, 1919-1922: Evidence. II, 35 HARV. L. REV. 428, 447
(1922) ("Wigmore's view.., does not require contemporaneousness with an event."),
quoted in Showalter v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 106 P.2d 895, 899-900 (Cal. 1940). In the end,
however, Wigmore's analysis did not occupy the entire field formerly designated by the
term res gestae. Some courts treated simultaneity, as well as stress, as a basis for reliev-
ing a statement from the hearsay rule. See, e.g., Houston Oxygen Co. v. Davis, 161
S.W.2d 474, 477 (Tex. 1942) (stating that, in an automobile accident case, "present
sense-impressions[] have such exceptional reliability as to warrant their inclusion
within the hearsay exception for spontaneous declarations"). The Federal Rules of
Evidence now include a hearsay exception for statements of present sense impression,
FED. R. EVID. 803(1), alongside the exception for excited utterances, FED. R. EVID.
803(2).
194 Edmund M. Morgan, A Suggested Classification of Utterances Admissible as Res Ges-
tae, 31 YALE L.J. 229, 238 (1922) (footnotes omitted).
195 Id.
196 E.g., Wheeler v. United States, 211 F.2d 19 (N.C. Cir. 1953); N.Y., Chi. & St.
Louis R.R. Co. v. Kovatch, 166 N.E. 682, 684 (Ohio 1929). English courts appear to be
willing to apply the exception only if the declarant is unavailable, and only if the time
between the event and the statement is very brief. COLIN TAPPER, CROSS AND TAPPER
ON EVIDENCE 547-48 (9th ed. 1999).
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more leniently than Wigmore's formulation suggested they should.
Wigmore had demanded that the statement be "spontaneous and un-
reflecting, 19 7 made "before there has been time to contrive and misrepresent,
i.e. while the nervous excitement may be supposed still to dominate
and the reflective powers to be yet in abeyance."198 But courts began
to invoke the exception in cases in which, though the declarant may
well still have been affected substantially by the stressful event, one
could not say reasonably that nervous excitement was still dominant,
or that the declarant had little opportunity to reflect on her statement
before making it. 9 This development may have been attributable in
large part to a growing general disaffection with the hearsay rule, es-
pecially in civil cases,20 and the disinclination of courts to craft a dif-
ferent set of evidentiary rules for civil and criminal cases. In any
event, it is clearly reflected in the two main precursors to the Federal
Rules of Evidence: the original Uniform Rules of Evidence 
of 1953201
202
and the California Evidence Code of 1966. Neither of these speaks
of the dominance of nervous excitement or the abeyance of reflective
197 3 WIGMORE, supra note 178, § 1750(a).
198 Id. § 1750(b).
199 E.g., Guthrie v. United States, 207 F.2d 19, 22-23 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (holding that
an accusatory statement to the police by an incoherent adult complainant at least
eleven hours after an assault and several days before death was admissible as a sponta-
neous utterance); Soto v. Territory, 94 P. 1104, 1105 (Ariz. 1908) (admitting a four-
year-old boy's statement made an hour and a half after an assault because, where a
young victim's age would "render it improbable that his utterance was deliberate and
its effect premeditated in any degree," the utterance need not be "so nearly contempo-
raneous with the event which gave rise to it as in the case of an older person, whose
reflective powers are not presumed to be so easily affected or keep [sic] in abeyance");
State v. Novak, 132 N.W. 26, 27 (Iowa 1911) (holding admissible as a spontaneous
statement the declaration of a seventy-one-year-old woman (who testified at trial) after
running half a mile from her home, where the assault occurred, to her nephew's
house).
200 See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IOWA L. REV. 331, 331,
347 (1961) (contending that prevailing hearsay rules "exclude evidence that has a
higher probative force than evidence they admit," and that, at least in civil cases, the
rule against hearsay should be converted "from a rule of exclusion to one of discre-
tion").
201 See UNIF. R. EVID. 63(4) (b) (1953) (excepting from the hearsay rule a state-
ment made "while the declarant was under the stress of a nervous excitement" caused
by his or her perception of "the event or condition which the statement narrates, de-
scribes or explains").
202 CAL. EVID. CODE § 1240 (West 1966) provides: "Evidence of a statement is not
made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement: (a) Purports to narrate, de-
scribe, or explain an act, condition, or event perceived by the declarant; and (b) Was
made spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by
such perception."
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powers. Instead, they merely demand that the statement have been
made while the declarant was "under the stress" of the exciting event.
And the Federal Rules of Evidence, effective in 1975, followed suit.
The "excited utterance" exception of Rule 803(2) provides that, with-
out regard to the availability of the declarant, the rule against hearsay
does not exclude "[a] statement relating to a startling event or condi-
tion made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement
caused by the event or condition."20 3
Like its precursors, Rule 803(2) applies whether or not the de-
clarant is available; the drafters appear to have followed the lead of
Wigmore in this respect without much consideration. 4 Codifications
based on the Federal Rules now have been adopted in more than forty
states, and all but one of these codifications include rules identical
(or, in the case of Florida, virtually and substantively identical) to Rule
803(2). 20r The remaining codification, that of New Jersey, also has a
very similar rule; like its prior codification, which was adapted from
the original Uniform Rules, it still insists that the statement have been
made "without opportunity to deliberate or fabricate.20 ° The courts,
however, appear not to have made much of the difference.0 7
Outside as well as within the context on which this Article fo-
cuses-statements made in 911 calls and follow-up conversations-the
courts have continued to apply the exception with increasing leni-
ency, often tolerating great time lapses between the stressful event and
the statement.2°8 It appears, however, that, until relatively recently, the
203 FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
204 The English rule is to the contrary. See TAPPER, supra note 196, at 548 (observ-
ing that under English law "the doctrine can be used when the prosecution has taken
all reasonable steps to secure the attendance of a witness").
205 See DAVID F. BINDER, HEARSAY HANDBOOK 14445 & Supp. (3d ed. 1991) (list-
ing state evidentiary codes patterned after Rule 803(2)); 2 GREGORY P. JOSEPH ET AL.,
EVIDENCE IN AMERICA: THE FEDERAL RULEs IN THE STATES 6 (1989 replacement pam-
phlet & Supp.).
206 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 803(c) (2) (West 1994).
207 See, e.g., Truchan v. Sayreville Bar & Rest., Inc., 731 A.2d 1218, 1222 (N.J. 1999)
("Even where the time interval between the event and the statement is long enough to
permit reflective thought, the statement is not necessarily excluded if the proponent
can establish that the statement was nevertheless made under the stress of the event
without reflective thought.").
208 See 2JOSEPII ET AL., supra note 205, ch. 58, at 36 ("Statements made after lapses
of one to two and one-half hours, five hours to seven or eight hours or more are ad-
missible, if the proof establishes the appropriate excitement."); see also, e.g., United
States v. Rosetta, No. 97-2023, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 28862, at *5 (10th Cir. Oct. 20,
1997) (admitting a statement made by a complainant approximately nine hours after
an attack as an excited utterance); United States v. Farley, 992 F.2d 1122, 1126 (10th
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exception was rarely if ever used to allow the prosecution to prove its
case by introducing a statement, describing a crime and made to law
enforcement authorities or their agents, by a declarant who is avail-
able to testify at trial but whom the prosecution has not called.20
9 The
Cir. 1993) ("through the day and until the following morning"); Guthrie v. United
States, 207 F.2d 19, 23 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (eleven hours); State v. Starcevich, 678 P.2d
959, 968 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) (nine hours); People v. Nevitt, 553 N.E.2d 368, 375 (I11.
1990) (five hours); State v. Stipek, No. 92-B-59, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 1355, at *3
(Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1995) ("four to six weeks"), appeal dismissed, 652 N.E.2d 799
(Ohio 1999); State v. Crowhurst, 470 A.2d 1138, 1145 (R.I. 1984) (three hours). But
see Pacifico v. State, 642 So. 2d 1178, 1186-87 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (suggesting that
a time lapse of approximately one hour may have been "sufficient to permit reflective
thought," but not reaching issue because statements were admissible under "first com-
plaint" doctrine); State v. Barnies, 680 A.2d 449, 453 (Me. 1996) (excluding statements
made by a domestic violence complainant in response to police questioning at the
scene as not sufficiently spontaneous, and construing the excited utterance exception
narrowly). Courts have been particularly lenient with respect to statements made by
children. E.g., 2JOSEPH ET AL., supra note 205, ch. 58, at 37.
M_ We base this assertion on a survey of virtually all the cases cited in 6 JOHN
HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRas AT COMMON LAW § 1750 (James H. Chadbourn
ed., rev. 4th ed. 1976), conducted for us by Hannah Weiss of the Harvard Law School
Class of 2003. It appears that in most of the cases in which a narrative statement was
admitted under the exception against a criminal defendant the declarant was either
unavailable or present and testifying. In many of these cases, the declarant was the vic-
tim of a homicide, the crime being charged. See, e.g., Littlejohn v. State, 219 A.2d 155
(Del. 1966) (holding admissible a statement by the deceased ten minutes after a fatal
attack); Washington v. State, 98 So. 605 (Fla. 1924) (holding admissible the statement
"Randolph shot me," made by the deceased two minutes after a shooting); cf People v.
House, 217 N.E.2d 566 (I11. App. Ct. 1966) (holding admissible the statement by a vic-
tim of robbery, since deceased, to the police); State v. Crawley, 410 P.2d 1012 (Or.
1966) (holding admissible a statement to a police officer by a victim of theft, since de-
ceased, shortly after discovering the theft). In some cases, the court did admit a state-
ment by a declarant who, so far as appears, was available to testify but did not actually
do so. But in these cases the statement was almost always made to an acquaintance of
the declarant rather than to those who might be considered representatives of law en-
forcement. See, e.g., People v. Poland, 174 N.E.2d 804 (I11. 1961) (admitting a state-
ment to a neighbor that the declarant's son-in-law had just shot his wife, the declar-
ant's daughter); State v. Stafford, 23 N.W.2d 832 (Iowa 1946) (admitting a statement
by the victim to her neighboring sister and brother-in-law that her husband had tried
to kill her); cf Curran v. State, 122 A.2d 126 (Del. 1956) (stating in dictum that a
statement, not actually presented to the jury, by an unknown caller to the police that a
rape was being committed appears to have been admissible as a spontaneous declara-
tion). The courts tended to be receptive to testimony by parents of statements made
to them by their young children, even though (or because?) the children may have
been incompetent to testify at trial. See, e.g., Soto v. Territory, 94 P. 1104 (Ariz. 1908)
(admitting the statement of a four-year-old child to his mother alleging sexual abuse);
State v. Hutchison, 353 P.2d 1047 (Or. 1960) (admitting the statement of a five-year-
old child made to his parents). Similarly, the courts seem to have been receptive to
testimony of statements made by the defendant's spouse, who would have been in-
competent to testify against him. See, e.g., State v. Breyer, 232 P. 560 (Idaho 1925)
(holding admissible a statement to the sheriff by the defendant's wife, who would not
122320021
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reason is not easy to discern; nothing in the articulation of the excep-
tion would appear to preclude its use in this way. But we suspect that
courts and prosecutors had a residual sense that such a use of the ex-
ception would violate the defendant's right to confront the witnesses
against him. As we will now show, the Confrontation Clause jurispru-
dence of the Supreme Court has-at least for now-removed that ob-
stacle to dial-in testimony.
C. The Confrontation Right Subsumed by Hearsay Law
Section B has shown that developments in the hearsay exception
for excited utterances have opened the door to prosecutors' use of
statements made even a considerable time after the events they de-
scribe and with the anticipation that they would be used as evidence,
and even if the declarant is available at the time of trial. But if hearsay
law does not block admissibility of such statements, does the Confron-
tation Clause?
In early cases, most notably Mattox v. United States, the Supreme
Court took the view-which squares well with the historical account
we have given in Section A-that the "primary object" of the Clause
was to prevent the use of testimony taken ex parte.2 '0 The word "hear-
say" is not even mentioned in Mattox, or in most of the other early
confrontation cases. It also is not used in Pointer v. Texas, the 1965
case in which the Supreme Court held the Clause applicable against
the states. In the years shortly after Pointer, the Court tended to em-
phasize the degree to which the Confrontation Clause and the law of
hearsay are distinct.2 2
have been a competent witness); State v. Pilcher, 104 So. 717 (La. 1925) (holding ad-
missible as part of res gestae the statement, made by a wife to police about to conduct a
search, that a barn belonged to her husband).
210 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895).
211 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965). In Pointer, the Court reiterated that "a major reason
underlying the constitutional confrontation rule is to give a defendant charged with
crime an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him." Id. at 406-07 (citing
Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242; Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911); Motes v.
United States, 178 U.S. 458, 474 (1900); and Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55
(1899)). None of these cases mentioned the word hearsay. Two cases presented as
secondary citations, Queen v. Hepburn, 11 U.S. (1 Cranch) 290, 295 (1813), and Hopt v.
Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 581 (1884), the former a civil case, did discuss hearsay, but did not
mention confrontation.
212 See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970) ("[T]he Sixth Amendment's Con-
frontation Clause and the evidentiary hearsay rule stem from the same roots[, b]ut this
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More recently, however, the Court has tended to emphasize the
degree to which they are similar.
2
'
3 The Court took a significant step
toward melding the law of confrontation and of hearsay in 1980 when,
in Ohio v. Roberts,214 it offered "a general approach"
21 5 to the law of con-
frontation as it applies to hearsay statements made by out-of-court de-
clarants:
[W]hen a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial,
the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is unavail-
able. Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears adequate
"indicia of reliability." Reliability can be inferred without more in a case
where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In
other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of• 216
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.
The Roberts standard thus treated the reach of the Confrontation
Clause, with respect to statements by out-of-court declarants, as co-
extensive with that of hearsay law. That is, if a speaker is "a hearsay
declarant" who "is not present for cross-examination at trial," then the
prosecutor faces a Confrontation Clause problem.
17 To solve that
problem, Roberts appears to prescribe, the prosecutor must satisfy both
an unavailability requirement and a reliability requirement-and the
reliability requirement can be satisfied by bringing the statement
within a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception. The reliability require-
Court has never equated the two, and we decline to do so now." (footnote omitted)).
Similarly:
While it may readily be conceded that hearsay rules and the Confrontation
Clause are generally designed to protect similar values, it is quite a different
thing to suggest that the overlap is complete and that the Confrontation
Clause is nothing more or less than a codification of the rules of hearsay and
their exceptions as they existed historically at common law.
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970); see also United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S.
387, 393 n.5 (1986) (noting that the Confrontation Clause and hearsay doctrine 
do
not overlap completely).
213 See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 353 (1992) (discussing how "'hearsay rules
and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values"' and
how they "'stem from the same roots"' (quoting Green, 399 U.S. at 155, and Dutton, 400
U.S. at 86)); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 182-83 (1987) (same); Ohio 
v.
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (same); see also Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 814
(1990) ("Although we have recognized that hearsay rules and the Confrontation
Clause are generally designed to protect similar values, we have also been careful not
to equate the Confrontation Clause's prohibitions with the general rule prohibiting
the admission of hearsay statements.").
214 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
215 Wight, 497 U.S. at 814 (construing Roberts, 448 U.S. at 56).
216 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (footnote omitted).
217 Id.
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ment therefore poses no greater obstacle to the admissibility of prose-
cution evidence than does ordinary hearsay law.
At first, it appeared that the unavailability requirement would pro-
vide such an obstacle, but the Court soon largely eviscerated that re-
quirement. The guiding principle seems to be to follow the Federal
Rules of Evidence, which now provide the dominant framework for
American evidentiary law. If the statement fits within one of the enu-
merated exemptions to the hearsay rule that, as expressed in the Fed-
eral Rules, do not make unavailability of the declarant a requirement
for admissibility, then the Court will not impose an unavailability re-
quirement under the Confrontation Clause.
Like Pointer and Mattox, Roberts involved prior testimony given in a
formal proceeding.2 8 The prosecution offered the statements under
the hearsay exception for former testimony, now expressed in Federal
Rule of Evidence 804(b) (1), which applies only if the declarant is un-
available. And so the Roberts Court articulated the unavailability re-
quirement. In other settings in which unavailability would be a requi-
site for admissibility under the Federal Rules, the Court has held out
the possibility that the Confrontation Clause requires unavailability as
a constitutional matter.2
In United States v. Inadi, however, a majority of the Court held that
Roberts established an unavailability requirement only for prior testi-
mony, and not for all out-of-court statements. 20 The Inadi Court re-
fused to apply the unavailability requirement to statements that fit
within the hearsay exemption for statements of a conspirator.2 ' That
218 Mattox, 156 U.S. at 240, involved testimony given at a prior trial, and Pointer,
380 U.S. at 401, and Roberts, 448 U.S. at 59-60, involved testimony given at preliminary
hearings.
In Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 544 n.5 (1986), the prosecution argued that the
statement was against penal interest. The Court noted that it did not need to reach
the question of unavailability, because it held the statement inadmissible on grounds
of unreliability. Id. at 539. In Lilly v. Virginia, the prosecution also argued that the
statement was one against penal interest, and the plurality assumed explicitly that, to
the extent unavailability of the declarant was required for admissibility, the condition
was satisfied. 527 U.S. 116, 122, 124 n.1 (1999). The exception for statements against
interest is established for federal courts in FED. R. EVID. 804(b) (3), which applies only
if the declarant is unavailable. Also, in Wright, 497 U.S. at 816, the Court made a point
of saying that it would "assume without deciding that, to the extent the unavailability
requirement applies in this case, the [declarant] was an unavailable witness." There,
the State argued that the statement fit within the residual exception to the hearsay
rule, but the Court properly refused to regard this open-ended exception as a firmly
rooted one for purposes of Confrontation Clause analysis. Id.
220 475 U.S. 387, 394 (1986).
221 Id. at 394-96.
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TV. REVAMPING CONFRONTATION THEORY
To us, the willingness of courts to allow prosecutors to prove their
cases through dial-in testimony, without even demonstrating why the
caller has not been brought to court as a witness, demonstrates that
something has gone very wrong with the jurisprudence of the con-
frontation right; a proper conception of the right would not tolerate
the practice. We expect that some readers will agree-but not all. In
this Part, we show how the Supreme Court's conception of the con-
frontation right is flawed, and argue that the Court should adopt a
radically different approach, intolerant of dial-in testimony.
In effect, we argue from both ends. Regarding tolerance of dial-in
testimony as plainly suspect, we use the phenomenon to support our
argument that confrontation jurisprudence should be revamped. At
the same time, we develop what we believe, on principle, is a better
approach to the confrontation right, and we show that it leads to an
attitude suspicious of dial-in testimony.
In Section A, we contend that the Court has erred in tying the
confrontation right to hearsay law and in making its applicability de-
pend on whether the particular statement at issue, or a category of
statements into which that one might fit, is deemed reliable. This ap-
proach gives the right too broad a scope and then denigrates it by di-
lution. Under this conception, the confrontation right is treated as a
generalized protection against unreliable evidence-a role for which it
is not needed, and which, as illustrated by dial-in testimony, it does
not perform well. At the same time, this conception fails to recognize
the confrontation right as an expression of one of the basic procedures
of our criminal justice system. Thus, as illustrated by the recent case
of Lilly v. Virginia, this conception makes easy cases hard; instead of
treating the Confrontation Clause as a ringing endorsement of a prin-
ciple that commands widespread respect, the courts must treat it as a
complex, amorphous, and technical expression of principles that are
baffling even to lawyers.
In Section B, we argue that a better approach, more consistent
with the language and history of the Clause and with an intuitive sense
for what the confrontation right is all about, can be articulated inde-
pendently of hearsay law. Under this approach, the Clause does not
apply to hearsay in general, but only to statements that are deemed
testimonial. As to those, however, it creates a categorical rule: The
statement should not be admitted against the accused unless he has had an
adequate opportunity to cross-examine the declarant under oath. To this rule,
we would admit only one qualification: If the declarant is unavailable
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exemption, as expressed in the Federal Rules, does not require the
declarant to be unavailable for the exemption to be applicable. And
in 1992, in White v. Illinois, the Court held that the unavailability re-
quirement did not apply to statements that fit within Illinois' hearsay
exception for statements made for purposes of medical treatment
or-most importantly for purposes of this Article-within its excep-
tion for "spontaneous declarations. ,22 Illinois did not then have an
evidentiary codification based on the Federal Rules, but its statutory
medical statement exception was very similar to the exception pro-
vided by Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4) .4 And it articulated its
common law "spontaneous declaration" exception in terms identical
to the "excited utterance" exception of Federal Rule of Evidence
803(2) . And those exceptions, too, apply even if the declarant is
available.
At the same time, the White Court held that the "excited utter-
ance" exception, as well as the medical statement exception, is "firmly
rooted" for purposes of Confrontation Clause analysis.
226 Thus, the
way is clear: If a statement is deemed to be within the "excited utter-
ance" exception, then under the Supreme Court's interpretation the
Confrontation Clause poses no obstacle to its admission, even if the
declarant is available to be a witness but is not called by the prosecu-
tion. 27 As we have shown, prosecutors soon began in earnest to take
advantage of this opportunity.
22 FED. R. EVID. 801 (d) (2) (E).
223 502 U.S. 346, 356-57 (1992).
224 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/115-13 (West 1992) provided that, in certain
prosecutions,
statements made by the victim to medical personnel for purposes of medical
diagnosis or treatment including descriptions of the cause of symptom, pain
or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external
source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment shall
be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule.
225 See People v. White, 555 N.E.2d 1241, 1246 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) ("A statement
relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the 
stress
of excitement caused by the event or condition is admissible as a hearsay exception.").
226 White, 502 U.S. at 356 n.8.
227 A state constitution's confrontation clause may still pose an obstacle to admis-
sion, however. See, e.g., State v. Ortiz, 845 P.2d 547, 556 (Haw. 1993) ("Although 
ex-
cited utterances have certain guarantees of reliability, we also recognize that 
the right
to confront an accuser should not be abandoned simply because the alleged 
incrimi-
nating statement was made spontaneously."); State v. Lopez, 926 P.2d 784, 
788-89
(N.M. Ct. App. 1996) ("We are not persuaded that the White decision gives 
sufficient
importance to the values sought to be protected by the confrontation clause.").
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to testify at trial because of misconduct of the accused, then the ac-
cused should be deemed to have forfeited the ight. We will show
how this approach can be applied in the case of statements made in
911 and follow-up conversations.
In Section C we will compare our approach to others with which it
bears some resemblance. Subtle differences can have important con-
sequences in this context, and we will show how this is true with dial-in
testimony.
A. Flaws of the Current Doctrine
1. Language and Structure
To a textualist, the language of the Sixth Amendment controls the
meaning of the confrontation right. Even if we accord no prescriptive
force to the constitutional text, moreover, it is an important articula-
tion of the right. That articulation, and the context in which it is set
out, may contain significant indications of how the right should be
construed.
The Sixth Amendment reads in full as follows:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and
to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
2 8
Note at the outset that the Amendment does not read like a balancing
doctrine. On the contrary, it provides rights to apply " [i]n all criminal
prosecutions." That language has not been construed as broadly as it
might be; the Supreme Court has, for example, held with consider-
able historical support that "there is a category of petty crimes or of-
fenses which is not subject to the Sixth Amendment jury trial provi-
sions. ", 29 Moreover, in some cases, the exact bounds of the rights are
limited by the open-textured words used to describe them-how slow
can a trial be and still qualify as speedy?23' And the rights are subject
228 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
229 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968); see also, e.g., Scott v. Illinois, 440
U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979) (holding that the Federal Constitution is not violated if a state
trial court fails to appoint counsel in a case in which the accused is not actually pun-
ished with imprisonment).
2.% Pretty slow. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 536 (1972) (holding that succes-
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to waiver or forfeiture.232  But within their bounds, the rights are
categorical. That is, they are stated and applied without qualifica-
233tlon. Thus, the Amendment does not say, nor has it been construed
to provide, that the accused shall enjoy the right to be tried by a jury
unless the facts are so complicated that a jury likely would not under-
stand them or be able to render an accurate verdict, or that he shall
enjoy the right "to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence" un-
less his guilt is so clear that such assistance probably would do little
good, or in the circumstances of the case it actually would obstruct the
search for truth. Even in an "age of balancing,, 23 4 there are some ab-
solutes.
Now focus on the Confrontation Clause itself. In simple and
straightforward terms, it provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right.., to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him." Like the other clauses in the Amendment, it
seems to establish a procedural right of the accused, in this case a
right that takes effect if a person acts as a witness against him. And,
like the other rights established by the Amendment, this one appears
to be categorical. This is seen most easily with respect to what now
appears to be the paradigm for application of the Clause, the witness
who testifies at trial.23' The Clause does not speak about the reliability
of the witness's testimony-it does not say that the accused shall enjoy
the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him unless their
sive continuances resulting in a delay of well over five years between arrest and trial did
not violate petitioner's right to a speedy trial); id. at 521 (" [T] he right to speedy trial is
a more vague concept than other procedural rights.... We cannot definitely say how
long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift but deliberate.").
31 See, e.g., Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 720-26 (1948) (discussing criteria
for waiver of right to counsel); Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930) (per-
mitting waiver of right to jury trial in criminal cases).
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 546 (2d ed.
1992) ("Although commonly described as involving waivers, cases in which defendants
have been forced to proceed pro se because they failed to obtain counsel prior to trial
are more appropriately characterized as forfeiture cases.").
233 See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) ("[A]bsent a knowing
and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified
as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.").
234 T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J.
943, 943 (1987) (exploring balancing as a form of constitutional reasoning "that has
become widespread, if not dominant").
235 We say that this now appears to be the core case for application of the Clause
because, as our historical review has suggested, in its origins the Clause was more con-
cerned with ensuring that witnesses be brought before the accused than with prescrib-
ing what happened when they were brought there. Supra Part III.A.
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testimony is so reliable that the right is of little value. ("Thank you,
Ms. Witness, for that helpful testimony. You are excused; there is no
need for the accused to cross-examine you.") Nor does the Clause
suggest that if a witness testifies before trial, without the accused hav-
ing the right to confront her, but later becomes unavailable through
no fault of the accused, then the prosecution may use the pre-trial tes-
timony and the confrontation right does not apply. Of course, there
is ambiguity in the term "witnesses," which we shall explore. But it is
important to bear in mind that "witnesses" is the key term used in the
Clause. The Clause does not speak about hearsay declarants-it does
not say the accused shall enjoy the right to be confronted with the de-
clarants of any hearsay offered against him.
Taking the text of the Confrontation Clause and of the whole
Sixth Amendment seriously, then, it appears that the Clause sets forth
a simple categorical rule that an accused has a right-subject to waiver
or forfeiture-to confront the witnesses against him, whoever they
may be. And that, we will argue, is indeed the proper way to view the
Clause. But now compare to this view the confrontation doctrine cur-
rently applied by the Supreme Court.
First, rather than viewing the Clause as setting forth a procedural
right, the current doctrine focuses on the Clause as a rule of evidence.
The difference, though not airtight (for the procedure is enforced in
part through exclusion of evidence that violates it), is significant. As
suggested above, categorical procedural rights are common in our sys-
tem. 36 It is not strange for us to conclude, when presented with a
procedural alternative that is tempting in a particular case, that we just
do not do things that way. Rules of evidence, by contrast, tend away
from absolutism because they involve an assessment of whether the
evidence will help or hurt in determining truth, and that assessment
almost inevitably involves attention to the details of the particular
case.
Second, as a related matter, there is no serious attempt under cur-
rent doctrine to come to grips with the term "witnesses." The Roberts
Court did not view the term as a significant limitation on the scope of
the Clause. The Court implicitly assumed that any hearsay declarant
is a witness within the meaning of the Clause, for it spoke of a poten-
tial Confrontation issue arising whenever "a hearsay declarant is not
236 Another example, in addition to those discussed above, supra notes 229-34 and
accompanying text, is that no matter how truthful it seems a witness will be, she must
testify under oath or affirmation. See FED. R. EVID. 603 (applying the requirement to
"every witness").
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present for cross-examination at trial. 237 How did hearsay get into this
picture, one might ask? Rather than attempt to define the word "wit-
nesses"-not an easy matter, as we shall see-the Court simply bor-
rowed a concept that seemed related. But note how broad this makes
the reach of the Confrontation Clause. Any person who makes an as-
sertion that is later offered to prove the truth of the assertion is a
hearsay declarant, even if in doing so she was just going about her
daily business with no anticipation of litigation. The clerk who makes
a routine entry in a business record or the conspirator who conducts a
mundane conversation with her colleagues may turn out to be a hear-
say declarant, depending on the use that a litigant later attempts to
make of the statement at trial.
Third, given that the current doctrine applies the right over such
a broad region, inevitably it dilutes the right. A system that excluded
all hearsay would be untenable. Thus, the Court has had to develop
a mechanism for limiting the right. Given that the Court has equated
the scope of the right to the scope of hearsay law, it is not surprising
that the principal mechanism that the Court has chosen has been the
prime criterion that Wigmore articulated for the admissibility of hear-
say: reliability, or trustworthiness. Thus, the confrontation right, in-
stead of being defined sturdily within defensible boundaries, has be-
come an amorphous right against the admission of untrustworthy
evidence. And that, as we will now argue, is an inappropriate stan-
dard.
2. The Inappropriateness of the Trustworthiness Standard
The Supreme Court has said that the "underlying purpose" of the
Confrontation Clause is "to augment accuracy in the factfinding proc-
ess by ensuring the defendant an effective means to test adverse evi-
dence."239 Because cross-examination is considered, in the famous
words of Wigmore, the "'greatest legal engine ever invented for the
discovery of truth,' 240 an out-of-court statement ordinarily will be pre-
237 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
238 Cf id. at 63 ("If one were to read [the Confrontation Clause] literally, it would
require, on objection, the exclusion of any statement made by a declarant not present
at trial. But, if thus applied, the Clause would abrogate virtually every hearsay excep-
tion, a result long rejected as unintended and too extreme." (citation omitted)).
239 Id. at 65.
240 California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (quoting 5 JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW § 1367 (3d ed. 1940)); see also Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63 n.6 (quoting Green,
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sumptively inadmissible against an accused to prove the truth of what
it asserts unless he has had an adequate opportunity to examine the
declarant of the statement. But because the Court regards the Clause
as evincing "a practical concern for the accuracy of the
truth-determining process in criminal trials,"24 it has concluded that
in some settings other assurances that "the trier of fact [has] a satisfac-
tory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement" will satisfy
the Clause.242 In particular, a statement may be admitted without vio-
lating the Clause if the Court deems the statement to be "so trustwor-
thy that cross-examination of the declarant would be of marginal util-
ity.' '243  The Court has failed to recognize, however, that if this
standard were truly the measure of trustworthiness, very little evidence
would satisfy it.
In justifying the admissibility of statements fitting within the "dy-
ing declaration" exception to the hearsay rule, for example, in recent
years the Court has quoted approvingly the old wisdom that "the sense
of impending death is presumed to remove all temptation to false-
hood, and to enforce as strict an adherence to the truth as would the
obligation of oath,"244 and that "'no person, who is immediately going
into the presence of his Maker, will do so with a lie upon his 
lips.' 245
One must really have faith in the old-time religion to make these per-
ceptions the basis of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.
Let us perform a simple thought experiment. Victim, having
identified Defendant as the person who fatally wounded him,
promptly meets his Maker. But as it happens, the Maker is willing to
cooperate to allow Victim to testify by remote hookup-there are no
technological limitations in this thought experiment-and respond to
cross-examination by Defendant's counsel. How likely is it that De-
fendant's counsel would say, "No thanks," thinking to herself, "I
couldn't do anything with him. He made the statement when he
knew the gates of heaven were about to open, so it's obviously reliable
beyond any genuine doubt"? Not at all likely. This is the prime wit-
ness in a murder case. Even if she thinks that Victim's sincerity is be-
yond doubt, counsel will take the opportunity to explore such matters
399 U.S. at 158).
241 Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970) (plurality opinion).
242 Green, 399 U.S. at 161.
243 Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 823 (1990).
244 Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244, quoted in Wright, 497 U.S. at 820.
245 Wright, 497 U.S. at 820 (quoting Regina v. Osman, 15 Cox Crim. Cas. 1, 3 (N.
Wales Cir. 1881)).
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as reasons to believe that Victim did not have a good chance to ob-
serve his assailant, or that in fact his accusation was a conclusion based
on questionable inferences that he did not disclose. Beyond that,
counsel may want to explore whether Victim has minimized his role in
provoking the attack, or whether he had a grudge against Defendant.
Thus, it strikes us as nearly laughable to say that Victim's statement is
so trustworthy that we can comfortably conclude that cross-
examination of Victim essentially would be worthless.
Similarly, the Court has said that "[t]he basis for the 'excited ut-
terance' exception.., is that such statements are given under circum-
stances that eliminate the possibility of fabrication, coaching, or con-
fabulation, and that therefore the circumstances surrounding the
making of the statement provide sufficient assurance that the state-
ment is trustworthy and that cross-examination would be superflu-
ous." 246 Superfluous?! Consider the statements we have discussed in
this Article, made to 911 operators or to responding officers. Some-
times, we have shown, there are substantial reasons to doubt the truth-
fulness of such statements. Could one really say with a straight face
that as a general matter defense counsel could get no benefit from
cross-examining the declarants? Certainly when a caller does testify,
defense counsel do not as a rule conclude that the statement is so
clearly reliable that cross-examination would obviously be worthless,
and so decline even to try.
Thus, if trustworthiness means "so clearly truthful that the oppor-
tunity to cross-examine the declarant would offer the accused little
benefit and can be safely discarded," then the category of trustworthy
statements is far narrower than current doctrine, incorporating the
common hearsay exceptions, indicates. Indeed, the category of
statements meeting this rigorous criterion may be very small, and
there is no apparent way in which the courts can reliably discern
which statements do meet it.
Consider, then, an alternative definition of trustworthiness-"so
probably truthful that the truth-determining process is better off with
the statement admitted, even though the declarant has not been cross-
examined, than without any statement on the subject from the declar-
ant." But such a standard would provide slight resistance to the ad-
mission of hearsay. There is no psychological evidence or other per-
suasive reason to believe that jurors tend to overvalue hearsay
evidence so much that the truth-determining process is improved by
246 Id.
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shutting their eyes and ears to the evidence rather than exposing
them to it and allowing them to assess its deficiencies.247
In addition, such a standard is static, not taking into account the
impact that an exclusionary rule has in encouraging a prosecutor to
present the declarant as a live witness, if doing so is feasible-that is, if
the declarant is available. So another alternative definition of trust-
worthiness might be "so probably truthful that it is not worthwhile to
induce the prosecution to produce the declarant as a live witness."
But this third definition fares no better than the other two. If the de-
clarant is unavailable, it is congruent with the second definition, be-
cause the prosecutor cannot feasibly produce the declarant-hence
virtually any hearsay would be admissible. If the declarant is available,
this standard would seem to call for a balance of the difficulties in
producing her against the additional difficulties for truth-
determination created if she is not produced. Application of such a
grand, overall balance would be erratic and unpredictable, which may
account in part for the Supreme Court's reluctance to attempt it."'
Indeed, whatever standard of trustworthiness might be used, its
application is bound to be difficult. A good assessment of the prob-
ability that a given statement is accurate depends on an assessment of
all the facts in the case. To the extent that the standard of trustwor-
thiness attempts to take all of those facts into account,24 9 the confron-
tation right becomes essentially a case-by-case assessment of how likely
it is that the declarant was speaking accurately-which is often effec-
tively an assessment by the court of how likely it appears that the de-
fendant is guilty. To the extent that the trustworthiness standard at-
tempts to make determinations more uniform by cropping certain
types of information out of the inquiry 25 or acting on generaliza-
247 Empirical evidence suggests that jurors do not fail to take the weaknesses of
hearsay evidence into account. See, e.g., Margaret Bull Kovera et al.,Jurors'Perceptions of
Eyewitness and Hearsay Evidence, 76 MINN. L. REv. 703, 704-07 (1992) (examining mock
jurors' skepticism toward hearsay testimony). Indeed, it may be that in some circum-
stances jurors tend to discount hearsay too much rather than too little. See Peter
Miene et al., Juror Decision Making and the Evaluation of Hearsay Evidence, 76 MINN. L.
REV. 683, 691-98 (1992) (reporting a study in which the addition of hearsay evidence
to eyewitness testimony lowered conviction rates).
4Indeed, as discussed above, except in the context of prior testimonial state-
ments, the Court has thus far refused to make the availability of the declarant a ground
for excluding her hearsay statement. Supra text accompanying notes 217-27.
249 The current doctrine does this by asking about "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness." Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
250 The current doctrine accomplishes this by prescribing that a court may not
consider corroborating evidence in determining whether the "particularized guaran-
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251dons, it can aspire only to rough accuracy.
The fundamental problem is that, instead of grappling with the
question of what the confrontation right means, the Court assumes
that the right presumptively applies across a broad domain and then
attempts to use a trustworthiness standard to determine the circum-
stances in which the right may be safely disregarded. Thus, it seems
unlikely that the Court would say that the accused's right to be con-
fronted with "the witnesses against him" means that he has a right to
be confronted with "the declarant of any hearsay statement that is not
trustworthy." Trustworthiness is a tool used by the Court to pick up
the slack left by its failure to articulate the meaning of the right.
Justice Scalia was far closer to the mark in saying that "the Con-
frontation Clause does not guarantee reliable evidence; it guarantees
specific trial procedures that were thought to assure reliable evi-
dence., 25 2 But even this statement, with a proper emphasis on proce-
dure, overemphasizes the reliability of evidence. That a witness has
been cross-examined does not make her statement reliable: Witnesses
often speak falsely, and much of what a trial is about is the attempt to
determine when they are doing so. Moreover, that a statement is not
reliable does not mean that it cannot contribute to accurate fact-
finding. An accurate factual finding may, and often does, depend on
an accumulation of evidence, no single piece of which points infallibly
to the finding. To apply a common phrase, "a brick is not a wall,
2 53
and a brick that itself might not be characterized as reliable could
form part of a wall of evidence supporting an accurate finding.
3. Making Easy Cases Hard
Because the current approach does not proceed from a clear
sense of what the confrontation right means, it makes easy cases hard.
Consider, for example, Lilly v. Virginia.21 4 In that case, three men went
tees" standard is met. E.g., Wright, 497 U.S. at 822.
251 The current doctrine does this by asking whether the statement fits within a
"firml rooted" hearsay exception. Eg., Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 862 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting), quoted in
Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 142 (1992) (BreyerJ., concurring).
253 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999).
254 527 U.S. 116 (1999). For further commentary on Lilly, see Richard D. Fried-
man, Lilly v. Virginia: Glimmers of Hope for the Confrontation Clause?, International
Commentary on Evidence, at http://143.117.33.157/ice/index.html (July 10, 2000).
Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986), which like Lilly involved an accomplice confes-
sion and was decided by a five-to-four vote, would furnish nearly as good an illustration
of how the current doctrine makes what should appear to be a blatant violation of the
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on a crime spree during which one of them shot another young man
215
to death. One of the three, Mark Lilly, made statements to the po-
lice admitting to various crimes and identifying his brother Benjamin
as the triggerman. 5 6  Mark asserted the privilege against self-
incrimination at Benjamin's trial and so was deemed unavailable to
testify.2 57 Accordingly, the prosecution offered his prior statements
into evidence . Over the defendant's objection, the statements were
admitted. Benjamin was convicted and the Virginia Supreme Court
affirmed.25 9
Recall that in Tong's Case in 1662, the judges of King's Bench es-
tablished that a confession could be offered only against the person
who made it, not against another person who did not have a chance to
cross-examine him.2 60 Under traditional principles, therefore, it ap-
pears that this ought to have been an easy case.261 And Justice Scalia
saw the case that way. In a one-paragraph opinion, he said that use of
Mark Lilly's statement without making him available for cross-
examination constituted "a paradigmatic Confrontation Clause viola-
.,262tion.
Most of the Court, however, operated under the Roberts rubric,
and that made Lilly a rather difficult case, yielding a five-to-four deci-
sion and six separate opinions. First, the Justices had to compare the
statements at issue to the hearsay exception for statements against in-
terest. This inquiry posed two questions: Within what bounds, if any,
should the given exception be considered "firmly rooted"? Do the
particular statements at issue fit within those bounds? Justice Stevens,
for the plurality, focused on the first question and dissected the ex-
ception, concluding that "accomplices' confessions that inculpate a
criminal defendant are not within a firmly rooted exception to the
Confrontation Clause look like a hard case. And, on the other side of the coin, we be-
lieve that in other cases, e.g., United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986), the current
doctrine forces the Court to struggle with some cases that properly conceived do not
pose a genuine Confrontation Clause concern at all.
255 Lilly, 527 U.S. at 120.
256 Id. at 120-21.
257 Id. at 121.
258 Id.
259 Id. at 122.
260 Supra note 128 and accompanying text.
261 We put aside the possibility-because it is not one that the courts addressed-
that Mark asserted the privilege because of persuasion or inducement by Benjamin or
someone acting in his interests.
262 Lilly, 527 U.S. at 143 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
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hearsay rule as that concept has been defined in our Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence. ,6 3 Chief Justice Rehnquist, for himself and two
other justices, declined to make such a categorical pronouncement
but concluded that Mark's statements against his penal interest were
so far removed in time and place from the statements inculpating
Benjamin in the shooting that the latter could not be considered
within the exception for Confrontation Clause purposes. 2"" That was
not the end of the matter, however. The statements still might satisfy
the reliability requirement of Roberts if they showed sufficient "particu-
larized guarantees of trustworthiness. 2 65 After what he recognized to
be a "fact-intensive" inquiry 166-one that the Chief Justice thought was
premature 2-_Justice Stevens concluded that they did not.268 The in-
quiry was confined, however, because in accordance with the Court's
decision in Idaho v. Wright, the Court was willing to examine only in-
dicia of reliability that established the "inherent trustworthiness" of
the statements; the Court was precluded from relying on corrobora-
tive evidence, a basis that frequently offers strong guarantees of trust-
worthiness.7
Should Lilly have been so difficult? Justice Scalia's brief opinion
suggests not; indeed, its brevity suggests that both Justice Stevens and
Chief Justice Rehnquist overlooked a basic principle that should have
made the case easy. Justice Scalia did not attempt to articulate such a
principle, however. Ironically, Justice Stevens' opinion, while adher-
ing to the reliability-based orientation of the Court's confrontation
analysis and refusing to speak in categorical terms, did point in the
general direction of such a principle:
It is highly unlikely that the presumptive unreliability that attaches to ac-
complices' confessions that shift or spread blame can be effectively re-
butted when the statements are given under conditions that implicate
the core concerns of the old ex parte affidavit practice-that is, when the
government is involved in the statements' production, and when the
263 Id. at 134 (plurality opinion).
264 Id. at 145 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in the judgment).
265 Id. at 135 (plurality opinion).
266 Id. (plurality opinion).
267 Id. at 148 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
268 Id. at 137 (plurality opinion).
269 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
270 Lilly, 527 U.S. at 137-38 (plurality opinion) (citing Wright, 497 U.S. at 822). But
cf. Wright, 497 U.S. at 828 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("It is a matter of common sense
for most people that one of the best ways to determine whether what someone says is
trustworthy is to see if it is corroborated by other evidence.").
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statements describe past events and have not been subjected to adversar-
ial testing.
Justice Breyer, while joining the plurality opinion, wrote separately
to suggest that the law of the Confrontation Clause might be im-
proved by breaking its link to hearsay law and by recognizing that the
Clause was meant principally to protect "[t]he right of an accused to
meet his accusers face-to-face" rather than the trustworthiness of evi-
dence. 72 We agree, and in the next Section we will discuss how the
Confrontation Clause might be reconceptualized, and how doing so
would help solve the problem of dial-in testimony.
B. A Reconceptualized Confrontation Right: Protecting the
Conditions for Testimony
It is tempting to think that a witness is one who testifies at trial, or
at formal pre-trial proceedings, and that the Confrontation Clause is a
protection primarily drawn to govern the procedure for taking testi-
mony from such persons, with some peripheral (and necessarily un-
certain) application to out-of-court declarants.
2 3 But we think the his-
tory that we have summarized in Part III shows that the core idea
behind the Clause is to ensure that those who provide testimony
against the accused do so openly, under oath, in the presence of the
accused, subject to examination by the accused, and, if reasonably
possible, at trial. 27 ' And the language of the Clause points in the same
271 Lilly, 527 U.S. at 137 (plurality opinion).
272 Id. at 140 (Breyer, J., concurring); see id. at 142 (Breyer, J., concurring)
("[Wihy should we, like Walter Raleigh's prosecutor, deny a plea to 'let my Accuser
come face to face,' with words (now related to the penal interest exception) such as,
'The law presumes, a man will not accuse himself to accuse another'?" (citation omit-
ted)).
273 See Akhil Reed Amar, Confrontation Clause First Principles: A Reply to Professor
Friedman, 86 GEO. L.J. 1045, 1046, 1048-49 (1998) (stating that "the word 'witnesses' in
the Confrontation Clause means in-court 'witnesses' who testify rather than out-of-
court... eyewitnesses who do not," but concluding that the Clause should cover "gov-
ernment-prepared affidavits and depositions" and "[plolice station confessions and
statements").
274 We elide here questions of the type posed by Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836
(1990), whether the presence requirement can be satisfied in some circumstances,
even though the accused and the witness are in separate rooms, by a video connection.
In Craig, a bare majority of the Supreme Court held in the affirmative with respect to
those child witnesses who, case-specific findings indicate, would be traumatized by hav-
ing to testify with the accused in the same room. Id. at 860; see also infra text accompa-
nyingnote 286 (summarizing the Craig Court's holding).
If the witness is unavailable to testify at trial, testimony previously taken under
oath and subject to cross-examination may suffice. See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S.
12392002]
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direction. An accused has a right to "be confronted with" the wit-
nesses against him, meaning that they must be drawn together-pre-
sumably at trial, presumably "face to face"-for the giving of testi-
mony. The Confrontation Clause certainly is concerned with what
happens when a prosecution witness testifies at trial. But its first con-
cern is to make sure that the witness does testify, if at all, at trial or in
another forum where the confrontation right can be preserved.
Put another way, a person is not a witness for purposes of the Con-
frontation Clause because she is testifying at trial or some other formal
proceeding. Rather, she is a witness because she has made a testimo-
nial statement and therefore she must give testimony under prescribed
procedures, among which are that she must be subject to examination
by the accused; if she does not, the statement may not be used against
the accused.
Of course, this approach requires us to have a sense of what con-
stitutes a testimonial statement. Crafting a precise definition is not a
simple matter, but we believe the history and policy of the Clause yield
tolerable clarity: The Clause is meant to prevent a prosecution from
being based on testimony given behind closed doors, not under oath
or subject to examination by the accused. Imagine, then, that there
were no confrontation right. If a person made a statement with the
anticipation that it would be used in prosecuting the accused, and the
statement were so used, then the person should be deemed to be testi-
fying against the accused. That the statement was made informally,
perhaps privately and without oath or adverse examination, would not
undercut this conclusion. Rather, this hypothetical system without a
confrontation right would tolerate such informal testimony. Now,
clearly such methods of testimony are just what the Confrontation
Clause is meant to prevent. So we might say that if a person makes a
statement in circumstances under which-but for the confrontation
right-she would understand that the statement would likely be used
as evidence against the accused, the person is acting as a witness
against the accused, making a testimonial statement. But application
of that standard may be overly complex, both because of the condi-
tional ("but for" the confrontation right) and because it focuses on
the subjective state of mind of the declarant. A standard somewhat
easier to apply, but yielding similar results, would be: If a statement is
56, 73 (1980) (holding that admission at trial of testimony given at preliminary hearing
by a witness deemed unavailable at trial did not violate Confrontation Clause); cf FED.
R. EVID. 804(b) (1) (providing hearsay exception for former testimony given by wit-
nesses now unavailable).
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made in circumstances in which a reasonable person would realize that it likely
would be used in investigation or prosecution of a crime, then the statement
should be deemed testimonial Various rules of thumb can assist in appli-
cation of this standard.276
If a statement is testimonial, then the declarant is a witness for
purposes of the Confrontation Clause, and the statement must not be
offered against the accused unless the conditions for testimony have
been satisfied-among which are that the witness must have made or
confirmed the statement under oath and that the accused must have
had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine her. This is a categori-
cal rule, subject to but one qualification: If the inability of the witness
to testify under these procedures is attributable to wrongdoing by the




Let us see how this standard would apply in two recurrent types of
cases. First, consider accomplice confessions, as in Lilly. Mark Lilly's
statements to the police were certainly testimonial. A murder had
been committed, and Mark knew that the police were investigating
it.2 "7 Furthermore, his statement identified his brother as the trigger-
man.2 7 9 Clearly, a reasonable person in Mark's position would know
that he was providing information to the police that would aid investi-
gation and prosecution of the crime. Accordingly, the statement was
testimonial, and it should not have been admitted against Benjamin
Lilly unless Mark confirmed it under oath and subject to cross-
examination. The case was every bit as easy as Justice Scalia's brief
276 As one of the authors has previously suggested:
A statement made knowingly to the authorities that describes criminal activity
is almost always testimonial. A statement made by a person claiming to be the
victim of a crime and describing the crime is usually testimonial, whether
made to the authorities or not. If, in the case of a crime committed over a
short period of time, a statement is made before the crime is committed, it
almost certainly is not testimonial. A statement made by one participant in a
criminal enterprise to another, intended to further the enterprise, is not tes-
timonial. And neither is a statement made in the course of going about one's
ordinary business, made before the criminal act has occurred or with no rec-
ognition that it relates to criminal activity.
Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 1011,
104243 (1998).
277 For a discussion of the bounds of this forfeiture principle, taking the view that
it applies even when the crime being charged is the act that allegedly rendered the
witness unable to testify, see Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation and the Definition of
Chut Za, 31 ISR. L. REv. 506 (1997).
527 U.S. at 121.
279 Id.
2002]
1242 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 150:1171
concurrence made it appear. This was indeed "a paradigmatic Con-
frontation Clause violation" 2 0-without reference to whether the
statement was reliable or not.
Now consider statements made in 911 calls and to responding po-
lice officers. A reasonable person knows she is speaking to official-
dom-either police officers or agents whose regular employment calls
on them to pass information on to law enforcement, from whom it
may go to the prosecutorial authorities.28 The caller's statements may
therefore serve either or both of two primary objectives-to gain im-
mediate official assistance in ending or relieving an exigent, perhaps
dangerous, situation, and to provide information to aid investigation
and possible prosecution related to that situation. In occasional cases,
the first objective may dominate-the statement is little more than a
cry for help-and such statements may be considered nontestimonial,
at least to the extent that they are not offered to prove the truth of
what they assert. But as our discussion in Part I has shown, these
statements are often more detailed, providing significant information
that the police do not need for immediate intervention but that may
be useful to the criminal justice system. A reasonable person in the
position of the declarant would realize that such information would
likely be used in a criminal investigation or prosecution. Accordingly,
such a statement should be considered testimonial, and the confron-
tation right should apply to it.
Interestingly, the standard that this approach suggests is quite
similar to that of the excited utterance exception as it originally
emerged, and as we have described it above in Part III, but without the
metaphysical distinctions that the nineteenth century courts some-
times invoked. The more the statement narrates events, rather than
merely asking for help, the more likely it is to be considered testimo-
nial.
Thus, if any significant time has passed since the events it de-
scribes, the statement is probably testimonial. When, as is often the
case, the 911 call consists largely of a series of questions by the opera-
280 Id. at 143 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Interestingly, the new Oregon hearsay exception for statements by victims of
domestic violence seems drafted almost purposefully to facilitate admission of state-
ments that are testimonial in nature. The exception applies to a victim's description of
an incident of domestic violence, made within twenty-four hours after the incident, if it
has "sufficient indicia of reliability" and it was "recorded, either electronically or in
writing, or was made to a peace officer ... , corrections officer, youth corrections offi-
cer, parole and probation officer, emergency medical technician or firefighter." OR.
REv. STAT. § 40.460(26) (1999).
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tor, and responses by the caller, concerning not only the current inci-
dent but the history of the relationship, the caller's statements should
be considered testimonial. When OJ. Simpson called 911 to report
an assault by his girlfriend,2 his call was testimonial, not a plea for
urgent protection.
Often, of course, a 911 call is such a plea. Even in this type of
situation, a court should closely scrutinize the call. To the extent the
call itself is part of the incident being tried, the fact of the call pre-
sumably should be admitted so the prosecution can present a coher-
ent story about the incident.28 But even in that situation, the need to
present a coherent story does not necessarily justify admitting the con-
tents of the call. And even if the circumstances do warrant allowing
the prosecution to prove the contents of the call, those contents gen-
erally should not be admitted to prove the truth of what they assert.
28
If the contents of the call are probative on some ground other than to
prove the truth of the caller's report of what has happened, then ad-
missibility should be limited to such other ground. To the extent that
the contents of the call are significant only as the caller's report of
what has happened, such a report usually should be considered testi-
monial.
If the out-of-court statement is testimonial, then the declarant
should be deemed to be a witness for Confrontation Clause purposes,
and so the prosecution may not use the statement against the accused
to prove the truth of its contents unless the accused has had an ade-
quate opportunity to confront the witness. The impact of this princi-
ple is limited in some circumstances by the qualification that if the ac-
cused's wrongdoing has as a practical matter prevented the witness
from testifying subject to confrontation, then the accused should be
deemed to have forfeited the confrontation right. Thus, for example,
if the court determines as a threshold matter that the accused proba-
bly murdered the witness or intimidated her from testifying at trial,
then he presumably should not be allowed to invoke his confrontation
right to exclude proof of her out-of-court statement.
28 5 Such a finding
282 See supra note 94 (describing the call in greater detail).
283 For example, it may be that the defendant's voice is heard on the tape of the
911 call, or that the prosecution's account is that the defendant's resentment at the
making of the 911 call led him to renewed and intensified violence.
284 So, for example, if the prosecution wants to prove that the 911 tape recorded
the defendant making damaging statements in response to accusations made by the
complainant, those accusations would presumably be admissible-but only as the
predicate for the accused's statements.
285 The criteria for applying the forfeiture doctrine are further explored in Fried-
124320021
1244 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 150:1171
of forfeiture may be appropriate in a substantial number of domestic
violence cases.
C. Possible Objections
Our approach calls for a narrow but rigorous confrontation right,
qualified only by the possibility that the accused may have forfeited
the right by wrongdoing that prevented the confrontation. Against
this approach, we anticipate three types of objections. We will re-
spond briefly in turn to all three.
First, there may be an objection in principle. We have shown the
long-standing support in the Anglo-American legal system for accord-
ing the accused the right to insist that testimony against him be given
under appropriate conditions. But attachment to some of those con-
ditions may be loosening. Few commentators would be willing to as-
cribe the significance to the oath that was commonplace several hun-
dred years ago. And to some, the idea that a complaining witness
must give her testimony face to face with the accused may seem unac-
ceptable, a reflection of male hegemony that fails to take into account
the burden that such confrontation imposes on victims. Thus, in
Maryland v. Craig the Supreme Court allowed child witnesses to testify
in some circumstances outside the immediate presence of the ac-
cused."" One might expect that soon there will be significant pressure
to expand this possibility to adult victims of sexual violence.
We need not enter into a debate over these points. Even if it were
appropriate to dispose with the oath and the requirement that testi-
mony be given face to face with the accused, that would not suggest
that our system should dispose of all the traditional requirements for
testimony-in particular, cross-examination. No reasonable observer
can seriously contend that an acceptable means for a witness to give
testimony is by an informal statement, lacking the oath, face-to-face
confrontation with the accused, and cross-examination on behalf of
the accused. Yet the developing system of dial-in testimony allows
precisely that.
Second, there may be objection to the consequences of our ap-
proach. Our approach would make it more difficult for prosecutors
to secure convictions, especially in domestic violence cases. But that
difficulty is not in itself an argument against our approach. It would
also be easier to secure convictions if we did away with the right to
man, supra note 277.
M 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
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counsel, or the guilt-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, or all re-
straints on prosecution evidence. Our approach does not lead to in-
tolerable results. Indeed, our approach is no more unfavorable for
the prosecution than the law that until recently prevailed; under our
construction, the Confrontation Clause requires no more than that a
witness testify under the ordinary, traditional conditions necessary for
testimony. If the witness is available to testify at trial, the prosecution
should present her testimony rather than relying on a testimonial
statement she made previously. The risk that she will become unavail-
able through nobody's fault should be borne by the prosecution-
which bears the burden of proof and wishes to rely on her
testimony-rather than by the defendant, who has the right to
confront her. Only if she is unavailable through the fault of the
accused is there a compelling case for the prosecution to present the
prior statement, and in that case the forfeiture doctrine should
support admissibility.
Finally, an objection based on administrability is possible. Our ap-
proach depends on factual determinations to be made by the trial
court: Was the statement made under circumstances leading to the
conclusion that it should be deemed testimonial? If so, did the ac-
cused forfeit the right to confront the witness by wrongdoing that pre-
vented her from testifying? Sometimes, these determinations will be
difficult to make. But that is true of any system. The current system,
for example, depends on determinations of whether a hearsay excep-
tion is applicable, and that often depends on findings on such matters
as the declarant's state of excitement or anticipation of imminent
death-findings that not only can be remarkably difficult to make but
that bear at best an attenuated relationship to any question that
should determine admissibility."" Moreover, though there will some-
times be close cases under our approach, usually the proper result will
be quite clear, for the guiding principle is clear: The Confrontation
Clause is meant to prevent a system in which a witness can testify
against a defendant without taking an oath and submitting herself to
examination by the person she has accused.
287 In addition, the current system, like ours, sometimes makes questions of forfei-
ture significant. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b) (6) (excluding from the hearsay rule, if the
declarant is unavailable as a witness, any "statement offered against a party that has en-
gaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the un-
availability of the declarant as a witness").
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D. Related Theories
The theory that we have presented here is close in some respects
to theories that have been presented by justice Thomas and by Profes-
sors Akhil Amar and Margaret Berger, but it also differs in critical re-
spects. In Justice Thomas's view, "the Confrontation Clause is impli-
cated by extrajudicial statements only insofar as they are contained in
formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior
testimony, or confessions."288 Professor Amar takes a very similar view,
though he puts somewhat less emphasis on formalization and more
on the governmental role in preparation of the statement. According
to him, "the Clause encompasses only those 'witnesses' who testify ei-
ther by taking the stand in person or via government-prepared affida-
vits, depositions, videotapes, and the like."2 89  Similarly, Professor
Berger makes government participation in the preparation of the
2901statement the hallmark of her analysis. We will contend here that, if
a statement is testimonial in the sense we have described, it should be
covered by the Confrontation Clause, whether or not it is formalized
and whether or not the government participated in making it.
The trouble with making formalization a prerequisite to coverage
by the Confrontation Clause is that it gets matters almost precisely
288 White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment); see also Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 143 (1999) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (reiterating his view that the Con-
frontation Clause should only be implicated by extrajudicial statements if such state-
ments are contained in extrajudicial materials, but clarifying that he does not believe
the Clause imposes "a 'blanket ban on the government's use of accomplice statements
that incriminate a defendant"' (citation omitted)).
289 Amar, supra note 273, at 1045.
290 See Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation Clause: A
Proposal for a Prosecutorial Restraint Model 76 MINN. L. REv. 557, 561 (1992) ("Hearsay
statements procured by agents of the prosecution or police should therefore stand on
a different footing than hearsay created without government intrusion."). Like Amar
and ourselves, Berger would make the proscription of the Clause a categorical, bright-
line rule. See Brief of Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union et al., Lilly v. Vir-
ginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999) (No. 98-5881) (arguing that "[w]ithin its proper realm....
the Confrontation Clause states a simple and categorical rule, which is central to the
Anglo-American conception ofjustice: the accused has a right to confront all adverse
witnesses"), available at LEXIS 1998 U.S. Briefs 5881, at *2. By contrast, it appears from
Justice Thomas' opinion in White that he would hold that, even if a statement fits
within the scope of the Confrontation Clause, it is exempted from the proscription of
the Clause if it also fits a "firmly-rooted" hearsay exception. See White, 502 U.S. at 358-
66 (Thomas, J. concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (concurring in the
Court's opinion-which applied the doctrine exempting from the Clause statements
fitting within a "firmly rooted" exception-except for its discussion rejecting a pro-
posed narrow reading of the term "witness against").
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backwards. Formalities such as the oath are not necessary to render a
statement testimonial. Rather, they are necessary, but not sufficient,
to render testimony acceptable. Imagine a judicial system that adver-
tised to the public as follows:
If you want to make a criminal accusation against a person, make the
statement however you wish and present it to us in a way that we can pass
it on to the fact-finder. If you want, you can make it in person to the
fact-finder, but you don't have to. You can make it on audio or video
tape, you can make it in writing (no need for a signature), you can make
it by telephone (we've set up a special number, 911, for just that pur-
pose), or you can make it to any person you want, with the request that
he or she pass it on to us. And you don't have to take an oath. In fact, if29 1
you want to do the whole thing anonymously, that's OK, too. We can
use the statement at trial however you make it.
Given such a receptive attitude, a person who made a statement
for the police describing a crime, perhaps by calling 911, would be tes-
tifying in any meaningful sense of the term: The person is making a
statement with the understanding that, in accordance with the usual
procedures of the criminal justice system, it will probably be used as
proof against the accused in a criminal trial. The lack of formality
would not make the statement less testimonial. Instead, the lack of
formal requirements would make this system for the creation of testi-
mony appalling.
Indeed, if formality were necessary to bring a statement within the
Confrontation Clause, perverse incentives would arise. The govern-
ment, or others interested in the creation of prosecution evidence,
would have an incentive to encourage the making of statements-
such as 911 calls-lacking formalities such as the oath, because the
avoidance of such formalities would ensure that the statement would
not be covered by the Confrontation Clause.
A rule that the Confrontation Clause does not cover a statement
unless the statement is formalized breaks down most obviously with
respect to confessions. It is obvious that accomplice confessions-
such as those in the Raleigh, Tong, and Lilly cases, among many
others-must be covered by the Confrontation Clause; it is practically
a commonplace that the Raleigh case was one of the principal targets
at which the Clause was aimed. Only by simple fiat did Justice Thomas
bring confessions within the ambit of the Clause as he would define it;
29 But see Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 131-32 (1968) (holding that the right to
confront a prosecution witness includes the right to ask the witness's name and ad-
dress).
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that is, he declared that confessions were among the "formalized tes-
timonial materials" covered by the Clause. But why is a confession a
formal statement? As in Lilly, it can be made quite informally. This
may be why Amar admits to some difficulty in fitting confessions into
his theory. He regards out-of-court confessions as a hard case,292 a
conclusion that does not square well with the clear evidence that, as
Justice Scalia has said, accomplice confessions are a "paradigmatic"
concern underlying the Confrontation Clause.9
In the end, Amar brings "[p]olice station confessions and state-
ments" within his theory of the Confrontation Clause, presumably
within the rather vague "and the like" safety valve of his standard. His
inclusion of the mysterious "and the like" among the statements cov-
ered by the theory seems to reflect recognition that if an accomplice
confession fits within the Clause there is presumably no reason why an
equally accusatory statement, made under similar circumstances but
not inculpating the declarant along with the accused, should not also
be covered by the Clause.
Amar's principal reason for bringing declarations made in the po-
lice station within the Clause is that they "are prepared by the govern-
ment for in-court use and are then used in court. 29 4 There is no doubt
that, in modem criminal procedure, the government is usually in-
volved in the taking or preparation of a testimonial statement by a
witness for the prosecution. After all, the paradigm for acceptable tes-
timony is live testimony of the witness at trial in response to questions
from the prosecution and then cross-examination by the accused.
And the prospect of the government taking or preparing testimony
without affording the accused confrontation rights may be particularly
disturbing. But this does not mean that government involvement is
necessary to render a statement testimonial.
Indeed, such a theory is profoundly ahistorical. Even as late as the
eighteenth century, most prosecutions were private lawsuits,' 95 and yet
292 Amar, supra note 273, at 1048-49. Amar acknowledges that "[p]olice station
confessions and statements... are often made without oath," but argues that "they
typically have other formal indicia of testimony-response to precise questions, pur-
portedly precise rendition or transcription or taping, signature, and the like." Id. at
1049.
293 Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 143 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
294 Amar, supra note 273, at 1049.
2q5 As the distinguished historian J.M. Beattie has written:
Until the state assumed the management of crime in the nineteenth century
and professional police forces took over the pursuit and apprehension of sus-
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the norm of the "altercation" between accuser and accused, described
2916
by Thomas Smith in the sixteenth century, was established long be-
fore. The right of the accused to confront his accusers does not lose
force in a system in which an accuser rather than the State is the ad-
verse party. Recall the insistence of the Roman governor Festus that
the accused have an opportunity to confront his accusers face to
face.27
Even in a system of governmental prosecutions, government in-
volvement in the preparation of a statement cannot reasonably be re-
garded as a prerequisite for the statement to fall within the coverage
of the Confrontation Clause. Suppose that, entirely unbidden, Ac-
cuser walks into the police station and delivers a handwritten state-
ment-printed on a transparency, no less, so that it is ready for pres-
entation to a jury-accusing Defendant of a crime, and then saunters
off. We do not believe that one can seriously contend that the Con-
frontation Clause has nothing to say about the use of this statement in
pects, the gathering of evidence, and the preparation of cases .. . these mat-
ters were left largely to the private initiative of the victim. If he wanted to
bring an offender to justice in the eighteenth century, the victim himself (or
his agent) had to take on the burden and the expense of the prosecution, not
only bringing the offense to the attention of the authorities but also preparing
himself unaided for the trial, assembling witnesses, and taking the lead in lay-
ing out the evidence in court. Only in rare cases did the law officers of the
crown or local constables actively prosecute offenses against property or the
person. It was becoming more common in the eighteenth century for prose-
cutors to hire counsel to take the lead in court, but this did not alter the fun-
damental point that virtually all prosecutions in cases involving personal vio-
lence or the loss of property were still initiated and carried forward by the
enterprise and at the expense of the victim.
J.M. BEATrIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND, 1660-1800, at 35-36 (1986); see also,
e.g., LANGBEIN, supra note 119, at 39 ("In the sixteenth century ordinary crime was lo-
cally, and in the main privately, prosecuted .... Typically [the magistrate operating
under bail and commitment statutes passed in Queen Mary's reign] could limit himself
to binding over aggrieved citizens to prosecute in their own causes."); Jonakait, supra
note 132, at 97-99 (describing the medieval English worldview of crime as a matter of
private vengeance by those wronged).
29 6 See supra note 112 and accompanying text (noting the open and confronta-
tional manner in which testimony was taken in the English system).
297 See supra note 110 and accompanying text (recounting a statement by Festus in
the Book of Acts). But see Amar, supra note 273, at 1048 ("The Sixth Amendment is
triggered when Carl [the defendant in a hypothetical posed by Amar] is 'accused' by
the state, not by Abner [the person who has made an accusatory statement]."). Of
course, Amar is right that the Sixth Amendment is not triggered until an accusation is
tried; the Confrontation Clause does not give a person a right to confront one who has
accused him of a crime if no charges are brought. But if a charge is tried, the accused
has a right to confront the accusing witnesses, whatever the identity of the prosecuting
party may be.
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a prosecution of Defendant because government agents were not in-
volved in its production (or, for that matter, because it is not "formal-
ized").
Perhaps a fallback argument would be that for the statement to be
considered witnessing, it is necessary not that the government have
been involved in the preparation of the statement, but that the de-
clarant have been speaking directly to or through government agents.
That does not help us very much, however. Suppose Accuser, rather
than writing out the accusation by hand, dictates it to Scribe, with
clear and explicit instructions to take the statement to the police for
possible use in a prosecution of Defendant. If the criminal justice sys-
tem in fact allows a statement produced in this manner to be used
against Defendant, then wasn't Accuser testifying long distance,
through Scribe? And now suppose that, although Accuser did not
give such instructions to Scribe, Scribe conducts a regular course of
operations in which she transmits such accusatory statements to the
police, and people in the position of Accuser understand that this is
what she does. If the system allows the use of evidence produced in
this way, then it still seems clear that Accuser is testifying through
Scribe.
And that, of course, is in substance often what happens with 911
calls. In some areas, the 911 system is operated by a governmental
agency, and in others it is operated by the regional telephone com-
pany or some other private organization."" But it would be absurd for
these mechanics of operation-which the caller is unlikely to know-
to determine the Confrontation Clause standing of the statement.
The significant fact is that a 911 caller knows that, even if she is not con-
nected to the police, her message will be transmitted to the police.
29
Perhaps one contending that the critical fact is governmental in-
298 One article explains:
Far from a nationwide standard, no single agency either controls or coordi-
nates America's 911 system. In some areas, regional telephone companies
own the 911 answering centers and operate them under contract to local gov-
ernments. Other 911 systems, while operated by governments, are actually
"owned" by different entities in different jurisdictions. Sometimes the fire
department operates 911, while in the next town down the road, it's the po-
lice, or sheriffs department, or a private provider.
Y2K and the 911 System, ABOUT.COM, at http://usgovinfo.about.com/library/weekly/
aa091999.htm (Mar. 19, 1999).
Similarly, we think it would be odd if a 911 call were deemed outside the scope
of the Confrontation Clause because the operator was not an agent of the state, and
yet a statement made by the same declarant to the police officer responding to the 911
call were deemed covered by the Clause.
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volvement would respond that, even if a private organization owns and
operates the 911 system, it does so under contract with governmental
agencies, and so the 911 operators should be considered governmen-
tal agents for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. This argument
relies heavily on but stretches the concept of agency. We doubt that a
private 911 operator would indeed be considered a government agent
rather than an independent contractor, but the whole question seems
irrelevant to the applicability of the Confrontation Clause.
Moreover, a government-agent theory would not be able to han-
dle all similar cases. Suppose a rape counselor, with no ties to the
government at all, advises her clients, "Make your accusatory state-
ments to me, and I will pass them on to the authorities, who will then
be able to use them in prosecuting your assailant. There will be no
need for you to come to court or to take an oath. '0° Amar's only re-
sponse to this argument is that "the Constitution is mainly addressed
to state action. 30 1 That is true, but irrelevant. Even assuming the Con-
frontation Clause requires state action, the criterion is easily satisfied.
The Clause is not violated when the counselor takes the statement, or
even when she passes it on to the authorities, but only when a court
operated by the state admits it into evidence in support of a prosecu-
tion of the accused.
It certainly tends to be easier to recognize the testimonial charac-
ter of a statement when the statement is made directly to, or with the
participation of, government officials. In such a case, it is often clear
that a reasonable person in the position of the declarant would realize
that she is creating testimony for use in a prosecution; there are no
doubtful links in the chain of transmission. But such statements do
not exhaust the universe of statements that pose the problem to which
the Confrontation Clause was addressed. That problem arises in full
force if a person testifies through intermediaries, never taking an oath
or confirming her statement face to face with the accused. How in-
termediaries may be characterized-whether they be deemed agents
of the state, of the witness, of both, or of neither-does not matter.
The critical question is whether a reasonable person in the position of
the declarant would recognize a likelihood that the statement would
be passed on to the authorities and then used to assist a criminal
prosecution. If a realistic assessment of the situation yields an affirma-
300 For a somewhat more elaborate version of this hypothetical, see Friedman, su-
pra note 276, at 1041.
301 Amar, supra note 273, at 1048.
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tive answer, then the statement should be deemed testimonial, and
the declarant should be treated as a witness for purposes of the Con-
frontation Clause.
Ultimately, although our approach and approaches like that of
Amar yield similar results in most cases, they proceed from very differ-
ent points. Amar tries to develop an understanding of the word "wit-
nesses" by beginning at the core meaning of the term in common
modem parlance and then extending it somewhat outwards. We be-
lieve the best way of approaching the Confrontation Clause is to con-
strue it to ensure the result at which it was aimed, that prosecution tes-
timony be given in formal proceedings, subject to the oath and
confrontation by the accused. If a statement is testimonial in function
but fails to meet those criteria, those failures do not mean that the
statement falls outside the reach of the Confrontation Clause because
the statement does not fit the core meaning of testimony. On the
contrary, those failures mean that the statement is presumptively un-
acceptable under the Clause because otherwise our system would
countenance testimony given in an intolerable way.
CONCLUSION
We believe that the problem of dial-in testimony represents a cru-
cial turning point for our criminal justice system. The Supreme Court
may decide that statements made in 911 calls and to responding offi-
cers may be used in place of in-court testimony. But if it does, it will
forswear one of the foundational pillars of the common law system,
the principle that accusatory witnesses testify under oath and subject
to cross-examination, face to face with the accused. On the other
hand, the Court may refuse to accept such statements as a proper
302 See id. at 1046 ("Consider first the ordinary, everyday, common-sense under-
standing of the word 'witness': someone who testifies in the courtroom."). Amar also
makes an ultimately unsuccessful effort to devise a common meaning of the word "wit-
ness" wherever it appears in the Constitution. See id. at 1049 n.15 ("Even if a police
station statement were viewed as 'witnessing' for Treason Clause purposes, the state-
ment still might not qualify under that Clause, because it was not given under oath and
arguably was not, strictly speaking, 'testimony' within the meaning of the Clause.").
Suppose that in response to a demand under the Sixth Amendment's Compulsory
Process Clause, which grants the accused "the right.., to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor," the State responded, "OK, give us the names of your
witnesses, and we'll compel them to come to the police station and answer our ques-
tions. You can then introduce their responses at trial." Under Amar's theory, it would
appear, this should suffice: A statement in a police station in response to police ques-
tioning is witnessing, and so the State has compelled the production of witnesses in the
defendant's favor. But this result seems patently absurd.
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method for a witness to present her account to an adjudicative fact-
finder. We believe the Court should take the latter course. The rea-
sons for doing so will become clearer if the Court abandons the cur-
rent jurisprudence of the Confrontation Clause, which makes the
Clause depend on the vagaries of hearsay law. Instead, the Court
should treat the Clause as capable of standing on its own, stating a
fundamental principle of how acceptable testimony shall be given.
* * * * * *
